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ABSTRACT 
DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL FOR A MULTIPLICITY OF PUBLIC SPACES:  
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MEDIA-HOSTED DISCUSSION BOARDS 
 
FEBRUARY 2015 
 
BRYAN MATHEW BALDWIN, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
M.A., EMERSON COLLEGE 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Jarice Hanson 
 
 
Since their inception, online discussion boards have intrinsically appealed to 
proponents of deliberative democracy, and those appended to Web-based news sources 
have been recognized as possessing the potential – whether realized yet or not – to 
engender meaningful discussions by engaged citizens on a range of public issues.  In 
contrast, ardent critics of such forums contend they are merely raucous and unstructured 
repositories of expressions reflecting the darker side of human nature (e.g. incivility, 
vulgarity, ad hominem attacks, racism, homophobia, etc.).   
This study assessed the deliberative quality of online postings made over a two-
month period and affiliated with four popular news sites.  The researcher administered an 
a priori content analysis scheme designed to gauge four key component measurements of 
a comment’s deliberative quality (civility, politeness, justification and complexity) while 
also coding categorical information pertaining to the modality and constitution of 
precipitating news content.  The findings revealed statistically significant differences in 
the overall deliberative quality of comments, as well as a wide range of differences 
within each of the component measures, across the four platforms.  A broader matrix of 
comparisons (utilizing each of the categorical variables to group data accordingly) are 
	  viii 
presented in alignment with five overarching research questions. 
From the study emerges the need to embrace a different premise altogether when 
considering the efficacy of online discussion boards: to better understand whether or not 
this contemporary communicative construct is thriving or withering, it is first necessary 
to recognize that a multiplicity of online spaces exist, each theoretically serving different 
typologies of publics.  Only after doing so does the researcher endeavor to offer an array 
of tailored reforms to better calibrate the expectations for participant engagement and 
information dissemination and synthesis. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview: A New Invitation to Construct Meaning 
The coupling of Web-based news outlets and online discussion boards has grown 
increasingly commonplace.  Among the traditional media outlets, including those as 
seemingly mainstream as The New York Times, National Public Radio and CBS News, 
technologies allowing readers, listeners and viewers to comment easily on what they have 
read, heard or seen have been integrated just as readily as within the domains of upstart 
blogosphere journalists, podcasters and YouTube mavens.  Though there may be 
uncertainty as to whether demand for this technology has driven its deployment or its 
deployment has driven demand (for discussions of technological determinism see, for 
example, Postman, 1993), its increasingly ubiquitous presence and popularity are clear.  
According to the Pew Internet and American Life Project, consumers of online news are 
highly participatory and 37% of adults (and 51% of adults between the ages of 18 and 29) 
surveyed cited the “ability to comment” as one of the most popular features of Web-
based news outlets (Purcell, 2010).  At the same time, and even on some of the most 
traditional online news sites (such as WSJ.com, the online presence of The Wall Street 
Journal), articles written by bona fide journalists occupy the same level of prominence as 
user comments within much of the hypertextual frame.  
Though much has been written about the Internet’s broader implications on 
subjects ranging from the intrinsic opportunities for greater democratization of news 
reporting (see, for example, Papacharissi, 2002) to the inherent dangers for healthy 
citizenship affiliated with users’ newfound abilities to tailor news content and curtail a 
	  	  
	  
2 
diversity of perspectives (see, for example, Sunstein, 2001; Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 
1997), such questions all begin with a shared – and enduring – assumption: the journalist 
is still the primary distiller of facts, information and analyses into news content that is 
then transmitted to and digested by an audience.  Though the nearly universal 
accessibility of the Internet (at least in an American context) and the growing availability 
of news broadcasting tools have certainly widened the field of entry considerably for new 
journalists, their introduction and rise did not immediately transform the role of the 
journalist itself.  Whether a foreign correspondent for The Washington Post, a blogger for 
The Drudge Report, or the host of an RSS-fed podcast, journalists as recently as a decade 
ago still operated clearly as elites (or insiders) and the public was still very much, to use 
Lippman’s (1927) term, a “phantom” in that “the citizen gives little of his time to public 
affairs, has only a casual interest in facts and a poor understanding of theory” (Lippman, 
1927, p. 25).   
Commenting features and easy-to-use discussion interfaces are important 
technological developments to be sure, but far more important is what their marriage to 
traditional news outlets symbolizes: an implied invitation to the public to not only join a 
discussion but to participate in the synthesis of information and contribute in an open 
forum in which meaning may be considered, deconstructed and reconstituted over and 
over again.  Within such a construct, the determination of the meaning of news content 
no longer resides exclusively, or concludes with, the journalist.  Rather, the journalist can 
be seen as now playing a very different role: he/she germinates or furthers a conversation 
by offering an initial news report; the conversation is catalyzed by the explicit or implicit 
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invitation for members of the audience to discuss; and the journalist is then nearly always 
absent from the direct proceedings of said discussion. 
As its central premise, this dissertation recognizes this change to be radically 
upsetting to the traditional norms of interaction and engagement (or lack thereof) that 
have long existed between the purveyors of news and audiences.  A shift so seismic is 
worthy of deeper investigation in its own right, but it is the staggering speed with which 
this change occurred within the culture that makes such an exploration particularly 
intriguing.  With so little time for adjustment, both progressive news outlets and forward-
thinking participants alike struggle with how to best engender an appreciation for these 
forums as virtual agoras and not the cyberspace equivalent of the bathroom stall (see, for 
example, Goldberg, 2010; Perez-Pena, 2010; and Messmer, 2009). 
As a secondary premise, this study readily acknowledges the enduring agenda-
setting capabilities of news organizations (Iyengar & McGuire, 1993; McCombs & Shaw, 
1972).  Beginning with Lippman’s (1922) initial conclusion that the public responds not 
to actual events but to the “pictures in our heads” (p. 4) created largely by the reporting of 
the press, and steadily advancing through sophisticated explorations in contemporary 
political psychology illustrating the inherent powers of the elite to shape public opinion 
(see, for example, Zaller, 1992), the agenda-setting function is highly relevant to the 
current inquiry. Even during a time of considerable evolution and upheaval in how a 
burgeoning media connects with a diversity of audiences, Cohen’s (1963) words still ring 
true: the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, 
but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (p. 13).
 Ultimately, this work seeks not only to better understand the various forces at play 
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within this expansive and often cacophonous discursive space, but also to apply the 
analytical findings to a program of practical reforms and an articulation of reasonable 
best practices.  And while vibrant public spaces may take any number of forms – 
Habermas’ (1989) rational-critical model, Hauser and Grim’s (2004) rhetorical 
democracies, Mouffe’s (2000) agonistic confrontations, and Schudson’s (2011) 
monitorial citizenries are but a few – all stem from the shared tradition of civic virtue 
perhaps best captured by Arendt’s (1958) notion of vita activa, in that the self is 
secondary to the public realm and one’s merit is established by public conduct (Hauser, 
1999).  Absent a deeper and more pragmatic understanding of how new technologies do 
or do not possess the inherent capacity to energize such domains and excite healthy civic 
discourse, any proposed strategies to leverage or redefine the ways in which journalists 
serve the public – and of how the public serves journalists – would be premature.  These 
spaces may hold the democratic potential to emerge and potentially flourish as bona fide 
publics, but before making any assessment it is first necessary to gauge how much of the 
exertion of discursive energy is merely about (at best) talking in circles or (at worst) what 
one former online ombudsman labeled “the digital equivalent of the loudest drunk in the 
bar” (Shepard, 2011). 
  
Political News: A Key Ingredient of Democratic Vitality 
 While there is an ongoing and highly-charged debate over the efficacy (see, for 
example, Capella & Jamieson, 1997; Jamieson, 1993; Page & Shapiro, 1992) and 
political-economy (Bagdikian, 2004; McChesney, 1999) of contemporary news 
organizations, a well-functioning press is generally understood to be a necessary 
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ingredient to any political environment in which democratic values and robust debate 
flourish.  Few critics would be given pause, for example, with a reminder of Winston 
Churchill’s famous wartime pronouncement: 
A free press is the unsleeping guardian of every other right that free men prize; it 
is the most dangerous foe of tyranny… Under dictatorship the press is bound to 
languish, and the loudspeaker and the film to become more important.  But where 
free institutions are indigenous to the soil and men have the habit of liberty, the 
press will continue to be the Fourth Estate, the vigilant guardian of the rights of 
the ordinary citizen (Ingelhart, 1998, p. 188). 
 
Political information concerning the affairs of state and the nerves of government is 
synthesized and channeled through the media, thus introducing a powerful check-and-
balance against the excesses of power.  For James Madison, this dynamic was so essential 
that it functioned as, in effect, the cornerstone of the (then) radical new experiment in 
popular sovereignty: 
Nothing could be more irrational than to give the people power, and to withhold 
from them information without which power is abused.  A people who mean to be 
their own governors must arm themselves with power which knowledge gives.  A 
popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is 
but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both (Madison, 1900, p. 143). 
 
 Though the value of political information vis-à-vis democratic institutions may be 
accepted as a truism, there are sharp divisions in the understanding of the means by 
which such information is transformed into political knowledge, let alone the extent to 
which that knowledge sparks critical discussions, excites civic activity or informs 
political decision-making.  For purposes of this study, two particular scholarly traditions 
are of interest: the mastery of political facts as a measure of political sophistication; and 
political cognition through the use of schema and heuristic cues.  Though no single 
explanation comes close to explaining fully the discursive dynamics at work within 
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online discussion spaces, an understanding of each provides an effective orientation for 
beginning to conceptualize the analysis. 
Political Literacy 
 Research placing an emphasis on the importance of the public’s familiarity with 
political facts (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Luskin, 1987; Neuman, 1986) begins with 
the assessment that the American political system is constituted by an amalgamation of 
disparate and even inconsistent normative values.  As such, the ability of citizens to 
participate within such a system requires a relatively mature sense of political literacy.  
For those with a high degree of political literacy, the system functions quite well; for 
those without, the system can quickly become practically impenetrable and conceptually 
less democratic.  Ultimately, varying levels of political knowledge contribute to a 
stratified and, potentially, reinforcing power structure.  In their seminal work, What 
Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1997) 
concluded that Americans know comparatively far less about how their political system 
functions than do the citizens of nearly all other industrialized nations, and citizens who 
are most informed about one topic tend to be most informed about all topics.  They go on 
to argue that the distribution of political knowledge is an issue of power and not one of 
choice: better informed citizens are more likely to participate, discern their own self-
interest, have stable opinions, and connect their opinions to political developments.  
Citizens need to be more engaged in politics, but the reasons for paying attention need to 
be clearer to them, the benefits of stronger citizenship must be more evident, and the 
opportunities to learn about politics should become more frequent, timely and equitable. 
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While numerous studies over an extended period of time offer evidence 
supporting the broader claim that Americans’ political literacy is dangerously low (see, 
for example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954; Converse, 1964; Entman, 1989; 
Converse, 2000), Delli Carpini and Keeter further conclude that levels have remained 
ostensibly constant over the past five decades.  An explosion of new communications 
channels shrinking the chasm between those who govern and the governed (see, for 
example, Grossman, 1995; Abramson, Arterton & Orren, 1988) has done remarkably 
little to improve political literacy.  At the same time and equally surprising, the waning of 
print-based news, with its natural bias for prioritizing the objective, rational use of the 
mind (Ong, 1982), and the rise of more televisual forms, which catalyze emotional 
responses (Hart, 1994) and reinforce entertainment as a supra-ideology (Postman, 2005), 
has hardly been to its detriment.  Not only have levels of political literacy remained 
virtually unchanged but, as Page and Shapiro (1992) detail in their study of a nearly 
identical time period, Americans’ collective policy preferences have been shown to be 
generally stable and, when they do change, they typically change in understandable and 
predictable ways. 
Political Cognition 
An emphasis on political facts necessarily privileges the idea that citizens are 
rational beings for whom the quality of their political decisions is based upon the clarity 
and the completeness of information.  For Lippman (1922) and others, it is a false ideal to 
conceive of a public that is capable of managing its own affairs in this way, and it is folly 
to suggest the average citizen is “omnicompetent” (p. 21) in the manner necessary to 
flourish.  The public, according to Lippman, does not express its opinion so much as 
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align itself against a set of choices that are proffered by governing or controlling elites.  
This “bewildered public” (p. 21) consists merely of spectators of political action who can, 
at best, confine their interests in the public to those things of great interest in a moment of 
crisis.  This dim – or at minimum, sobering – view of citizenship was echoed by Downs 
(1957) in An Economic Theory of Democracy.  Writing more than 30 years after 
Lippman, Downs (1957) concluded that rationally behaving citizens have little incentive 
to gather information before making political choices (or even choosing to make political 
choices at all) and struggled with the fact that citizens would ever turn out in large 
numbers to vote – and yet, to varying degrees, they generally do. 
Concurrent advances in cognitive psychology (see, for example, Bartlett, 1932; 
Piaget, 1952) may partially explain how it is that citizens with deficient levels of political 
literacy and few incentives to pay closer attention can continue to be both grounded in a 
stable set of political values and adaptive to an increasingly complex universe of 
information.  Building on Kant’s (2003/1781) original notion of schema as an 
imaginative construct for linking non-empirical concepts to mental images of objects that 
had been experienced empirically, the cognitive literature brings to light the possibility of 
shortcuts employed by humans as they wade through a bevvy of observations.  Within 
such a framework, the importance of political news is not so much connected to fueling 
one’s supply of political information as it is to expanding the depth and range of political 
cognition and civic learning. 
Understood from this perspective, and as noted by Graber (2001), the core 
features of political knowledge are not the facts they contain but the implications they 
hold for decision-making and action.  She insists that citizens marshal an array of 
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inherent heuristic devices to pay attention to what they need and concludes, “When it 
comes to functionally useful knowledge, average citizens are moderately well informed” 
(p. 45).  In his discussion of presidential campaigns, Popkin (1994) details the ways in 
which citizens employ low-information rationality to make reasonable, from-the-gut 
choices.  Like Graber, he concludes that evaluating the health of the citizenry based 
solely on factual knowledge is both misleading and failing to address the deeper concerns 
of citizenship.  Citizens are quite capable of relying upon and subconsciously tapping into 
any number of “cognitive holding spaces” to simplify assumptions, evaluate information, 
and make reasonable decisions.  Key (1966) offers perhaps the most blunt description of 
reasons for optimism vis-à-vis the ability of citizens to process political information: 
[My] perverse and unorthodox argument… is that voters are not fools.  To be 
sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed, yet by and large the 
electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given 
the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information 
available to it.  In American presidential campaigns of recent decades the portrait 
of the American electorate that develops from the data is not one of an electorate 
straitjacketed by social determinists or moved by subconscious urges triggered by 
devilishly skillful propagandists.  It is rather one of an electorate moved by 
concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental 
performance, and of executive personality (p. 7). 
 
 Beyond the domain of individualized decision-making, the use of cognitive 
shortcuts also helps to explain many of the dynamics of group political behavior and 
begin to reveal how it is that ordinarily disinterested citizens can suddenly find 
themselves interested in collective activities.  As Gamson (1992) argues, most citizens 
condition political knowledge through their own experiences, memories and reflections.  
As such, they possess a “latent political consciousness” (p. 20) that can be elicited by any 
number of collective action frames.  Integral to the definition of collective action frames 
are the components of injustice (moral indignation expressed in the form of political 
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awakening), agency (awareness that is possible to alter conditions or policies through 
collective action), and identity (the process of defining a sense of belonging, typically in 
contrast to a sense of other).  As this study is fundamentally concerned with the 
discussions existing within online forums – as opposed to one-off pronouncements or 
discursive hit-and-runs – an understanding of such dynamics is highly relevant.   
 
Purpose and Nature of the Study 
According to national trend data collected by the Pew Internet and American Life 
Project, a significant number of American adult Internet-users report they have posted 
comments on online news sites and the participation rate has risen significantly – 18% in 
February 2006, 22% in December 2007, 27% in September 2009, and 32% in September 
2010 (the last time such data were collected) (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 
2012).  This growth may be interpreted as somewhat understated given that the size of the 
American adult population of Internet-users has also risen steadily over the same period.  
Across the broader landscape of similarly functioning communicative technologies, the 
upward trajectory is as clear as it is consistent: Nielsen/McKinsey reports that the 
worldwide number of blogs has risen from 36 million to 173 million from October 2006 
to October 2011 (NielsenWire, 2012); 51% of Americans had a Facebook account in 
2011 versus 8% in 2008 (Webster, 2011); and the number of Americans using Twitter on 
a typical day quadrupled between November 2010 and February 2012 (Pew Internet and 
American Life Project, 2012a).  The inescapable conclusion is that, more than ever and at 
an expanding rate, users are publicly recording their thoughts and opinions, creating 
content, and contributing effort to enlarge the universe of discourse.  It remains to be seen 
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if such users are behaving as a simple amalgamation of an increasingly noisy and 
disconnected audience or whether they might possibly be crossing a different threshold – 
that of conscious and participating citizens who, perhaps each in their own way, readily 
or accidentally embrace a mode of vita activa. 
 While dozens of recent studies within the field of political communications have 
assessed the implications this explosion of traffic has had on any number of important 
civic dynamics (see, for example, Himelboim, 2011; Bennett, Wells & Freelon, 2011; 
and Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), very few have attempted the additional fete of gauging 
levels of discursive quality within such spaces.  Too much attention in the past has been 
paid to the volume of content created, be it measured by force of strength or sheer 
numbers.  The result has been an overemphasis on the two extremes of the cyber-
optimism/cyber-pessimism continuum: either the surge in voluntary expression on 
matters of public interest is seen as a boon for the democratic spirit (see, for example, 
Anderson & Cornfield, 2003), or the rapid expansion in noise lessens the ability for 
citizens to resolve political differences through such a mode of discussion (see, for 
example, Sparks, 2000).   
It must be noted that the choice to focus on the quality of discourse is made 
primarily to gauge a flavor of the overall civic-mindedness of discussants and to reveal, if 
possible, some of the more generalizable characteristics of groups populating each online 
discussion board.  Doing so allows for a consistent and fair exploration of differences 
between the various groups, anchors the research trajectory to a rich literature pertaining 
to civic discourse and deliberation (see Chapter 2), and allows for the construction and 
administration of a comprehensive content analysis coding scheme (in this case, centered 
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around four unique measures of discursive quality – civility, politeness, complexity and 
justification; see Chapter 3).  This approach also carries with it, however, an inherent 
challenge and limitation that must be identified at the outset: the methodology employed 
corresponds to but a single understanding of quality, one influenced significantly by the 
underlying theories and virtues of deliberative democracy.  The narrowness of this 
approach notwithstanding, examining a large sample of public discourse through a 
common lens is useful for determining if, at least based upon one set of grounded 
measures, there are significant differences present across the broader population.    
What may make this study unique is that, as it assesses the quality of public 
discourse with an eye towards civic-mindedness, it is also attempting to determine 
whether or not different kinds of online news content – understood in this investigation as 
the unique starting material for each of the online discussions considered – may have an 
impact on the quality of discourse that follows.  Here, too, the methodology employed is 
attempting to unweave the densely woven tapestry of online discussions into some of its 
component threads.  The chosen grouping categories are intended to be neither 
exhaustive nor arbitrary, but simply reflective of some commonsensical distinctions 
between one packet of news content and another.  There are any number of 
differentiating choices that could have been made to explore differences and, given the 
exploratory nature of the study, the researcher deliberately focused on but two of the 
more obvious ones: categories describing the news channel; and categories describing the 
overarching focus of the news content itself.   
The news channel dimension is of inherent interest because it describes, in 
essence, the technological mode (in this case, either print or audiovisual) through which 
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news content traverses to reach audiences.  In addition, as this study focuses on the 
relatively new deliberative space of online discussion boards (one made possible by the 
advent of the Internet), it is compelling to distinguish between news channels that are 
native to the Internet Age and those that arrived in the pre-Internet era.  It is conceivable 
that the very agency of a news organization may be understood quite differently by those 
born in cyberspace and in a time of ubiquitous social media than those that were not (see, 
for example, Braun & Gillespie, 2011).   
With respect to the dimension of news content, numerous critics have tended to 
categorize political news as being about either the workings of democratic processes or 
tactics and gamesmanship (see, for example, Patterson, 1993).  This study embraces the 
spirit of the existing lineage of scholarship while also, perhaps, streamlining and tailoring 
its underlying distinction for purpose of easier measurement; political news content is 
characterized as being either primarily focused on a mode of governing or a mode of 
campaigning.  Additionally, each segment of news content considered by this study is 
labeled as being principally concentrated around domestic political topics (meaning 
germane to the United States) or those predominantly relevant to international affairs.  
Much has been made of the influence of the Internet in engendering a truly global 
perspective and mindset: cyber-optimists point to signs of political borders being  made 
more permeable and the formation of a global village as a result of new technologies; 
cyber-pessimists see a strengthening of the innate human tendency towards balkanization 
(see, for example, Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 1997).  Again, this study is not so much 
concerned with validating or refuting such arguments but about marshaling them within 
the given methodology to consider an array of potential differences. 
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Once the vibrancy of the discursive space is examined deeply, the opportunity to 
reconsider and, if need be, reform the rules, procedures and guiding principles 
undergirding such forums arises.  Emerging best practices and time-tested exemplars will 
be examined in brief, and a new menu of practical strategies – to boost discursive quality, 
improve efficacy of the forum, and further engender an appreciation for democratic 
dialogue – will be presented.  First, however, the study must shine a light on the larger 
question of whether or not the historic relationship between journalists and audiences has 
fundamentally changed given the introduction of new technologies that readily encourage 
deliberation.  Moreover, it is necessary to consider to what extent the fine line between 
audiences and citizens is being further blurred (or, perhaps, is coming into greater focus) 
as a result of users' engagement with new deliberative tools.  To do so, the study begins 
by scrutinizing the quality of the given discourse and establishing where important 
differences may exist given the analytical approach.  Only then can it envision the 
emergence of a difference set of dynamics altogether, one which may hold the potential 
for, first, understanding that a multiplicity of unique typologies of publics can reasonably 
exist, and second, supporting each of those typologies with a more sophisticated 
calibration of the space itself.  As such, the more intrinsic value of this research is to 
demonstrate the idea that new technologies are important to the human condition not so 
much in that they alter it but because they may allow humanity to understand itself in a 
more deep and meaningful way. 
 
Research Questions 
 Employing the methodology of content analysis prescribed in Chapter 3, the 
dissertation poses five overarching research questions: 
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(RQ1) As measured by the four characteristics of quality public discourse, what 
is the overall quality of the discussions taking place in the four online 
discussion forums and are there significant differences?   
(RQ2) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant 
differences in the measures of quality public discourse between those 
news sites that offered printed materials versus those that offered 
multimedia segments? 
(RQ3) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant 
differences in the measures of quality public discourse between Internet-
native and traditional news sites? 
(RQ4) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant 
differences in the measures of quality public discourse in discussions 
linked to stories/segments principally covering domestic politics and those 
principally covering international politics? 
(RQ5) Among the four online discussion forums, what are the significant 
differences in the measures of quality public discourse in discussions 
linked to stories/segments principally covering governing/policymaking 
and those principally covering campaigning? 
 
Organization of the Study 
The dissertation is organized into five chapters.  Chapter 2 follows this 
introduction with a thorough review of the existing literature.  As the study positions 
itself at the intersection of numerous scholarly vectors, the chapter is understandably 
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bricolage in flavor.  And while a wide variety of existing trajectories could factor in to 
the analysis, several emerge as being highly relevant.  These include, but are not limited 
to: contemporary identifiers and dynamics of public spaces; enduring and emerging 
considerations for the interplay between journalistic integrity and the democratic 
imperative; the changing landscape for reporting, interpreting and digesting political 
news; and key elements of theory and practice as they pertain to deliberation (and 
particularly online debate) and public discourse.  Lastly, the chapter will catalog the 
small number of existing studies that have sought to measure discursive quality in online 
spaces and begin to articulate the theoretical foundations behind how this study measures 
discursive quality as an indicator of an online community’s civic health. 
Chapter 3 describes in detail the specifics of the content analysis methodology 
employed in the study.  Particular attention is given to the operationalization of the four 
variables of quality and, given the large number of content units, the process of training 
the coding team to achieve adequate levels of inter-coder reliability.  Chapter 4 presents 
the findings achieved as a result of undertaking the given methodology and responds to 
each of the five research questions.  Observations from a secondary analysis, which 
qualitatively (and holistically) reviews the most voluminous online discussion in each of 
the four forums, is also presented in this chapter.   
As described previously, Chapter 5 considers the broader implications pertaining 
to the vibrancy and quality of this discursive space, reviews current and possible best 
practices, and develops a slate of recommendations with an eye towards improving 
democratic vitality.  Before concluding, the overarching strengths and weaknesses of the 
study are assessed and opportunities for further research are offered. 
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Conclusion 
 Rapid – and accelerating – advances in technology have made it increasingly 
commonplace for users to create and marshal the content of their choice.  Never before 
has the act of expression been easier to constitute, register and broadcast.  
Communication technologies are now as ubiquitous as they are instantaneous, and even 
the most novice of users can marshal an array of inexpensive – or even free – tools and 
transmission systems that not very long ago were limited to those who possessed 
sufficient means and/or sufficient focus and determination to convey their beliefs, 
conclusions or consternations.  The ability of a U.S. Senate candidate tapping into her 
Twitter feed, for example, certainly raises new questions about the need for public 
relations or journalistic intermediaries.  No less important, the anonymous poster of a 
hastily articulated online comment attached to a published story about said campaign 
causes one to wonder about the long-term health, plausibility and efficacy of more time-
tested (let alone validating) techniques of writing letters to the editor or crafting op/ed 
pieces.   
For many scholars, technology is already understood to be an extension of the self 
(see, for example, Turkle, 2005; Kurzweil, 2000): mobile devices and a cloud-based 
infrastructure are becoming as essential to users as opposable thumbs and rapid eye 
movements, while social media feeds and a plethora of information channels are as 
seamless to a user’s experience as senses of smell, taste or touch.  Critical to remember, 
however, is that what defines a user is not necessarily the same as what embodies a 
citizen.  Simply interfacing with technology does not, in and of itself, meet or surpass the 
various thresholds of engaged citizenship.  Similarly, activity per se does not necessarily 
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equate to the virtues of Arendt’s vita activa.  To be a citizen is to think and behave as a 
contributing member of a broader public; one’s public deliberation should be forged of 
judicious argument, critical listening and earnest decision-making (Gastil, 2000) and 
strive (even if not always successfully) to advance the democratic ideals of empathy, 
egalitarianism and open-mindedness (Barber, 1984).  
Through a professional acumen built on integrity and objectivity, and by 
functioning as the quintessential stewards of publicly relevant information and analyses, 
journalists have long served not only an invaluable scrutinizing function but also as 
catalysts for the transformation of content and activity into public deliberation and 
discourse worthy of democratic institutions and life.  Profound changes in technology, 
and specifically the growing ease with which users can readily broadcast their opinions 
anonymously and without the need for validation or evidence, certainly holds the 
potential to disrupt the bearings of this invaluable balance wheel.  The news industry 
certainly finds itself in the midst of similarly epochal change – and facing historic choices 
– as detailed by the most recent annual report of the Pew Research Center’s Project for 
Excellence in Journalism:  
So far, news organizations are mainly using the popular networking platform, 
Twitter, to push out their own content rather than to engage with audiences, solicit 
information or share information they themselves did not produce… The 
problems of newspapers also became more acute in 2011.  Even as online 
audiences grew, print circulation continued to decline. Even more critically, so 
did ad revenues.  In 2011, losses in print advertising dollars outpaced gains in 
digital revenue by a factor of roughly 10 to 1, a ratio even worse than in 2010. 
When circulation and advertising revenue are combined, the newspaper industry 
has shrunk 43% since 2000.  The civic implications of the decline in newspapers 
are also becoming clearer.  More evidence emerged that newspapers (whether 
accessed in print or digitally) are the primary source people turn to for news about 
government and civic affairs. If these operations continue to shrivel or disappear, 
it is unclear where, or whether, that information would be reported… In sum, the 
news industry is not much closer to a new revenue model than a year earlier and 
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has lost more ground to rivals in the technology industry. But growing evidence 
also suggests that news is becoming a more important and pervasive part of 
people’s lives. That, in the end, could prove a saving factor for the future of 
journalism (Mitchell & Rosenstiel, 2012). 
 
For this hope to become reality, and for the news media to reassert its invaluable role as a 
guardian of the public interest, the function of the journalist needs to be reimagined in the 
context of burgeoning, user-created content and heightened expectations for engagement.  
Absent a thorough assessment of the quality of such content, even given the presumed 
rawness of its current form, one could understandably infer that signal had 
overwhelmingly been squelched by noise.  And yet, even if they are distracted by this 
cacophony, audiences continue to demand and consume significant quantities of news.  It 
may very well be that audiences continue to assign high intrinsic value to the role 
journalists have historically played in helping to transform passive audiences into active 
citizenries, but the emergence of new tools may have altered the conditions by which that 
can both occur and be recognized.  Perhaps even more important, the simple notion of a 
dichotomous partnership between the news media and its audiences may no longer be a 
sufficient construct to sort out the bigger questions of who is responsible for integrity and 
objectivity.  In its place, revealed at least in part by the widespread utilization of new 
technological tools to support dialogue, arises the possibility of identifying a much richer 
and diverse multiplicity of public spaces in which both the purveyors and consumers of 
news may come together in a variety of ways to catalyze discussion, promote exchange, 
and create the conditions for a flourishing and invested citizenry.  The roles, 
responsibilities and expectations of all involved could vary significantly from one public 
space to the next, as could the conditions for maximizing each domain's democratic 
potential. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A Bricolage of Research Traditions 
The scholarly trajectory of this investigation requires passage through a 
tremendously active, but also rather raucous, intersection of numerous research traditions.  
Occasionally, the boundaries between these fields of study are blurred beyond 
identifiability, while at other times the connective tissue that lies between them is not so 
readily apparent. Key influencing components drawn from the existing literature include: 
the virtues, complexities and realities of public spaces; an understanding of the various 
theories of public discourse as they pertain to the digestion of political news and potential 
activation of civic responsibility; the possible effects (positive, negative and neutral) new 
communication technologies may hold for the democratic imperative; and measures of 
quality for online public discourse. 
 Though this study may draw from a range of research perspectives, it is 
fundamentally grounded in Page’s (1996) underlying premise that “[p]ublic deliberation 
is essential to democracy” (p. 1).  As described in their comprehensive review of the 
empirical literature, Delli Carpini, Lomax Cook, and Jacobs (2004) note that the 
celebration of public deliberation has its origins in the city-states of ancient Greece and 
further flourished in the town hall meetings of colonial New England and bourgeoisie 
salons and cafes of Eighteenth Century Paris.  Within at least one tradition of democratic 
theory (see, for example, Barber, 1984; Connolly, 1983; Dahl, 1989; Dewey, 1954/1927; 
Fishkin, 1992; Habermas, 1996; Mansbridge, 1983), public deliberation is understood to 
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be a cornerstone of participatory democracy and representative government.  According 
to Chambers (2003), public deliberation: 
begins with a turning away from the liberal individualist or economic 
understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in conceptions of 
accountability and discussion.  Talk-centric democratic theory replaces voting-
centric democratic theory.  Voting-centric views see democracy as the arena in 
which fixed preferences and interests compete via fair mechanisms of 
aggregation.  In contrast, deliberative democracy focuses on the communicative 
processes of opinion and will formation that precede voting… Although theorists 
of deliberative democracy vary as to how critical they are of existing 
representative institutions, deliberative democracy is not usually thought of as an 
alternative to representative democracy.  It is rather an expansion of 
representative democracy (p. 308).   
 
This connection of theory with purpose continues to be highly relevant in an era 
defined by rapidly evolving new media forms that are increasingly participatory and 
accessible, and a time in which rapid technological innovation has precipitated the 
expectation for a heightened mode of invention and the possibility for a greater variety of 
communication channels.  Be that as it may, newer forms of media (not unlike all those 
that preceded them) continue to hold a highly contingent level of utility in empowering 
the public domain as each new innovation is shaped and conditioned by both the citizens 
who use them and the discourse that serves as their lifeblood. 
Publics and Public Spaces: Competing Definitions and Dynamics in a New Age 
 As noted by Dahlberg (2007), many Internet-democracy commentators, 
researchers and practitioners embrace the notion and advocate for the further 
development of a deliberative “public sphere” as the ideal framework for citizen 
participation in politics.  Within such spheres, rational-critical debate between citizens 
over shared problems and interests leads to better informed public opinion that can both 
guide and balance the work of officials and the systems of government (see, for example, 
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Benson, 1996; Bohman, 2004; Clift, 2003; Davis, 1999; Fung & Kedl, 2000; Gimmler, 
2001; Noveck, 2000; Sunstein, 2001; Tanner, 2001; Wilhelm, 2000).  Though the 
literature surrounding public spheres and their emergence, maintenance and expansion – 
or, more pessimistically, their dissipation, atrophy and decay – is as varied as it is vast, 
the primacy of discourse is central to nearly every relevant theoretical construct.   
Though each theorist defines and positions the notion of public in a slightly (or in 
some cases, radically) different manner, each argument has a strong conceptual tether to 
discourse.  As a foundational conception, an understanding of public has a multitude of 
connotations and innumerable philosophical origins.  For purposes of this study, 
however, the seminal works of two theorists are particularly noteworthy in setting the 
stage for a consideration of public realms: Hannah Arendt’s (1958) The Human 
Condition and John Dewey’s (1954/1927) The Public and Its Problems.   
Arendt (1958) noted that an underlying problem facing western philosophy was 
the subordination of action and appearance (what she labeled vita activa) to purer forms 
of thought and eternal essences (vita contemplativa).  In calling for a reversal of this 
hierarchy, Arendt outlined the three forms of human activity: labor, work and action.  
Labor, she argued, consists of the things humans need to do to keep themselves alive.  
The results of labor are fleeting and the only record of labor’s presence is human 
survival.  In contrast, work is the process by which man creates a world of artificial 
things that endure over time.  Critical to this understanding is the belief that a mode of 
work also sets the stage and establishes the conditions by which actions can occur.  
Action, in turn, is a uniquely human quality, speaks to mankind’s ability to be novel and 
inventive, and is accomplished chiefly through speech and communication.  Arendt 
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insists that action requires a sense of public, a term she defines as a place of commonality 
(i.e. occupied by shared structures and institutions generated from work) and political 
agency in that actions carry with them a degree of agency.  For Arendt, who rejected neo-
romantic notions of intimacy and emotional frameworks within the broader construct of 
public, the public sphere is a largely artificial place defined by civility and, when 
appropriate, solidarity.  This was not a shortcoming, she claimed, but served as one of its 
greatest achievements in that it created the appropriate environment for contributing 
members of the public to determine their own affairs.  One could argue that online 
discussion and comment boards, the discursive space examined by this dissertation, 
epitomize the very artificiality of which Arendt described.  
Though his perspective and underlying philosophy were very different than 
Arendt’s, Dewey’s faith in the public’s ability to determine its own affairs was quite 
similar.  Writing after the first World War but before the onset of the Great Depression, 
Dewey (1954/1927) argued that political meaning is created through conjoined action and 
a public consists of all those things that are directly or indirectly connected to the broader 
array of such actions.  The challenge for the public, he posited, was one fueled by the 
context of modern industrial life.  Homogenous communities of shared interests (e.g. 
Jefferson’s agrarian democrats) had been replaced by loose, heterogeneous clusters of 
mass audiences.  Until the “Great Society is converted into a Great Community,” he 
argued, “the Public will remain in eclipse” (p. 142).  Dewey described the Great 
Community as: 
a society in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of 
associated activities shall be known the fill sense of that word, so that an 
organized, articulate Public comes into being.  The highest and most difficult kind 
of inquiry and a subtle, delicate, vivid and responsive art of communication must 
	  	  
	  
24 
take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and 
breathe new life into it.  When the machine age has thus perfected its machinery it 
will be a means of life and not its despotic master.  Democracy will come into its 
own, for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion… It 
will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the 
art of full and moving communication (p. 184). 
 
Few scholars describe a more obvious and essential role for discourse with respect 
to energizing public spheres than Jurgen Habermas (1989).  This clarity, however, comes 
only with the privileging of the very particular kind of discourse Habermas identifies as 
the “ideal speech” type.  Against the broader context of rational-critical debate, the ideal 
speech type is one in which all participants have an equal ability to engage in discourse, 
there is mutual respect by all involved for each individual’s contribution to the 
discussion, and the speech itself is devoid of ideological connotations.  In such a mode, 
which Habermas claims existed for only for a brief period of time in certain parts of 
Europe (Witschge, 2004), citizens come with private agendas to engage in strategic 
communications within the public sphere.  What emerges as the victorious argument is 
the one that trumps all others based upon its own discursive strength.  While ideal speech 
types and modes of rational-critical debate seem applicable only to very particular kinds 
of homogenous communities, Froomkin (2004) notes that individuals are only capable of 
practical discourse, which produces only provisionally legitimate laws or rules that apply 
only to the group or polity that produced them.  Practical discourse cannot be achieved 
directly within society as a whole but only through the creation of smaller communities 
focused on discrete matters of import.  Significant improvements in information 
technology, however, may hold the promise to bolster levels of communicative capacity.  
Discourse-enabling tools are being developed at a rapid pace and hold the potential to 
radically empower individuals operating in cyberspace.  Froomkin is hopeful that some 
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combination of these tools will help to overcome the daunting problems of scale and 
draw discursive power back into the public sphere.    
While many democratic theorists conceive of public as a type of space (real, 
virtual or otherwise), Hauser (1999) suggests something else entirely: the public as a 
rhetorical activity.  By conceptualizing publics in this way, Hauser is able to explain why 
what appear to be outwardly inchoate political movements have a sense of integrity that 
would otherwise arise only from many years of maturation and the refinement of a 
common vocabulary.  Describing the notion of public not so much as an environment but 
a mode of engagement, Hauser and Grim (2004) argue that there need not be the 
acceptance of a particular point of view but rather respect for the underlying belief that a 
given contribution occupies a central place in the constitution of public itself.  
Conceptualized in this way, there is less of an inherent need to form a single 
comprehensive sense of public.  Instead, multiple publics form principally around issues 
and ultimately contribute to a broader sense of civic dialogue.  While some theorists (see, 
for example, Gitlin, 1998), point to these public “sphericules” as either too chaotic or too 
assimilated, Hauser suggests that what is most important is that they are eventful, in that 
citizens become members of a public only by directly contributing to a broader activity.  
Considered in this context, a lack of consensus or the absence of sophisticated discourse 
within online discussion spaces need not necessarily be equated with the deficiency of a 
sense of public.  What matters instead is a shared propensity by participants to openly 
contribute to the process of engagement, even if what is being contributed varies 
considerably from one participant to the next.   
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For Mouffe (2000), the very idea of consensus is antithetical to the broader 
project of democracy and is more likely to precipitate the onset of hegemony.  
Democratic conditions, Mouffe contends, originate from two seemingly incompatible sets 
of normative values – one based on the rule of law (e.g. rights, property, etc.) and the 
other based on popular sovereignty.  Too often, in Mouffe’s judgment, consensus is akin 
to the colonization of one of these sets of normative values over the other.  Rather than 
strive to reach consensus, Mouffe advocates for a mode of agonism.  The ongoing 
presence of adversarial conditions, along with the continuous reshaping of the public 
landscape based upon changing dynamics between adversaries, activates the democratic 
spirit.   
 Whether highly stylized or purposefully bereft of norms for interaction, publics 
and public spheres emerge from the supposition that an exchange of ideas ultimately 
empowers modes of deliberative democracy, be they narrowly or broadly constituted 
(Fishkin & Laslett, 2003).  For a mode of communication to be deliberative, however, it 
must exist for far deeper purposes than simple transmission and reception of messages to 
and from citizens.  Indeed, it is a communicative form that is both interactive and 
purposeful, defined as “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-
informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of 
discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers, 2003, 
p. 309).  Only when the participants understand their participation to be essential, and 
thus recognize that their exchange may have some concrete impact (no matter how large 
or small) on political outcomes, can the role of the public – and thus, the imperative of 
public deliberation – be both clear and strong. 
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Public Deliberation: Norms and Critiques 
An extensive body of literature points to a surprisingly small number of norms 
vis-à-vis the ability of public deliberation to engender positive democratic outcomes 
(Delli Carpini, Lomax Cook, & Jacobs, 2004).  If deliberation is sufficiently empathetic, 
egalitarian, open-minded and reason-centered, it is expected to result in the consequences 
of: heightened appreciation for the perspective of others; a broadened sense of one’s own 
interests; the belief that citizens can work collaboratively to solve problems; enhanced 
legitimacy for the overarching political system; and the generation of social capital (see, 
for example, Barber, 1984; Gutman & Thompson, 1996; Mansbridge, 1983; Warren, 
1992; Sunstein, 1993; Putnam; 2000).  At the same time and no less important, there 
remains significant and reasonable doubt as to the practicality, appropriateness, efficacy 
and political significance of such a communicative form (Delli Carpini et al., 2004).  
Critics argue that forums for public deliberation are too infrequent, lack connectivity with 
the machinery of government, privilege the affluent and well-educated, and require a 
skillset not possessed by the typical citizen (see, for example, Brown, 2000; Hibbing & 
Thiess-Morse, 2002; Mansbridge, 1983; Mutz, 2002; Sanders, 1987; Schudson, 1997; 
Sunstein, 2001).   
Fishkin (1992) places some of these concerns in context by arguing the quality of 
deliberation exists on a continuum between less deliberative and more deliberative.  
When, for example, arguments by some participants go unanswered by others, or when 
information that would be required to understand the force of a claim are absent, or when 
some citizens are unwilling to weigh in on some elements of the debate, the process is 
regarded as less deliberative.  From a practical standpoint, and given the diversity of 
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perspectives, styles and aptitudes participants bring to any forum, a certain amount of 
incompleteness is expected and thus tolerable.  The act of improving deliberation (i.e. 
moving it from a mode of less deliberative to more deliberative) has much to do with 
expanding levels of completeness. 
As an activity, Lewinski (2010) suggests that forms of deliberation must be 
further differentiated as either horizontal or vertical criticism.  In the former, a group of 
participants jointly objects to distinct elements of a complex argument put forward by an 
opponent.  In the latter, participants act in sequence by deepening the previously voiced 
criticisms against one element of their opponent’s argumentation.  Such a definition is 
particularly relevant to this study and brings into sharper focus the methodological 
framework for scrutinizing the data in question.  It is essential to understand that, within 
the discursive space of online discussion boards attached to media outlets, participants 
are responding both to the content of the linked story (written or produced by a journalist) 
and to the comments of one another (almost always non-journalists).   
Much of the existing literature on public deliberation reinforces the blurring of the 
critical difference between notions of politeness and civility, a tendency that can unduly 
lessen the democratic merit of robust, animated and even heated forms of discussion 
(Papacharissi, 2004).  Habermas (1989, 1991), for example, placed significant value on 
well-behaved interaction and emphasized the need for courteous turn-taking and well-
mannered demeanor.  In contrast, Lyotard (1984) thought quite differently of the logic of 
restraint and argued that anarchy, individuality and disagreement were the pathways to 
democratic emancipation.  Equally noteworthy, Fraser (1992) suggested that adherence to 
a condition of politeness necessarily privileged those in power – specifically, wealthy, 
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white men – and reinforced existing power structures functioning to drown out 
individuality and uniqueness.  
A number of scholars have found a way through this blurriness by utilizing a less 
idealistic framework and opting, instead, for a pragmatic approach.  As one example, in 
her work on civility within the United State Congress Jamieson (1997) considers the need 
for a norm of reciprocity in that 
[T]he differences between members and parties are philosophical and not 
personal, that parties to a debate are entitled to the presumption that their views 
are legitimate even if not correct, and those on all sides are persons of goodwill 
and integrity motivated by conviction (p. 1). 
 
Similarly, Papacharissi (2004) notes that before a behavior is termed uncivil, its 
implications for democratic society should be considered.  As such, it is only when 
people demonstrate offensive behavior toward social groups that their behavior becomes 
undemocratic; anything less does not have lasting repercussions for the health of 
democracy.   
 Beyond norms (and subsequent critiques of those norms) of behavior, however, 
public deliberation is also very much about the content of an argument.  While Habermas 
(1984) suggests that participants subscribe to an “orientation for reaching understanding” 
(p. 285), and Schudson (1997) insists that a commitment to try to reach consensus is the 
line of demarcation between deliberation and simple conversation, other scholars 
emphasize the overarching value of justification (see, for example, Ferree, Gamson, 
Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Entman, 2004; Wessler & Schultz, 2007).  Essential to the 
power of public deliberation is the giving of justification for one’s own claims, the 
demand of justification for others’ claims, and the willingness to rebut and refine based 
upon the content of the ensuing interactions.  Doing so shifts attention away from 
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participants and onto the substance of their contributions.  Wessler (2008) proposes four 
different levels of analysis for such contributions (the idea, the utterance, the article and 
the page) while further noting that the justification and rebuttal/refinement criteria 
do not require that speakers in public deliberation actually aim at reaching 
understanding with their opponents.  To have an enlightening effect on audiences, 
it is sufficient that justifications and counter-justifications be presented in 
public… debates conducted in front of an audience are as normatively valuable as 
dialogues between speakers, provided they adhere to their own set of normative 
standards (p. 4). 
 
Taken as a whole, the expansive literature surrounding public deliberation is, in 
effect, focused on responding to an overarching question: what is it about the discourse 
present in certain kinds of public spaces that makes it distinct from ordinary discussion or 
even simple conversation?  As has been discussed previously, the very act of engaging in 
public deliberation, along with varying degrees of a citizenry's commitment to continue 
to do so, are at the heart of any and all of the traditions supported by democratic theorists 
and proponents of deliberative democracy.  The artifact of that deliberation, however, is 
the discourse itself; it is that which must be scrutinized to detect the array of forces at 
work within such spaces, let alone to begin to identify the significant differences that may 
exist among them.   
Doing so is analogous to extracting and then analyzing a blood sample from a 
corporeal being.  Just as a physician cannot determine critical biochemistry or toxicology 
levels through simple examination, neither can the researcher effectively gauge through 
casual observation the variety of democratic life forces that may be at work within a 
given public space.  In a similar vein, a physician, after analyzing a blood sample, must 
then compare its levels to some established set(s) of norms that will allow them to take on 
meaning within the realm of lived experience.  These norms, which typically both reflect 
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a rich understanding of history and offer a correlated sense of expectations given 
particular circumstances, can only serve as a generalizable resource of relatively 
unbounded definitions.  Thus, just as a doctor's patient possessing excessively high levels 
of blood glucose (again, in comparison to a given norm) is not automatically diabetic, 
neither may an online discussion space that simply appears to be healthy and engaging – 
or perhaps more likely, presents itself as sick and off-putting – be easily characterized as 
advancing or retarding the project of deliberative democracy.   
Fortunately, the affiliated literature offers insights into at least some of what those 
important norms may be and, at the very least, allows for the articulation of at least one 
possible compound description of what high quality (or to use the current metaphor, 
healthy) public discourse looks like.  From there, the theorist can then begin to broach 
more complex investigations (as in the case of the concluding chapter of this dissertation) 
to assess the relative importance different communities may directly or indirectly place 
on a range of pathways to engage political news (e.g. the tools of political cognition, 
political literacy or collective action) or to help facilitate its processing and further 
dissemination (e.g. the concepts of Dewey's (1927) citizen journalists, Lippman's (1922) 
intelligence bureaus, or Sunstein's (2001) general interest intermediaries).  Before 
describing the components of that compound defintion, however, it is first necessary to 
consider some of the unique characteristics of deliberative spaces that exist solely online.  
Moreover, it is helpful to summarize critical ways in which the introduction of new 
technologies require us to think differently (or in some cases, not so differently) about the 
processes of reporting and digesting political news. 
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Unique Dimensions of Online Deliberative Spaces? 
 In contrast to more traditional forms of deliberation (e.g. town hall forums, 
dueling op/ed pieces, televised debates, etc.), public deliberation occurring in cyberspace 
carries with it a host of new aspects that have been the subject of considerable study.  
Some of these new dimensions are structural in nature and the result of how the 
underlying technological infrastructure is oriented with respect to users.  Other 
differences emerge from the variety of new ways with which users do – or do not – 
interact with one another.  Each requires careful scrutiny and critics are wise not to 
become either too ensconced in either blind optimism or shallow cynicism.  New 
technologies generally lead to new opportunities and a host of new challenges; online 
homes for deliberation are no different in this regard. 
 As noted by Plant (2004) and others, the technology of the Internet creates a 
coalescing force that enables the emergence of online groups.  Such groups consist of 
either individuals or organizations that come together through an electronic medium to 
interact with respect to shared opportunities, challenges and interests.  Hauben and 
Hauben (1997), as part of their comprehensive analysis of Usenet (one of the oldest and 
most diverse online communities), suggest that groups controlling their own information 
can be quite vibrant and successful, even if they lack formal rules or means of enforcing 
such rules.  Citizenship, they claim, naturally evolves into a form of “netizenship” and 
members of online groups are highly skilled at fending off threats to the health of the 
community.  While lauding the voluntary nature of online communities, Anderson and 
Cornfield (2003) note than an unfortunate consequence of such communities is a 
tendency for homogeneity.  Despite the attraction of belonging to voluntary communities, 
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their rise can often intensify existing social and political dynamics.  Group homogeneity, 
while often comforting to members, can have negative consequences for the broader 
development of society.  Public deliberation benefits from a diversity of perspectives, 
though Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) argue the potential for deliberation occurs primarily 
in online groups where political topics come up only incidentally.  More pessimistically, 
Gandy (2002) concludes that the majority of the 100 most frequently visited websites in 
the world are dedicated to commerce and entertainment as opposed to political discourse.  
Barber, Mattson, and Peterson (1997) reinforce this notion in claiming that the Internet, 
as whole, has come to resemble the realm of shopping, play, entertainment and little else.  
 Within the online arena, users do not have to satisfy the same thresholds of self-
identification as do participants in other deliberative spaces.  Dutton (1996) argues that 
the ability to hide one’s real identity (or at least to be given the choice to do so) 
precipitates a disinhibiting effect; participants are freer to express their honest opinions.  
In a similar vein, the research of Blader and Tyler (2003) suggests evidence of a 
correlation between the absence of nonverbal cues and an invigoration of discussion 
likely caused by the removal of barriers.  A lowered, generalized sense of social presence 
online may encourage expression of dissenting voice and mitigate perceived risks of 
deliberative participation (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimmons, 2002).  In contrast, 
Maldonado (1997), beginning with a premise that that topics of politics are too serious to 
engage with a stranger, argues that participants should necessarily identify themselves in 
order to act as responsible actors within any online debate.  Poster (1997) contends that 
rational argument can rarely prevail in an online setting as identities are fluid and the 
conditions for encouraging compromise are lacking.  Lastly, Davis (1999) offers a 
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sobering view of the democratic promise related to the Internet’s interactive features.  
The traditional, predominant forces in American politics dominate the Internet, like all of 
its technological predecessors; such forces seek to sustain or expand their existing power 
relationships.  As such, he argues, the Internet is hardly a revolutionary force for 
democratic virtues and interactivity is primarily an illusion. 
 Cyber-optimists maintain the Internet has and will continue to diversify the 
marketplace of ideas and provide new forums for public deliberation (see, for example, 
Papacharissi, 2002).  Some observers, including Connery (1997), see in the Internet the 
opportunity to revive a Habermasian, coffeehouse-style (1989) public sphere, arguing 
that such spaces generate invaluable (even if contradictory and digressing) discussion that 
constitutes the basis of public opinion and informs affairs of state.  At the opposite end of 
the philosophical spectrum, and building on Mouffe’s (1999, 2000) theoretical 
foundation, Witschge (2004) notes the Internet holds tremendous potential to weaken 
hegemonic power and energize agonism in that it is rife with contradictory and digressive 
viewpoints.  Irrespective of whether they possess the requisite ingredients for either a 
bona fide public sphere or mode of adversarial agonism, online spaces are heralded by 
nearly all cyber-optimists as having the ability to facilitate exposure to opinions beyond 
the confines of participants’ immediate associations (see, for example, McKenna & 
Bargh, 2000).  In stark contrast, cyber-pessimists (or cyber-skeptics) believe that while 
the Internet may hold considerable promise for realizing the democratic potential of 
society, it also betrays the proclivities of individuals to seek membership in communities 
of like-minded thinkers (see, for example, Davis, 1999; Sunstein, 2001), damages 
deliberative ideals by facilitating selective exposure to alternative perspectives (see, for 
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example, Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 1997), and encourages interest in matters that 
have little to do with advancing coherent citizen engagement on matters of public 
significant (see, for example, Dahlgren, 2000).  Much of the broader debate between 
cyber-optimists and cyber-pessimists, however, originates from the mode of inquiry and 
the community that is examined.  When critics investigate heterogeneous communities, 
for example, they generally conclude the Internet engenders deliberative exchanges 
among open-minded individuals with dissimilar perspectives (see, for example, Dahlberg, 
2002; Stromer-Galley, 2003).  If, instead, they focus on homogenous (or even partisan) 
groups, they are likely to conclude that discussion spaces are not deliberative but rather 
echo chambers for dominant discourse (see, for example, Davis, 1999; Hill & Hughes, 
1997, 1998). 
 In addition to the considerable body of research exploring the efficacy of online 
discussions occurring between users, it is important to reference a secondary (and more 
modest) literature: that which focuses on discussions occurring largely between users and 
themselves.  Dumoulin (2003) labels these recursive and reflexive contributions 
“interactive monologues,” while Wilhem (1999) argues their utterance reflects a 
communicative mode that is largely bereft of listening, responding or engaging in the 
type of dialogue that would typify healthy deliberation.  Knapp (1997) is far more 
hopeful of where such expressions can lead, suggesting that the rigorous rhetoric of so-
called “essayistic messages” are the critical starting material for transforming online 
groups into vivid public spheres.  Others argue that such testimonies allow for the 
development of more coherent and comprehensive public opinion and the creation of a 
collective memory and archive (see, for example, Tanner, 2001).   
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 Whether real or perceived, many of the unique features associated with online 
deliberative spaces may hold the potential to challenge and ultimately redefine not only 
how scholars assess the relative importance of citizens' tools for engaging with 
information (e.g. political cognition, political literacy and collective action) but also the 
ways in which citizens better calibrate their own utilization of such tools to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their efforts.   
Old and New Challenges of Reporting and Digesting Political News 
Though the Digital Age brings with it any number of new dimensions for the 
synthesis, sharing and absorption of political news, the writings (and warnings) of a key 
critic writing nearly a century ago seem as relevant today as ever.  Writing at a time when 
radio and television transmission of news was just entering the mainstream, and in 
contrast to many democratic theorists, Lippman (1922, 1927) was much less sanguine in 
his view of the capacity and capabilities of thinking and deliberating publics.  For 
Lippman, the formation of public opinion was driven predominantly by issues with which 
participants had a high stake.  Unlike Dewey (1954/1927) and others, Lippman argued 
that citizens should focus on contributing only to politics in which they could make a 
legitimate contribution and steer clear of all others.  The idea that citizens were somehow 
“omnicompetent” and could make rational decisions if provided with sufficient 
information was highly dubious for Lippman.  Not only was there simply too much 
information to process but citizens had no vested interest in digesting such a wide range 
of topics.  The “pictures in people’s heads” shaped by journalistic accounts – e.g. images 
of government, statescraft, policy-making and leadership in action – simply did not 
correspond to what the average citizen was living on a day-to-day basis.  As such, 
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Lippman argued that affairs of state should largely be managed by elites and that 
knowledge bureaus staffed by objective professionals were needed to connect legitimate 
sources of executive power with a prevailing sense of citizen need and public opinion. 
Citizens, according to Lippman, still required a window or passageway to the complex 
machinery of government and the management of issues, but that passageway needed to 
be managed by professional administrators.   
Though their ongoing debate over the roles and responsibilities of the public may 
have been among the most important of the early Twentieth Century, Dewey and 
Lippman both advocated for the further popularization of the mainstream press and the 
need to make the daily news more accessible.  While they may have argued vociferously 
over the appropriate structures for news generation and vehicles for dissemination, they 
shared a deep understanding for the importance of news and its ability to connect 
narrowly-focused individuals with a broader sense of society.  Despite the proliferation of 
media channels, formats and styles, the basic framework of this historic premise – and its 
squabbling over many of the finer points – remains quite contemporary. Bimber (2003), 
for example, notes that healthy public spheres need professional communicators to 
facilitate discussion among ordinary citizens.  Similarly, Walsh (2003) argues that in a 
mass-mediated society average citizens, after receiving elite-originating communications, 
typically process and condition them through casual, often face-to-face conversations 
with those most immediately available or in closest communicative proximity. 
Journalism forged on the work of elites, however, is the subject of intense and 
longstanding criticism.  Entman and Herbst (2000), for example, argue that audiences – 
and not publics – are what drives journalism; political news is shaped through the media-
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framing process and information is carefully packaged with audiences in mind.  Capella 
and Jamieson (1997) place the public’s state of apathy at the feet of the media in that it 
perpetuates a style-over-substance approach, replete with sound bites and flash in lieu of 
depth and objectivity.  The rhythm of the news media is also increasingly out of synch 
with both deliberative ideals and the gradualness of policy-making.  By portraying so 
many issues as crises and emergencies, the media triggers waves of attention focusing on 
a single problem and crowding out others (Wolfsfeld, 2000).  At the same time, Patterson 
(1993) notes the dominant schema for the reporter has become the strategic game, thus 
leading to a ‘horserace’ style of journalism that is overly dramatistic.  Every news story, 
he contents, is measured not by the extent to which it elevates the public’s understanding 
but by its prescribed structure and conflict, problem and resolution, rising action and 
falling action, and clear beginning, middle and end.  With respect to campaign discourse 
specifically, Jamieson (1993) similarly identifies the highly conventionalized genres of 
candidates and press discourse and notes that such forms can minimize argumentation 
and ignore the responsibilities of parties to shoulder the claims they make.  When 
discourse becomes adlike, she maintains, argument, engagement and accountability are 
lost.  Ultimately, Entman’s (1989) Catch 22-like observation continues to be prophetic: to 
become sophisticated citizens, Americans would need high-quality, independent 
journalism; but news organizations, to stay in business, would need an audience of 
sophisticated citizens. 
More recently, critics of the Internet’s effect on journalism note that, as a 
medium, cyberspace is highly effective in supporting so-called narrowcasting.  As the 
solidification of niche forms of communications directed at highly specific audiences 
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continues to expand, the participatory divide between the politically active and non-active 
will continue to widen (Bimber & Davis, 2003).  Equally important, the predominance of 
increasingly specialized and personalized information is offset by the steady decline of 
what Sunstein (2002) calls ‘general-interest intermediaries,’ or objective journalists or 
officials who possess the agency to help the public sort through the cacophony of 
information.  By and large, the Internet facilitates the distribution of information and 
circumvention of gatekeepers and other such intermediaries (Schapiro, 1999).  Jamieson 
and Waldman (2003) advocate for the restoration of the press as custodians of fact, 
arguing that reporters need to help the public make better sense of competing arguments, 
defining terms, filling in gaps of information, assessing the accuracy of information 
offered, and relating claims and counterclaims to possible, real-world outcomes.  
Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) similarly propose a constructionist model of political 
communications, one that emphasizes the perspective of an active, interpreting audience; 
stresses interaction between such audiences and the media; and privileges common 
knowledge over public opinion, in that while news coverage may be dry and specific, 
audience reaction is affective and integrative.   
The introduction of online commenting platforms may very well be born out of 
these same ideals and lofty goals.  Though some scholars (see, for example, Schultz, 
2000) have concluded there is little real connectivity between commenters and 
journalists, and most journalists do not read the comments for lack of time of interest, 
others suggest they provide an important window into the minds of readers.  As one 
journalist from The Guardian recently noted: 
I've learned a hell of a lot from reading the Internet, and I'd guess that I've learned 
at least as much from the comments and amateur blogs as from professional 
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writers. To take just one example, it was the commenters here on Comment is free 
who were railing against the injustices of work capability assessments introduced 
by this government and conducted by Atos, long before mainstream political 
journalists, even the most left-leaning Guardian columnists, picked up on the 
story. As a journalist, I am forever picking up nuggets of information on topics of 
interest from below the line. Of course, many turn out to be somehow (or entirely) 
inaccurate or misunderstood, but a significant minority are immensely useful. I 
find it genuinely unfathomable that other writers would cut themselves off from 
this goldmine of knowledge (Fogg, 2013). 
 
Part of the lack of connectivity may be the result of a juxtaposition of two very different 
kinds of discursive norms.  As Braun and Gillespie (2011) suggest, media organizations 
increasingly saddle themselves with the task of hosting an unruly user community that 
does not wish to – and generally is not obligated to – play by the norms of journalism.  
News provision, they suggest, is increasingly intertwined with community management, 
leaving many journalists frustrated, unprepared and demoralized.  In addition, a decidedly 
subversive undercurrent (known as “trolling”) infests many online commenting spaces.  
As one journalist from salon.com recently opined: 
the trolls really do hold tremendous power of persuasion. Why try to craft a well-
reasoned argument, using facts and grammar, when the real way to influence how 
a person feels is a well-aimed “Kill it before it lays eggs,” or the classic “Your 
stupid”? Even if the effect is divisive, at least it’s substantial — to the point that it 
can strongly affect how one feels about the original piece itself (Williams, 2013).  
 
It is precisely this diversity of opinion with respect to the broader value of online 
comments that makes a deeper and more objective investigation of their discursive 
quality so essential.  Even the most overtly civic-minded spaces can be littered with foul 
language, personal attacks, racial epithets or hate speech.  At least during the period of 
study, users' access to such spaces was typically quite unfettered; moderation, if it existed 
at all, was strikingly passive or woefully inadequate; and broader commitments to 
maintaining user anonymity were very much the norm.  Though prevailing standards may 
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have changed considerably since that time (see Chapter 4), this investigation occurred 
during what might have been the proverbial perfect storm for revealing the miserable 
underbelly of public discussion occurring within online spaces.  The words, sentiments 
and messages carried on these waves of toxicity can easily overpower a casual observer 
and drown out a more accurate understanding of what is actually transpiring at any given 
moment.  Absent an objective process for measuring a forum's deliberative health, it 
would be impossible to sort through the noise with any degree of consistency (or perhaps 
at all), let alone to consider some of the broader opportunities and challenges for thriving 
in such spaces. 
 
Measuring Discursive Quality:  An Indicator of Civic Health 
Formal study of online spaces has hardly kept pace with either the rapid evolution 
of existing spaces or the mushrooming of new ones.  Such a conclusion is hardly 
surprising even against the backdrop of widespread and growing interest: If the 
investigation of an emerging construct did not prove challenging enough, one must also 
consider that the metaphysics of that construct are in a near continuous state of flux even 
as huge communities of users are seemingly able to adapt with relative ease.  As such, 
when building a mechanism for measuring the overall civic health of a deliberative space, 
it is important not to become too preoccupied with the changing technological contours 
of that space.  Rather than try to keep up with structure, a concerted effort to gauge 
generalized levels of civic-mindedness within such spaces must focus on discourse, the 
principal artifact of the activities taking place within those spaces.  By employing such an 
approach, it is understood that any derived measures of discursive quality are not so 
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much valuable in their own right but for the extent to which they can sufficiently reflect 
different dimensions of civic health with a given online space.  A thin but promising 
literature offers important insights into how to conceptualize the notion of discursive 
quality; a broad understanding of some of the central tenets of deliberative democratic 
theory help to close the remaining gaps.  As described in the remainder of this section, 
four basic measures of discursive quality emerge: civility, politeness, justification and 
complexity).  Procedures for operationalizing these concepts into a measurable set of 
variables follow in Chapter 3. 
As noted previously, extensive scholarship exploring the ways in which public 
deliberation may catalyze or reinforce democratic activities point to a fairly limited 
number of conditions (Delli Carpini, Lomax Cook, & Jacobs, 2004).  The measure this 
study labels as "civility" is a reflection of the condition Barber (1984) describes as 
empathetic, Gutman and Thompson (1996) consider to be egalitarian, and Jamieson 
(1997) structures as a norm of reciprocity.  It is, in essence, the prerequisite that all 
members of a given community have a right to participate in public deliberation and that 
their legitimacy for doing will not be challenged even if their respective expressions and 
ideas may very well be.  Papacharissi (2004) utilized the inverse of this measure of 
civility in her content analysis of 287 political discussion groups over a period of several 
months.  "Incivility," as she categorized it, should be "operationalized as the set of 
behaviors that threaten democracy, deny people their personal freedoms, and stereotype 
social groups" (p. 267).  In building her index of incivility, Papacharissi further assessed 
whether stereotypes were mild or offensive; antagonistic (i.e. clearly intended to offend) 
or neutral (i.e. not clearly intended to offend); and interpersonal (i.e. directed at another 
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commenter) or other-directed (i.e. directed at someone not present in the discussion, such 
as a politician, celebrity or journalist).   
Too often, the measure this study refers to as "politeness" is the only one the 
casual observer can readily recognize.  Here, politeness refers principally to the absence 
of name-calling, ad hominem attacks and vulgar language.  It is essential to note that not 
only can the presence of impoliteness potentially overshadow or diminish the likelihood 
of other considerations, but using it as stand-alone indicator of a public space's civic 
health can be misleading.  The literature on deliberative democracy contains an extensive 
set of arguments which privilege polite discourse and consider it a necessary ingredient to 
achieve democratic outcomes (see, for example, Habermas, 1989, 1991).  An equally 
large and thoughtful array of scholarship advocates for just the opposite consideration, 
arguing, for example, that democratic emancipation needs to take advantage of 
unrestrained language (Lyotard, 1984) or that the conditions of politeness naturally 
privilege the powerful (Fraser, 1992).  The concept is employed in this study not so much 
to locate it along this continuum but to clearly differentiate it from civility.  In her work, 
Papacharissi (2004) was similarly careful to distinguish between the two dimensions and 
instead used validated measures of politeness based on Jamieson's (1997) and Jamieson 
& Falk's (1998) review of floor debate in the United States Congress; she ultimately 
concluded that while many discussions were impolite, few were uncivil. 
A third measure employed by this study, "justification," recognizes that the 
subject matter conveyed through public discourse is not insignificant and shifts attention 
away from participants and onto the substance of their contributions (Wessler, 2008).  
Nearly all theorists of deliberative democracy emphasize the underlying value of 
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justification for engendering a shared sense of meaning or understanding within 
deliberative space (see, for example, Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Entman, 
2004; Wessler & Schultz, 2007).  For deliberation to be efficacious, they argue, 
discussants must give justification for their own claims, demand justification for others' 
claims, and be willing to rebut and refine their arguments based upon the strength of 
those claims.  The research of Himelboim, Gleave, and Smith (2009) further 
demonstrates a correlation between heightened levels of justification and more prolific 
discussions.  Their six-month analysis of approximately 40,000 authors across 20 
political discussion groups identified authors who received an atypically large number of 
replies.  More than 95% of comments made by these discussion catalysts contained 
content imported from elsewhere in cyberspace, and approximately two-thirds of their 
comments included links to stories available from traditional news organizations.  In 
addition to those which rely upon external sources, the present study's concept of 
justifications also borrows from the social capital literature (see, for example, Putnam, 
2000) suggesting that the tendency for individuals to choose to belong to active social 
networks may be tremendously beneficial in supporting a shared sense of civic 
responsibility.  Within such networks, trust is established by sharing more personal 
information describing details of a particular lived experience.  In a matter of speaking, 
such expressions of trust may be thought of as something of an internally validated 
justification. 
The fourth and final measure – "complexity" – emerges from the recognition that 
public deliberation is a dynamic and ongoing process.   While Habermas (1984), for 
example, suggests that participants must subscribe to an "orientation for reaching 
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understanding" (p. 285), Schudson (1997) insists that the commitment to try to reach 
consensus is the line separating deliberation from simple conversation.  Irrespective of 
whether consensus is a necessary or even desirable motivation, what matters is that the 
generation of meaning is a highly contingent (and often non-linear) activity.  Within 
deliberative space, discussants need the opportunity to sort through conflicting ideas, ask 
questions to approach higher levels of understanding, and even express their own 
uncertainty about a given topic.  Stromer-Galley (2007) formalized elements of a content 
coding scheme with many of these very considerations in mind.  Using data from the 
Virtual Agora Project (Muhlberger, 2005), in which residents of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
deliberated school policy online, Stromer-Galley constructed variables for, and then 
recorded instances of: agreement, a signal of support with something a prior speaker said; 
and question, a genuine inquiry directed to another speaker trying to seek information.  
Believing prior measures were overly complicated to administer (see, for example, 
Graham and Witschge, 2003), Stromer-Galley included elements in her coding scheme 
intended to "balance the need to capture the complexities of group interaction while being 
simple enough to achieve acceptable levels of intercoder agreement" (p. 21). 
 
Conclusion 
 This brief review of the existing literature sets the stage for the development of an 
effective methodology to measure the quality of deliberation taking place in online 
discussion spaces affiliated with a limited number of news outlets.  Though diverse, the 
collection of prior research examined herein serves as the theoretical foundation for 
systematically seeking the presence of four distinct (but not entirely unrelated) telltales of 
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a site’s overall civic-mindedness.  Once this exploration is conducted, it becomes far 
more feasible to consider why there might be both profound differences and revealing 
consistencies across the spaces examined.  In doing so, it is important to note that this 
study examines only a very small – if still representative – sliver of online space.  While a 
wide variety of electronic forums both exist and are arguably home to active, 
commenting publics (such as those found on Twitter, Reddit, etc.), this study is solely 
concerned with deliberative spaces operated and managed by the purveyors of news.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 METHODOLOGY  
	  
Overview: The Vicarious Nature of Content Analysis 
	   As a forum, online discussion boards simply aggregate the various contributions 
users make to an ongoing, asynchronous conversation on a particular topic.  For those 
forums affiliated with news outlets, a journalist’s article (in the print universe) or 
multimedia segment (in the audiovisual realm) initially frame some of the dimensions of 
a topic and then precipitate a user-driven discussion.  Furthermore, it is important to note 
that this study is concerned exclusively with discussion forums operating solely through 
the medium of written forms of communication.  While a number of vehicles, such as 
CNN’s iReport and YouTube’s video response platform, allow for full video 
contributions, such forms are still relatively new and not widely used (or at least not 
when compared to written communication channels).  As such, the utility of content 
analysis as a “method that uses a set of procedures to make valid references from text” 
(Weber, 1990, p. 9) is highly viable.  While some computer-based forms of content 
analysis attempt to measure variables by gauging the simple frequency of terms relative 
to a pre-determined dictionary or corpus of words within a given sample (see, for 
example, Hart, 1989; Hart, 2002; and Hart, Jarvis, Jennings & Smith-Howell, 2004), the 
casual nature with which participants prepare and submit posts to an online discussion 
board (to say nothing of their propensity to use slang, abbreviations and emoticons) make 
this an ineffective strategy.  A deeper and more thorough investigation – one that 
empowers and requires human coders to make judgments about the meaning of the words 
contained within user submissions – requires both a more robust definition of the 
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research technique and one that better establishes its descriptive power.  While 
Krippendorf (1980) offers a similarly basic definition of content analysis – “a research 
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context” (p. 21) – 
his description of the texts themselves (i.e. the artifacts to be code) is particularly 
instructive for purposes of this study.  He notes: 
The most distinctive feature of messages is that they inform someone vicariously, 
providing the receiver with knowledge about events that take place at a distant 
location, about objects that may have existed in the past, or about ideas in other 
people’s minds.  Messages and symbolic communications generally are about 
phenomena other than those directly observed.  The vicarious nature of symbolic 
communications is what forces a receiver to make specific inferences from 
sensory data to portions of his empirical environment.  This empirical 
environment is what we refer to as the context of the data (p. 22; italics added). 
 
This added clarity concerning the overall power of the technique is undergirded 
by several important distinctions germane to the method itself: content analysis is an 
unobtrusive technique; it readily accepts untrusted data; it is context-sensitive and 
thereby able to process symbolic forms; and it is both easily scalable and capable of 
coping with large volumes of data (Krippendorf, 1980).  Taken together, these four 
distinctions (or propositions, as Krippendorf calls them) point to a methodology offering 
the requisite data collection and analytical tools needed, most specifically, to construct 
imputed measures of deliberative quality, and, more generally, to gauge the efficacy of 
these spaces as forums for public discussion. 
 
Data Collection 
With the appropriateness and applicability of the content analysis methodology 
established, this section will describe key considerations to be explored as part of the 
broader data-collection process.  Important dimensions include: defining clearly the unit 
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of analysis; determining key information delimiters for purposes of data categorization 
and grouping; addressing the essential mechanical procedures of, and underscoring 
rationale for, the sampling procedure associated with the current longitudinal study; 
establishing an algorithm for partitioning data; and identifying requisite safeguards to 
secure and archive electronic data.   
Unit of Analysis 
	   Discrete postings by individual users constitute the unit of analysis for this study.  
Such postings are entirely contained (i.e. they have a clear beginning and end) and there 
are no limits to either the number of users who may participate in a discussion or the 
number of times an individual user may post within that discussion.  To be explicit, the 
current study makes no attempt to measure the relative volume of contributions by unique 
users; all postings are treated consistently and without any regard to the identification of 
the poster.  For those users who contribute multiple postings to a discussion board, each 
posting is simply counted and assessed as its own unit.  Though some prior studies have 
elected not to employ a user-blind data collection scheme (see, for example, Lewinski, 
2010; Himelboim, Gleave, & Smith, 2009), there is insufficient information available to 
the current researcher to ensure the validity of uniqueness among users.  Such a 
methodological decision may ultimately weaken the explanatory power and overall 
generalizability of the findings vis-à-vis other studies.  An important point of distinction, 
however, is that said studies have typically examined postings made by users through a 
validated entry portal.  In such cases, users possess login credentials affiliated with a 
credit card account number or other type of verifiable identifier.    
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Key Information Delimiters 
Though individual postings may constitute the unit of analysis, each record of 
data is further associated with a select number of key information delimiters to track its 
concordance with different kinds of news articles and segments.  Thus, while all postings 
are considered discrete units, they are all appended to a variety of journalist-created 
content.  This study is concerned with several dimensions of that content, and each 
information delimiter corresponds to one of the five overarching research questions.  
These include: the name of the publication or broadcast source (RQ1); whether the 
journalist-created content is print-based or multimedia (RQ2); whether the publication or 
broadcast entity employing the journalist exists solely on the Web or has an antecedent in 
traditional media (i.e. newspapers, news periodicals, television) (RQ3); whether the 
journalist-created content is principally covering domestic politics or international 
politics (RQ4); and whether the journalist-created content is principally covering acts of 
governing and policymaking or campaigning (RQ5).  The process for encoding these 
information delimiters is outlined in the next section. 
Purposive Sampling of Targeted Online Discussion Forums 
The discussion platforms of four online news sites – The Daily Kos, The Los 
Angeles Times, The Young Turks YouTube Channel, and The Associated Press YouTube 
Channel – were selected as a meaningful set of forums from which a purposive sampling 
of user contributions could be conducted.  Derived directly from the data collection needs 
articulated by the study’s research questions, two important dimensions needed to be 
accommodated by the choice of platforms: channel constitution and channel medium.  As 
depicted in Figure 1 and for purposes of this study, channel constitution may be either 
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traditional (i.e. there is an antecedent news channel existing in the traditional print and 
broadcast media) or Internet-native (i.e. there is no antecedent news channel).  Channel 
medium refers to whether the given format of news precipitating online discussion is 
print-based or multimedia.  By utilizing four distinct data sources, both dimensional 
considerations (and combinations thereof) may be adequately considered.  
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Figure 1: Two Dimensions of News Channel Sample Selection 
 
 Within each of the four dimensional quadrants, the respective news channel was 
selected based on a combination of inherent credibility, measurable popularity and the 
ease with which the required data could be extracted.  According to Alexa.com (2010a), 
the online edition of The Los Angeles Times (latimes.com) was the fifth most visited 
U.S.-based newspaper in the world at the time of data collection and bested only by The 
New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and USA Today.  Among 
the top five sites, only The Los Angeles Times presented its discussions in such a manner 
as to allow for straightforward archival in an electronic format.  Similarly, Daily Kos 
(dailykos.com) was the fifth most visited U.S.-based web original at the time (Alexa.com, 
2011b) and the only such site belonging to the category allowing users to post without a 
	  	  
	  
52 
verifiable account.  In consideration of the audiovisual domain, the prominence of 
YouTube as the third most trafficked website in the world (topped only by Google’s 
search engine (google.com) and Facebook’s social media platform (facebook.com)) 
(Alexa.com., 2010c) made the platform an obvious choice.  Within the YouTube universe 
of content, the Associated Press was the most popular news and politics channel based 
upon video views and The Young Turks placed third (first if rated by either the number 
of electronic subscribers or channel views) (VidStatsX, 2010).    
It is important to note that the period of study corresponded to a time in which all 
four of the targeted news organizations, irrespective of their age of modality, found 
themselves in the midst of epochal change and engaged in a mode of significant (or in 
some cases, desperate) experimentation to take advantage of new technologies.  The older 
outlets (the Associated Press and Los Angeles Times), which had successfully endured 
multiple paradigm shifts precipitated by successive technological advancements, were 
beginning to understand that this was to be no ordinary time.  The Associated Press, for 
example, began as a non-profit print news collaborative among major New York papers 
in the mid-1800s and then, over the next century and a half, expanded its offerings to 
include photos (1935), radio stories (1941) and video segments (1994).  Throughout this 
evolution, the AP never needed to think about changing the fundamental ways in which 
in operated: content was transmitted to member news affiliates through what was 
essentially a proprietary infrastructure.  The fact that AP made the decision in 2006 to 
begin posting much of its content to YouTube (an entirely free and open channel owned 
by another entity) both reflected the staggering ways in which the media landscape was 
changing and revealed the radical steps news outlets would need to take if they wanted to 
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remain viable.  Seemingly overnight, what had been a closed network between AP and its 
affiliates had been upended and affixed to, at least in comparison, a chaotic and at times 
unruly commenting community. 
For The Los Angeles Times, in existence as a major daily newspaper since 1881, 
the story of its history prior to this period of rapid change was dominated not so much by 
technological shifts but by factors of political-economy.  The paper's oscillation between 
boom and bust corresponded with dynamics of ownership and, more recently, its 
consolidation under the Tribune conglomerate in 2000.  Through each period, however, 
the newspaper – at least in its role as a public entity and purveyor of news – operated in 
much the same way as it always had.  As was the case with AP, by the mid-2000s The 
Los Angeles Times was forced to take steps that would previously have been anathema to 
its powerful editorial license.  In June 2005, the editors of the paper took the 
unprecedented step of inviting the readership to use the emerging technological tool of a 
wiki to collaboratively rewrite a prominent editorial pertaining to the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars.  Though the experiment was compromised by hackers before its 
effectiveness could be gauged, the paper had clearly signaled just how far it could – and 
would – deviate from its norms to remain relevant with its audience. 
For the newer outlets (Daily Kos and Young Turks, both launched in 2002), the 
rapidly changing technological and sociological conditions present at the time of their 
emergence meant that not only was a mode of experimentation welcome but it was also 
the only one they really new.  Unconstrained by the inertia of a long history or the 
overhead of a significant infrastructure, both outlets were able to enter the arena as 
nimble and more expansive-thinking participants.  Daily Kos, for example, did not have 
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to make the decision as to whether it was a news organization, a community of opinion-
making or a hub for activism; it very easily became all three at once.  And, particularly in 
comparison to most traditional outlets, it was able to quickly embrace new technological 
tools in far more prolific, meaningful and accepted ways (its longstanding use of wikis, 
for example, stands in stark contrast to that of The Los Angeles Times).  Given the 
orientation of Young Turks and the ease with which it could operate in this different 
world, its decision to launch a YouTube channel in 2005 was as naturally evolutionary as 
it was blatantly revolutionary for the Associated Press.  Young Turks, after all, had 
previously been a cable television access show and then a radio program on Sirius.  After 
emerging as the world's first daily streaming online talk show, it later went on to build its 
own network across multiple platforms and produced original programming for 24-hour 
cable giants Al Jazeera and CNBC.  To be able to make so many major shifts during such 
a short period of time would have simply been unthinkable in the decade prior. 
Timeframe for Data Collection and Rationale 
	   Data were collected from the four discussion platforms each day in the early 
evening (approximately 8-9pm EST) from February 1, 2011 to March 31, 2011.  Though 
the study investigated a longer period of time than was arguably needed, the strategic 
decision was made to employ a larger sample size to allow for greater statistical scrutiny 
of data subsets and to provide the opportunity to perform supplementary analyses as 
needed.  The timing of February-March presented a number of key seasonal advantages: 
the completion of the major American holidays and the subsequent conclusion of the 
consumer-driven, holiday news cycle; historical trends suggesting a period of significant 
activity for the major institutions of the United States government; and the lack of any 
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major, immediately imminent elections.  The timeframe of early 2011 was selected 
because it was not expected to be a period of intensive campaign reporting (the mid-term 
Congressional campaigns had just concluded and the U.S. Presidential election was still 
more than 20 months away).  Knowing that the run-up to a major election may fan certain 
partisan flames, the choice of timing constitutes a basic mechanism to control for what 
would otherwise be the overabundance of campaign related news and the potential 
skewing of ensuing discussions. 
Random Selection of Affiliated News Articles and Segments 
While the targeting of selected news sites was purposive, a sample of political 
news was selected each day using a consistent randomization scheme.  From each of the 
four sites, a single story or segment was selected each day and it, along with all of its 
affiliated online comments, was recorded.  Throughout the study period, the possibility 
existed for no new political news to be posted on a given day.  During these rare times, 
no sample was collected and the process began anew on the following day.  Some 
tailoring of the randomization process was necessary given the different ways in which 
the sites categorize and post political news.  For two of the sites, The Daily Kos and the 
Young Turks YouTube Channel, all of the content was known to be focused exclusively 
on political topics.  As such, any stories or segments posted that day (all of the sites have 
a time stamp indicating when content was originally uploaded) could simply be 
numbered sequentially and then sampled using a random number generator.  In contrast 
to these sites, content on the online edition of The Los Angeles Times was divided into 
popular newspaper categories (e.g. Business, Sports, Health, etc.).  Using the same 
randomization technique, samples were selected from all stories posted daily within the 
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site’s Politics section (the configuration of the categories has since changed).  Unlike The 
Los Angeles Times online site, the Associated Press YouTube Channel simply posted all 
its segments in a single repository irrespective of categorization.  While the same 
randomization strategy could be employed, a secondary step was needed to check 
whether or not the given sample was political in nature.  The researcher investigated each 
initial sample and, if it was not, in his best judgment, obviously political in nature, it was 
discarded for a secondary (or in some cases, tertiary) selection.  A catalog of the articles 
and segments selected appears in Appendix A. 
Differentiation Between Robust and Non-Robust Discussion Threads 
	   As this study focuses on the quality of discourse occurring within deliberative 
spaces associated with political news reports, there was a need to account for the fact that 
different kinds of topics simply generate different volumes of response.  Effectively 
controlling for the quantity of discussion demanded the development of a mechanism by 
which each sample (up to four per day throughout the period of the study) could be 
normalized.  Building upon the research of Himelboim, Gleave, and Smith (2009), the 
unit components of every discussion were further organized as a collection of threads in 
that each unit could be categorized as either being a catalyst or a response.  Catalysts 
were defined as those contributions that began a new thread of conversation within the 
broader discussion; responses were defined as, quite simply, non-catalysts.  Thus, a single 
thread was defined as a catalyst plus any subsequent responses.  The manner in which 
contributions are typically displayed in online discussion boards (and certainly for the 
four sites examined in this study), in that catalysts are aligned with the left margin of the 
frame and responses are indented, allowed for easy differentiation and categorization. 
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Once this categorization was completed, the mean length of all threads within 
each discussion thread was calculated.  Threads with a length below the mean were 
discarded and the remainder were defined as being sufficiently robust for purposes of this 
study (see Appendices B, C, D and E for a summary of the sequestration).  In effect, this 
process operationalized Fishkin’s (1992) concept of the continuum between “less 
deliberative” and “more deliberative” discourse and, in doing so, is clearly focusing the 
study’s exploratory powers on the more deliberative elements of the sampled online 
discussions.  As a healthy side effect, it is important to note that this process entirely 
weeds out, irrespective of the varying lengths of threads, any threads that have only a 
catalyst and no responses.  Such postings are, in effect, simple one-offs within the 
postings and neither trigger nor (in many cases) warrant a response.  Based upon how this 
study defines deliberation, there is very little that could be described as “deliberative” 
about these postings.   
Data Integrity and Preservation 
Building an archival platform to catalog a large number of discussion units, print-
based stories and multimedia segments required the utilization of several digital tools.  As 
all discussion contributions appeared as printed text, time-stamped screen shots of each 
sample were saved in Portable Document Format (PDF).  Affiliated, print-based news 
stories were similarly archived.  For associated, audiovisual segments appearing on one 
of the two YouTube channels, the Xilisoft YouTube Video converter was used to save a 
permanent, Quicktime movie file of each.  Data were exported incrementally to a readily 
accessible, cloud-based file system (GoogleDrive) with sufficient backup protection.  As 
an additional step, verbatim copies of all files were concurrently stored on a local, 
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external hard drive and also subjected to a regimented program of daily backups.  The 
syntax used in naming the files was intuitive and included consistent reference to the 
news source and date.  At the end of the data collection phase, the researcher amassed – 
and continues to possess – a complete digital archive of all relevant data, and that archive 
is stored in multiple locations. 
	  
Coding Scheme and Process 
Two months of data collection in February and March of 2011 resulted in the 
harvesting of 16,859 comments affiliated with more than 200 news stories and segments 
(see Appendix A).  Following the application of the established procedure to differentiate 
between robust and non-robust discussion threads and focus exclusively on those threads 
determined to have higher-than-normal rates of participation, the total sample population 
of the study declined to 5,881 (a comprehensive description of the data is offered in 
Chapter 4).  Subsequent months were used to develop an initial a priori content analysis 
coding scheme, to train a small team of coders, and to further calibrate the coding 
scheme.  As noted by Weber (1990), Stemler (2001), and Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (2005), 
such an analysis mandates that coding categories, definitions and procedures be 
established in advance and based on existing theoretical foundations and methodologies.  
Revisions to the process may be made as necessary, particularly as coders are trained, 
inter-coder reliability tested, and coding instructions refined.  Full encoding of the data 
was accomplished during the late Spring and Summer of 2012. 
This section outlines critical elements necessary to establish and administer the a 
priori coding scheme.  Attention is paid to: the usage of trained coders and refinement of 
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their work; the operationalization of key concepts into essential variables; the 
introduction of a formalized coding sheet; and necessary tests for reliability and validity.	  
Training and Management of Coders 
Given the large amount of data and heeding Krippendorf’s warning – “Probably 
the worst practice in content analysis is when the investigator develops his recording 
instructions and applies them all by himself…” (p. 74) – the careful training of a coding 
team became an absolute prerequisite for a reliable analysis.  Two university students, 
both of whom were known to the researcher but not to one another, were recruited for the 
project and compensated for their efforts.  One student was a master’s level graduate 
student in communication at a large, public university; the second was an advanced 
undergraduate studying communication at a small, private college.  The researcher held 
an initial, introductory session with both members of the team present.  The research 
program was described in general terms and initial coding instructions were distributed.  
In keeping with the highest standards of reliability (see, for example, Krippendorf, 1980; 
Weber, 1990), modifications and refinements to the coding scheme, based upon the 
researcher’s ongoing assessment of its effectiveness when utilized by the coders, were 
incorporated by the researcher in isolation from the coders; revised coding instructions 
were then given to the coders uniformly and independently.  Following their initial group 
meeting with the researcher, the coders were not in contact with one another until all data 
had been fully coded.      
Operationalization of Grouping Variables 
Given the relevant concepts encapsulated by the overarching research questions, a 
handful of grouping variables needed to be introduced into the broader constructs of the 
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coding scheme.  All of the grouping variables are nominal and two of them – channel 
constitution and channel medium (as shown in Figure 1) – could be coded effortlessly as 
they merely reflect the news source.  Coding for two other grouping variables – 
geographic focus of political news, and topical focus of political news (illustrated in 
Figure 2) – required the participation of the coders.  As part of their initial slate of 
instructions, coders were given access to the complete digital archive of news stories and 
segments and asked to code all of the news samples for each of the two grouping  
 
 Grouping Variables 
 Geographic Focus Topical Focus 
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Domestic: 
Focus on the United 
States 
 Governing: 
Focus on Lawmaking, 
Policymaking and Public 
Policy Issues 
International: 
Focus on Nations Other 
Than the United States 
Campaigning: 
Focus on Elections, Balance 
of Power Discussions and 
Political Strategy 
	  
Figure 2: Key Grouping Variables 
 
variables (the final coding scheme appears in Appendix F and a quick sheet is provided in 
Appendix G).  The technique proved effective and the coders agreed on the relevant 
attribute 97% of the time with respect to the geographic focus variable and 92% of the 
time with respect to the topical focus variable.  On the very few occasions when the 
coders did not agree, the researcher made the final determination. 
 
 
	  	  
	  
61 
Operationalizing the Concept of Discursive Quality 
Chapter 2 described the logic behind gauging discursive quality with respect to 
four distinct dimensions: civility, politeness, justification and complexity.  Considered 
individually or in the aggregate, these measures may help to reveal a given discussion 
board's overall level of broader civic-mindedness, in that discourse can be considered the 
artifact of the deliberative activities taking place therein.  This section, as well as two of 
the accompanying appendices, detail how each of these four concepts are operationalized 
into working variables to be employed within the content analysis methodology. 
Operationalization of the concept of civility draws heavily from the work of 
Papacharissi (2004) and, to a lesser extent, that of Ruiz, Domingo, Mico, Diaz-Noci, 
Meso, and Masip (2011).  Using Papacharissi’s definition, civility is understood to be 
profoundly different – and thus requiring clear differentiation in any coding scheme – 
than the notion of politeness.  Moreover, civility is a default mode of behavior that is 
violated (i.e. a mode of civility becomes a mode of incivility) when a discussant employs 
one or more of the following argumentative techniques:  (1) she verbalizes a generalized 
or specific threat to democracy, democratic institutions or democratic values.  In this 
case, democracy in considered to be an amalgam of the broader concepts of liberty, 
equality and the rule of law; (2) she verbalizes a threat to individual rights and freedoms.  
These threats may take the form of statements intending or promising to do physical, 
psychological or emotional harm with the goal of retarding the freedom to enjoy such 
rights and freedoms.  In addition, these threats may be directed specifically at another 
discussant or more generally at a citizen or group of citizens; or (3) she employs one or 
more antagonistic stereotypes – that is, the discussant distinguishes, labels and makes a 
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judgment about a group of individuals – intended to antagonize, discredit or harm.  These 
antagonistic stereotypes may be directed specifically at another discussant or more 
generally at a citizen or group of citizens.  Though their work is focused on a very 
different research trajectory, the use of a “cooperative search for truth” variable by Ruiz 
et al. (2011) in defining a necessary feature of deliberative quality helps to corroborate 
the general framework advanced by Papacharissi (2004).  In addition, analyses completed 
by Zhou, Chan, & Peng (2008) in examining the emergence of online public spheres in 
China effectively validated Papacharissi’s original definition of civility. 
With respect to politeness, the work of Jamieson (1997) and Jamieson and Falk 
(1998) proved highly instructive for purposes of the current study.  Though Jamieson 
labels her framework a measure of civility and it has been employed and validated by 
numerous scholars since (see, for example, Kessler, 2008), its methodology is executed in 
concordance with gauging levels of politeness as defined by Papacharissi (2004).  In 
contrast to civility, politeness is measured by the absence of such techniques as name-
calling, pejorative utterances, vulgarity (Jamieson & Falk, 1998), hot-button words and 
inflammatory speech (Kessler, 2008).  Similar to politeness, this study’s coding scheme 
considers politeness to be the default mode of behavior unless a discussant marshals one 
or more of the following: (1) name-calling that is clearly intended to offend.  These 
name-callings may be directed specifically at another discussant(s) or more generally at a 
citizen or group of citizens; (2) ad hominem attacks – that is, an attack on another’s 
characteristics or authority without addressing the substance of the argument itself.  Here, 
too, attacks may be directed specifically at another discussant or more generally at the 
public; or (3) vulgar language, either expressed explicitly or clearly implied in the use of 
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abbreviations, grawlixes or other obvious symbols.  At the time of coding, all members of 
the coding team were given a static printout of the collectively constructed list of vulgar 
terms appearing in the online dictionary at noswearing.com.  This dictionary served as 
both a resource and an objective arbiter of what constitutes vulgarity and what does not.   
Justification is arguably the most straightforward measure of the quality of 
deliberation and was a key feature of nearly every methodology examined (Jamieson & 
Falk, 1998; Graham & Witschge, 2003; Papacharissi, 2004; Stromer-Galley, 2007; 
Kessler, 2008; Zhou, Chan, & Peng, 2008; Himelboim, Gleave & Smith, 2009).  In this 
measure, justification is simply the expression of some form of evidence to support an 
argument or claim.  The incorporation of evidence is indicative of the normative 
benchmark of logic and coherence (Habermas, 1984; see also Ruiz et al., 2011) and may 
take the form of supporting information ranging from the incorporation of third-party 
facts to the sharing of personal narratives.  Within the current coding scheme, 
justification is considered to not be present unless one or more of the following criteria 
are met: (1) the discussant justifies an argument or perspective by providing supporting 
evidence in the form of cited facts, embedded documents, web links, or 
quoted/paraphrased comments from experts; (2) the discussant justifies an argument by 
providing supporting evidence in the form of a description of personal experience or a 
first-hand account.   
Finally, the variable of complexity is an amalgam of several factors coalescing 
around the basic belief that the highest quality of deliberation is typically found in 
communities of debate characterized by a wide diversity of perspectives and the pursuit 
of deeper understanding (Ruiz et al., 2011).  Stromer-Galley’s (2007) variable of 
	  	  
	  
64 
“question” (a genuine inquiry into directed to another speaker trying to seek information), 
Zhou, Chan, and Peng’s (2008) “complexity” (the presence of an idea that incorporates 
conflicting value claims into its own claim), and Kessler’s (2008) “conflict” (the co-
presence of separate, conflicting ideas or policy positions in the same utterance) 
constitute different facts of the same variable.  For purposes of this study, complexity is 
not considered to be present in a comment unless the commenter has endeavored to do 
one or more of the following:  (1) incorporate opposing viewpoints into a given post, 
irrespective of whether she agrees with those viewpoints; (2) express the same viewpoint 
in multiple ways; (3) articulates her lack of certainty on a topic; or (4) clearly asks an 
honest question (versus a strictly rhetorical one) in an attempt to better understand a topic 
or viewpoint.   
The coding scheme for the variables of civility, politeness, justification and 
complexity is clearly described in Appendix F and further accounted for in Appendix G 
(the coding quick sheet employed by the coders).  For each of the four variables, it is 
important to note that the study does not factor in any sense of gradation in the strength 
of the variable.  Corresponding attributes are strictly binary in constitution and a key 
characteristic should be thought of as simply being present or not present.  Additional 
instructions were given to the coding team to note comments that had been removed by 
the discussion moderator, flagged by users as spam (and thus blocked from viewing), 
were indecipherable (including appearing in a language other than English), or for which 
the coder could simply not otherwise make a clear determination.   
Beginning with each of the four measures, a basic compound measure of 
deliberative quality was computed for each entry based upon a simple count of the 
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occurrences of civility, politeness, justification and complexity.  Those entries with zero 
or one instance were categorized as “low” (coded as 1); those with two instances (the 
mid-point of the range) were categorized as “medium” (coded as 2); and those with three 
or four instances were categorized as “high” (coded as 3). 
Though the study is chiefly concerned with the quality of deliberation occurring 
within robust discussion threads, an abbreviated secondary analysis examined indicators 
of quality within a representative sample of non-robust threads.  Of the 16,859 comments, 
10,978 were deemed to be non-robust.  A sample size of 371 was needed to measure the 
population with a standard confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of +/- 5%. 
Initial Pilot Study, Calibration of Coding Scheme and Test for Intercoder Reliability 
 Both Lacy and Riffe (1996) and Neuendorf (2002) suggest a sample size of 30 as 
a rule of thumb for conducting an initial pilot study.  Following this guidance, the 
researcher independently gave each coder an identical set of thirty units selected 
randomly from the net collection of 5,881 user comments; a random number generator 
aided in the randomization effort.  Initial levels of intercoder agreement with respect to 
the four nominal variables of deliberative quality fell within a relatively narrow band of 
64% to 73%.  After discussing and carefully reviewing the coding decision-making with 
each coder individually, the researcher improved the precision of the coding instructions 
and conducted a second pilot study using the same process; again, a random sample of 30 
non-duplicates was selected from the net data collection.  Following the second iteration, 
intercoder agreement improved to a range of 72% to 83% across the four variables.  
Based upon subsequent discussions (similarly conducted by the researcher independently 
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with each coder), additional clarifications to the coding scheme were made and a formal 
test of intercoder reliability was undertaken. 
 Lacy and Riffe (1996) derive a formula for determining the requisite sample size 
needed to establish sufficient intercoder reliability levels for nominal content categories:   
𝑛 = 𝑁 − 1 𝑆𝐸 ! + 𝑃𝑄𝑁𝑁 − 1 𝑆𝐸 ! + 𝑃𝑄  
Within this formula, N is the total population; SE is the standard error corresponding to a 
given confidence interval; P is the presumed population level of agreement; and Q=(1-P).  
For the current study: N=5,881; P=0.8 (a conservative estimate based upon the insights 
of the pilot); Q=0.2; and PQ=0.16.  Presuming a confidence interval of 5% and a desired 
level of probability of 95%, we can utilize the basic formula: Confidence  interval = 𝑍(𝑆𝐸) 
Z is the one-tailed Z-score associated with the given confidence level.  Using the normal 
distribution, the Z-score for 0.05 (a 5% confidence interval) is 1.64.  Solving for SE: 
𝑆𝐸 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑍  
SE is computed as 0.0305 and the required n can now be calculated: 
 𝑛 = 5,881− 1 0.0305 ! + 0.8 (0.2)(5,881)5,881− 1 (0.0305)! + 0.8 (0.2) 	  
 
Thus, a random sample of 174 test units are needed for the intercoder reliability test.  As 
adapted from Riffe, Lacey, and Fico (2005), if an 80% agreement in coding a variable on 
those 174 test units is achieved, chances are 95 out of 100 that at least an 80% or better 
agreement would exist if the entire content population was coded by all coders and 
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reliability measured.  The formal test for intercoder reliability revealed a very high level 
of concordance existing between the coders, as summarized in the following table: 
Table 1: Summary of Intercoder Reliability Test 
	  
Variable #  Cases 
# 
Agreements 
# 
Disagreements 
% 
Agreement 
Krippendorff’s 
Alpha 
Civility 174 166 8 95.4% 0.813 
Politeness 174 169 5 97.1% 0.943 
Justification 174 165 9 94.8% 0.903 
Complexity 174 166 8 95.4% 0.912 
 
	  
	  
Examination of Research Questions 
	   Basic contingency tables were developed for each of the five research questions 
and chi-square analyses were performed to test the respective null hypotheses: 
(RQ1) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility, 
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and political news 
source; 
(RQ2) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility, 
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and political news 
channel medium; 
(RQ3) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility, 
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and political news 
channel constitution; 
The remaining two research questions employed both the chi-square test and the more 
powerful Mantel-Haenszel analysis, which tested the following null hypothesis while also 
controlling for the news source 
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(RQ4) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility, 
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and the geographic 
focus of the corresponding article/segment; 
(RQ5) There is no association between the deliberative quality (civility, 
politeness, justification, complexity) of comments and the topical focus of 
the corresponding article/segment. 
 
Conclusion and the Need for Supplementary Analysis 
 The method of content analysis carries with it numerous, significant advantages 
that make it an excellent choice for purposes of this study:  it is a non-obtrusive, non-
reactive measurement technique; it recognizes that, because content often has a life 
beyond its production and consumption, longitudinal studies are possible using archived 
materials; and the quantification or measurement by coding teams permits reduction to 
large quantities of information that would be logistically impossible for close qualitative 
analysis (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005, p. 38-39).  While all of these pluses bode well for the 
current study, it is important to be mindful of and, to the extent possible, mitigate against, 
what are typically thought to be the overarching criticisms of the method.  Holsti (1969), 
for one, recommends blending quantitative content analysis with supplementary 
qualitative analysis to offset any claims that the quantification of content may lead to its 
trivialization.  Similarly, a supplementary qualitative analysis would be useful in 
identifying any key distinctions between manifest and latent content that the coding 
scheme is otherwise incapable of detecting. 
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 Though it would be impractical to engage in a deep reading of the nearly 6,000 
coded entries, the supplementary analysis identifies the most robust discussion threads for 
each of the four news sources.  As a matter of differentiation, these discussion threads are 
those having the highest total measures of deliberative quality as computed by the given 
methodology.  Put another way, these leading threads will have the most numerous, 
aggregate occurrences of civility, politeness, justification and complexity within a given 
thread. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
Overview and Descriptive Statistics 
 The given procedures for harvesting a significant data set of user comments 
posted on media-hosted discussion boards proved highly effective.  Over the course of 
the two-month data collection phase, nearly 17,000 comments affiliated with 201 unique 
political news articles and audiovisual segments across four popular sources were 
systematically recorded.  A comprehensive inventory of selected news content (along 
with a corresponding comment count for each) appears in Appendix A.  A more detailed 
breakdown of comment characteristics, including further differentiation among non-
threads, catalysts and responses, appears in Appendices B,C,D and E.  As shown in Table 
2, 5,742 comments were analyzed over the course of the study; a very small number 
(139) of the 5,881 comments deemed to be in robust discussion threads were eliminated 
per the coding methodology.  The Young Turks YouTube Channel accounted the largest 
number of comments (both recorded and analyzed), while Daily Kos generated threads of 
the greatest average length.   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Purposive Sample of Comments 
	  
Source 
# 
Comments 
Recorded 
Mean Thread 
Length 
# Comments 
Analyzed % of Total 
Associated Press  2,825 2.45 711 25.2% 
Daily Kos 3,982 3.90 1,929 48.4% 
Los Angeles Times 1,155 2.03 379 32.8% 
Young Turks 8,897 3.22 2,723 30.6% 
TOTAL 16,859 3.20 5,742 34.1% 
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In focusing the exploratory power of the study, the partitioning scheme limited the 
number of comments analyzed from a range of 25.2% (Associated Press) to 48.4% (Daily 
Kos).  The website of The Los Angeles Times was the least prolific generator of 
comments, measured either by total count or mean length of each thread.  
Given some of the skepticism for online discussion platforms outlined in the 
previous chapter, it was somewhat surprising that overall measures of deliberative   
across the whole of the robust stream proved to be noticeably high.  As shown in Table 3, 
approximately 81% of all comments drawn from the robust sample were of medium or 
high deliberative quality.  In contrast, only 29% of the small sample drawn from the non-
robust discussion stream were similarly classified; 71% of comments were found to be of 
low deliberative quality.  These findings suggest that the underlying assumptions 
employed in developing the methodology to differentiate between robust and non-robust 
discussions were valid. 
Table 3: Deliberative Quality (Robust Versus Non-Robust Threads) 
	  
Thread Type Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
# Comments 
Analyzed 
Robust (All) 1,073 (19%) 2,254 (39%) 2,415 (42%) 5,742 
Non-Robust (Sample) 263 (71%) 82 (22%) 26 (7%) 371 
 
 
Findings: Research Questions 
RQ1 
The first research question examines whether or not there are significant 
differences in levels of deliberative quality of users’ comments based solely upon the 
affiliated source of political news (i.e. Associated Press, Daily Kos, The Los Angeles 
Times and Young Turks).  In addition to considering the aggregate measure of 
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deliberative quality, differences within the individual components (i.e. civility, politeness, 
justification and complexity) were also investigated across the four news components.  
Table 4 depicts the chi-square contingency table of political news source and deliberative 
quality.  All differences are found to be statistically significant and the null hypothesis – 
that there is no association between the deliberative quality of discussion and source of 
political news – is rejected.  Particularly noteworthy in the given set of findings is the 
consistency with which comments are found to be of medium deliberative quality across 
the four news sources.  From a low of 35% (The Los Angeles Times) to a high of 40% 
(Young Turks), the range of the medium band is strikingly narrow, particularly when 
considered in contrast to the low and high bands.  Daily Kos is clearly skewed far more 
heavily towards a higher quality of deliberation, as is, to a lesser extent, Young Turks.  In 
comparison, Associated Press and Los Angeles Times tilt noticeably towards the negative 
end of the deliberative quality spectrum.  Though considered in greater detail 
Table 4: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative 
Quality) 
	  
Source Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Associated Press  234 (33%) 275 (39%) 202 (28%) 
Daily Kos 178 (9%) 751 (39%) 1,000 (52%) 
Los Angeles Times 116 (31%) 131 (35%) 132 (35%) 
Young Turks 545 (20%) 1,097 (40%) 1,081 (40%) 
χ2 (6, N = 5,742) = 287.400, p < 0.001 
 
under the auspices of RQ3, it is interesting to note that positively-oriented comment 
streams are those affiliated with news sources that began in cyberspace (they have no 
precursor in traditional print or broadcast domains).  Similarly, negatively-oriented 
comment streams are those occurring within the discussion platforms of news sources 
that have their origins in channels that long predate the Internet. 
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 Tables 5 through 8 depict the chi-square contingency tables for each of the four 
components of deliberative quality (civility, politeness, justification and complexity, 
respectively) across the four news sources.  Though the differences in each of the four are  
Table 5: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) 
	  
Source Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Associated Press  128 (18%) 583 (82%) 
Daily Kos 122 (6%) 1,807 (94%) 
Los Angeles Times 75 (20%) 304 (80%) 
Young Turks 253 (9%) 2,470 (91%) 
χ2 (3, N = 5,742) = 120.685, p < 0.001 
	  
Table 6: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) 
	  
Source Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Associated Press  382 (54%) 329 (46%) 
Daily Kos 492 (26%) 1,437 (74%) 
Los Angeles Times 208 (55%) 171 (45%) 
Young Turks 1,008 (37%) 1,715 (63%) 
χ2 (3, N = 5,742) = 247.477, p < 0.001 
	  
Table 7: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) 
	  
Table 8: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) 
	  
Source Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Associated Press  546 (77%) 165 (23%) 
Daily Kos 1,163 (60%) 766 (40%) 
Los Angeles Times 253 (67%) 126 (33%) 
Young Turks 1,893 (70%) 830 (30%) 
χ2 (3, N = 5,742) = 78.060, p < 0.001 
Source Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Associated Press  390 (55%) 321 (45%) 
Daily Kos 882 (46%) 1,047 (54%) 
Los Angeles Times 195 (52%) 184 (48%) 
Young Turks 1,437 (53%) 1,286 (47%) 
χ2 (3, N = 5,742) = 28.748, p < 0.001 
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highly statistically significant, an examination of the individual components reveals that 
the variances of those differences are, in some cases, highly consistent, and, in others, 
quite divergent.  Civility, for example, was dependably high across all four news sources 
(from a high of 94% for Daily Kos to a low of 80% for The Los Angeles Times).  In 
contrast, measures of politeness varied widely across the four, with two clear clusters 
emerging: Daily Kos and Young Turks occupied a higher band of politeness (with a range 
of 63% to 74%), while The Los Angeles Times and Associated Press occupied a much 
lower band (with a range of 45% to 46%).  In the case of both the civility and politeness 
measures, however, news sources native to the Internet faired consistently higher than 
those with origins in traditional media. 
	   With respect to the justification measure, and as shown in Table 7, there was little 
difference across the four news sources and all were tightly clustered around the 50% 
mark.  Though there is a much wider variability with respect to the complexity measure 
(from a high of 40% with Daily Kos to a low of 23% with Associated Press), all suffer 
from low levels of complexity within their respective comment streams.  Complexity is 
the only variable for which fewer than one-half – and for three of the sources, fewer than 
one-third – of the comments linked to all news sources contain the requisite indicator 
affiliated with quality deliberation.  If complexity is a key ingredient of healthy online 
deliberation, it is found far less often than not across the whole of the data examined. 
RQ2 
The second research question examines differences in deliberative quality of user 
comments based upon channel medium, the first of two dimensions differentiating the 
precipitating news sources.  As described in the preceding chapters and depicted in 
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Figure 1, channel medium may be either multimedia/audiovisual (as in the case of the 
Associated Press and Young Turks YouTube channels) or print (a la Daily Kos or The 
Los Angeles Times).  As revealed in Table 9, print-based news stories precipitated, with  
Table 9: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Deliberative 
Quality) 
	  
News Medium Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Multimedia / Audiovisual 779 (23%) 1,372 (40%) 1,283 (37%) 
Print 294 (13%) 882 (38%) 1,132 (49%) 
χ2 (2, N = 5,742) = 118.952, p < 0.001 
 
statistical significance, higher quality comments but not by an overwhelmingly large 
margin.  Both multimedia and print-based news sources yielded comments that tended to 
be of higher quality than not (the aggregate of medium- and high quality comments were 
77% and 87%, respectively). 
Subsequent chi-square contingency tables for each of the four components of 
deliberative quality are shown in Tables 10 through 13.  With moderate to high 
Table 10: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Civility) 
	  
News Medium Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Multimedia / Audiovisual 381 (11%) 3,053 (89%) 
Print 197 (9%) 2,111 (91%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 9.988, p < 0.01 
	  
Table 11: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Politeness) 
	  
News Medium Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Multimedia / Audiovisual 1,390 (40%) 2,044 (60%) 
Print 700 (30%) 1,608 (70%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 61.406, p < 0.001 
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Table 12: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Justification) 
	  
News Medium Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Multimedia / Audiovisual 1,827 (53%) 1,607 (47%) 
Print 1,077 (47%) 1,231 (53%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 26.614, p < 0.001 
	  
Table 13: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Medium and Complexity) 
	  
News Medium Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Multimedia / Audiovisual 2,439 (71%) 995 (29%) 
Print 1,416 (61%) 892 (39%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 58.539, p < 0.001 
	  
statistical significance with respect to each of the four comparisons, we can say 
conclusively that news conveyed through the print medium spawned comments that were 
of higher deliberative quality relative to each of the four measures.  These differences 
were larger for the variables of politeness and complexity (print-based news sources 
yielded comments that were, in each case, 10% more polite and complex than those 
precipitated by multimedia/audiovisual-based sources) and nearly nil for the variable of 
civility (91% versus 89%).   
RQ3 
The third research question examines differences in deliberative quality of user 
comments based upon the second of two dimensions differentiating the precipitating 
news sources: news channel constitution.  As shown in Figure 1, the grouping variable of 
news channel constitution can take on one of two attributes: web original (i.e. native to 
the Internet) or traditional (i.e. non-native to the Internet).  On the surface, the findings 
affiliated with RQ3 are very similar to those of RQ2.  Comments of high or medium 
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deliberative quality are, with a high degree of statistical significance, more frequent in 
platforms hosted by web-original news sources than traditional ones (85% versus 68%, 
respectively; see Table 14).  The same is true with respect to each of the individual 
components of deliberative quality: civility (92% versus 81%; see Table 15), politeness 
(68% versus 46%; see Table 16) and complexity (34% versus 27%; see Table 18) are 
noticeably higher for web-original news sources than traditional ones.  As is the case 
elsewhere, differences between the two dimensions with respect to the component of 
justification are less obvious and have more modest statistical significance (see Table 
17). 
Table 14: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and 
Deliberative Quality) 
	  
News Constitution Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Internet-Native 723 (15%) 1,848 (40%) 2,081 (45%) 
Traditional 350 (32%) 406 (37%) 334 (31%) 
χ2 (2, N = 5,742) = 172.798, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 15: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and Civility) 
	  
News Constitution Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Internet-Native 375 (8%) 4,277 (92%) 
Traditional 203 (19%) 8887 (81%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 108.836, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 16: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and 
Politeness) 
	  
News Constitution Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Internet-Native 1,500 (32%) 3,152 (68%) 
Traditional 590 (54%) 500 (46%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 182.690, p < 0.001 
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Table 17: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and 
Justification) 
	  
News Constitution Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Internet-Native 2,319 (50%) 2,333 (50%) 
Traditional 585 (54%) 505 (46%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 5.156, p < 0.05 
	  
Table 18: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Constitution and 
Complexity) 
	  
News Constitution Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Internet-Native 3,056 (66%) 1,596 (34%) 
Traditional 799 (73%) 291 (27%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 23.183, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
RQ4 
 The fourth and fifth research questions focus on differences in the deliberative 
quality of comments relative to generalizable differences in the content of the news 
stories and segments themselves (see Figure 2).  Specifically, RQ4 examines whether or 
not there are statistically significant variations in user comments based upon the 
geographic focus of the political news stories (understood to be predominantly focused 
on either domestic affairs or international issues).  In contrast to prior results and as 
shown in Table 19, there appears to be no statistically significant difference in the  
Table 19: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Deliberative 
Quality) 
	  
Geographic Focus Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Domestic 884 (19%) 1,879 (40%) 1,967 (41%) 
International 189 (19%) 375 (37%) 448 (44%) 
χ2 (2, N = 5,742) = 2.941, p = 0.230 
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deliberative quality of comments based upon the geographic focus of the affiliated 
political news content.  As revealed in Tables 20 through 23, the same can be said for 
differences in all four of the components of deliberative quality.   
	  
Table 20: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Civility) 
	  
Geographic Focus Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Domestic 469 (10%) 4,261 (90%) 
International 109 (11%) 903 (89%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 0.674, p = 0.412 
	  
	  
Table 21: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Politeness) 
	  
Geographic Focus Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Domestic 1,729 (37%) 3,001 (63%) 
International 361 (36%) 651 (64%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 0.280, p = 0.597 
	  
	  
Table 22: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Justification) 
	  
Geographic Focus Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Domestic 2,414 (51%) 2,316 (49%) 
International 490 (48%) 522 (52%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 2.284, p=0.131 
	  
Table 23: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Geographic Focus and Complexity) 
	  
Geographic Focus Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Domestic 3,171 (67%) 1,559 (33%) 
International 684 (68%) 328 (32%) 
χ2 (3, N = 5,742) = 0.114, p = 0.736 
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Because the grouping variable of geographic focus cuts across the content of all 
four news sources, it is possible to run the more powerful Mantel-Haenszel analysis and 
examine the subsequent chi-square contingency tables for each of the components of 
deliberative quality while controlling for political news source (see Tables 24 through 
27).  Though a large sample of comments was harvested to allow for this additional level  
of granularity of analysis, it becomes immediately evident that the number of comments 
	  
Table 24: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Civility 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Geographic Focus Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Associated Press  Domestic International 
94 (20%) 
34 (24%) 
476 (80%) 
107 (76%) 
Daily Kos Domestic International 
114 (6%) 
8 (6%) 
1,682 (94%) 
125 (94%) 
Los Angeles Times Domestic International 
70 (19%) 
5 (45%) 
298 (81%) 
6 (55%) 
Young Turks Domestic International 
191 (10%) 
62 (9%) 
1,805 (90%) 
665 (91%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 0.351, p = 0.514 
	  
Table 25: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Politeness 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Geographic Focus Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Associated Press  Domestic International 
309 (54%) 
73 (51%) 
261 (46%) 
68 (49%) 
Daily Kos Domestic International 
460 (26%) 
32 (24%) 
1,336 (74%) 
101 (76%) 
Los Angeles Times Domestic International 
203 (55%) 
5 (45%) 
165 (45%) 
6 (55%) 
Young Turks Domestic International 
757 (37%) 
251 (35%) 
1,239 (63%) 
476 (65%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 3.049, p = 0.081 
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affiliated with internationally-focused news stories from The Los Angeles Times (n=11) is 
insufficient to extract any reasonably conclusive findings.  Prefaced with this important 
limitation, however, it is clear that neither civility nor politeness vary in a statistically 
significant way with respect to geographic focus while controlling for the remaining three 
political news sources. At the same time, there is insufficient statistical significance to 
suggest that similar variations within the complexity indicator, though seemingly 
apparent, are not by chance alone.  It is only in the variable of justification that we see 
	  
Table 26: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Justification 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Geographic Focus Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Associated Press  Domestic International 
300 (53%) 
90 (64%) 
270 (47%) 
51 (34%) 
Daily Kos Domestic International 
818 (46%) 
64 (48%) 
978 (54%) 
69 (52%) 
Los Angeles Times Domestic International 
186 (51%) 
9 (82%) 
182 (49%) 
2 (18%) 
Young Turks Domestic International 
1,110 (56%) 
327 (45%) 
886 (44%) 
400 (55%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 7.034, p < 0.01 
	  
Table 27: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Geographic Focus and Complexity 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Geographic Focus Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Associated Press  Domestic International 
426 (75%) 
120 (85%) 
144 (25%) 
21 (15%) 
Daily Kos Domestic International 
1078 (60%) 
85 (64%) 
718 (40%) 
48 (36%) 
Los Angeles Times Domestic International 
247 (67%) 
6 (55%) 
121 (33%) 
5 (45%) 
Young Turks Domestic International 
1,420 (71%) 
473 (65%) 
576 (29%) 
254 (35%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 1.690, p = 0.194 
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any substantive differences based upon geographic focus of news content while 
controlling for news source.  Of particular note, the Young Turks YouTube Channel 
generated comments that were significantly more justified for international-focused 
segments than domestic ones.  Interestingly, the AP YouTube Channel saw the opposite 
result as its comments were significantly more justified for domestically-focused 
segments than domestic.  That there can be this kind of acute variability within a single 
commenting platform (YouTube) is worthy of additional consideration and scrutiny.   	  
	  
RQ5 
Similar to the fourth research question, the fifth examines variability in the 
deliberative quality of comments relative to the topical focus of the precipitating news 
content.  In this case, topical focus may be either campaigning-specific or governing-
specific (a more thorough description of the differentiation can be found in Chapter 3 and 
is summarized in Table 2).  As shown in Table 28, differences in deliberative quality 
based upon topical focus are slight though of statistical significance.  In addition, per 
Table 29, there is almost no variance in the component characteristic of civility between 
campaigning-focused and governing-focused stories and segments (these tiny differences 
are statistically significant).  In contrast, Tables 30 through 32 reveal modest but 
	  
Table 28: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Deliberative Quality) 
	  
Topical Focus Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Campaigning 236 (22%) 420 (40%) 408 (38%) 
Governing 837 (18%) 1,834 (39%) 2007 (43%) 
χ2 (2, N = 5,742) = 12.826, p < 0.01 
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statistically-significant differences with respect to politeness (60% of comments are 
polite for campaigning-focused content versus 65% for governing-focused content), 
justification (45% versus 50%, respectively) and justification (45% versus 50%, 
respectively).  In each case, those comments generated by governing-focused stories and 
segments possess more of the characteristics of higher deliberative quality. 
Table 29: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Civility) 
	  
Topical Focus Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Campaigning 85 (8%) 979 (92%) 
Governing 493 (10%) 4,185 (90%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 6.226, p < 0.05 
	  
	  
Table 30: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Politeness) 
	  
Topical Focus Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Campaigning 429 (40%) 635 (60%) 
Governing 1,661 (35%) 3,017 (65%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 8.674, p < 0.01 
	  
	  
Table 31: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Justification) 
	  
Topical Focus Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Campaigning 581 (55%) 483 (45%) 
Governing 2,323 (50%) 2,355 (50%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 8.488, p < 0.01 
	  
Table 32: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Topical Focus and Complexity) 
	  
Topical Focus Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Campaigning 766 (72%) 298 (28%) 
Governing 3,089 (66%) 1,589 (34%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 13.956, p < 0.001 
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As was possible for RQ4, utilization of the Mantel-Haenszel analysis offers 
deeper insights into differences in the deliberative quality of comments based upon the 
topical focus of news content while controlling for news source.  For the Associated 
Press and The Los Angeles Times (both traditional in terms of the grouping variable of 
news constitution), measures of civility were noticeably and statistically significantly 
higher for comments affiliated with stories focused on campaigning than governing (see 
Table 33).  In contrast, differences of politeness were starkest within the Daily Kos; 75%  
Table 33: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Civility 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Topical Focus Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Associated Press  Campaigning Governing 
0 (0%) 
128 (19%) 
32 (100%) 
551 (81%) 
Daily Kos Campaigning Governing 
17 (8%) 
105 (6%) 
184 (92%) 
1,623 (94%) 
Los Angeles Times Campaigning Governing 
22 (16%) 
53 (22%) 
112 (84%) 
192 (78%) 
Young Turks Campaigning Governing 
46 (7%) 
207 (10%) 
651 (93%) 
1,819 (90%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 8.089, p < 0.01 
	  
Table 34: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Politeness 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Topical Focus Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Associated Press  Campaigning Governing 
16 (50%) 
366 (54%) 
16 (50%) 
313 (46%) 
Daily Kos Campaigning Governing 
68 (34%) 
424 (25%) 
133 (66%) 
1,304 (75%) 
Los Angeles Times Campaigning Governing 
71 (53%) 
137 (56%) 
63 (47%) 
108 (44%) 
Young Turks Campaigning Governing 
274 (39%) 
734 (36%) 
423 (61%) 
1,292 (64%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 4.403, p < 0.05 
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of comments were found to be polite for governing-focused stories versus 66% for 
campaigning-focused stories (see Table 34).  Measures of justification were significantly 
higher in the Associated Press, Daily Kos and The Los Angeles Times for governing-
focused stories and segments versus those that were campaign-focused; there was no 
perceivable difference for Young Turks (see Table 35).  In addition, higher levels of 
complexity were significantly skewed towards governing-focused content across all of 
the news sources (see Table 36).	  
Table 35: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Justification 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Topical Focus Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Associated Press  Campaigning Governing 
21 (66%) 
369 (54%) 
11 (34%) 
310 (46%) 
Daily Kos Campaigning Governing 
111 (55%) 
771 (45%) 
90 (45%) 
957 (55%) 
Los Angeles Times Campaigning Governing 
80 (60%) 
115 (47%) 
54 (40%) 
130 (53%) 
Young Turks Campaigning Governing 
368 (53%) 
1,068 (53%) 
328 (47%) 
958 (47%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 5.779, p < 0.05 
	  
Table 36: Results of Mantel-Haenszel Analysis (Topical Focus and Complexity 
Controlling for Political News Source) 
	  
Source Topical Focus Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Associated Press  Campaigning Governing 
31 (97%) 
515 (76%) 
1 (3%) 
164 (24%) 
Daily Kos Campaigning Governing 
137 (68%) 
1,026 (59%) 
64 (32%) 
702 (41%) 
Los Angeles Times Campaigning Governing 
91 (68%) 
162 (66%) 
43 (32%) 
83 (34%) 
Young Turks Campaigning Governing 
507 (73%) 
1,386 (68%) 
190 (27%) 
640 (32%) 
χ2 (1, N = 5,742) = 11.770, p < 0.001 
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Supplementary Analysis 
Identifying the Most Robust Discussion Threads By News Source 
 Utilization of the given procedure to identify the thread of highest aggregate 
deliberative quality for each of the four precipitating news sources yielded the selection 
described in Table 37.  Given previous findings, it is not surprising to learn that the 
leading threads on Daily Kos and Young Turks were noticeably longer than those on The 
Los Angeles Times or Associate Press.  Similarly expected was the fact that the leading 
Table 37: Leading Discussion Threads For Each News Source 
	  
  Channel Constitution 
  Web Original Traditional 
C
ha
nn
el
 M
ed
iu
m
 
Pr
in
t 
 
Daily Kos 
 
Leading Thread: 
# of Comments: 121 
Aggregate Quality: 355 
Average Quality: 2.93 
 
Precipitating Article: 
“So-called ‘Right to 
Work’ and the assault on 
the middle class” 
 
Los Angeles Times 
 
Leading Thread: 
# of Comments: 6 
Aggregate Quality: 17 
Average Quality: 2.83 
 
Precipitating Article: 
“State Department 
spokesman P.J. Crowley 
resigns” 
M
ul
tim
ed
ia
 
 
Young Turks 
 
Leading Thread: 
# of Comments: 48 
Aggregate Quality: 121 
Average Quality: 2.52 
 
Precipitating Segment: 
“Def. Secretary Gates: 
Crazy Wars in Iraq, 
Afghanistan” 
 
Associated Press 
 
Leading Thread: 
# of Comments: 33 
Aggregate Quality: 69 
Average Quality: 2.09 
 
Precipitating Segment: 
“Raw Video: House 
Abortion Debate Gets 
Personal” 
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threads precipitated by news in the medium of print had comments of higher average 
deliberative quality than those contained within threads affiliated with multimedia-based 
news. 
The supplementary analysis requires a deep reading of each of the four leading 
threads and the active scanning for readily apparent patterns that may not otherwise be 
discernable from the results of employing the broader content analysis coding 
methodology alone.  Though this secondary analysis admittedly is limited as it 
investigates but a single thread for each news source, what emerges across the four is 
highly significant both in terms of clarity and consistency:  Each thread reflects a 
definitive (and remarkably contained) style of deliberation that is relatively easy to 
describe, and the overarching tone of each of these styles appears to be highly associated 
with that of the precipitating stories and segments themselves.  While potential reasons 
for these styles and correlations will be discussed in Chapter 5, it is first necessary to 
review the general patterns. 
Daily Kos: Bounded and Cerebral 
The Daily Kos article – “So-called ‘Right to Work’ and the assault on the middle 
class” – could hardly be described as, nor would there any expectation of it being, an 
objective piece based solely upon a resuscitation of facts; even the headline of the piece 
suggests its overt subjectivity.  In fact, large portions of the article take the form of a 
syllogism intended to build a cogent argument.  Consider the following passage, 
annotated with components of the logical construct:   
(Major Premise) In fact, RtW laws actually represent the government interfering 
in what employers can do, by preventing employers and unions from agreeing to 
“union security” clauses.  A union security clause says that if the union represents 
you, you have to pay your share of the costs they incur.  (Minor Premise) So what 
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banning that type of agreements means is that if someone gets a job in a unionized 
workplace, the union has to represent them, but they have no responsibility to the 
union.  They get the wages and benefits negotiated, however improved those may 
be (union members earn, on average, 28% more than non-members), and don’t 
contribute to the costs of negotiating.  If they’re fired illegally, the union 
represents them for free, no matter how much staff time and resources go into 
defending them.  And if they feel like the union didn’t do well enough 
representing them for free, they can sue.  (Conclusion) You can see where this 
goes.  People enter as freeloaders, happy to have improved wages and benefits 
and help when they have a problem with the boss, and happy to let someone else 
pay for it.  But that freeloading weakens the union, and in the end, working 
conditions and pay are driven down for everyone: RtW states have an average 
wage of $5,500 lower than other states (Clawson, 2011; italics added). 
 
By their very nature, syllogisms are a construct of deductive reasoning that employ the 
steady application of reduction until truth becomes apparent.  Employing this kind of 
argumentative tool lessens the likelihood for alternative conclusions, and it is intriguing 
that both the form and the function of the deliberative exchange that follows are both 
overtly rational and also especially narrow – and narrowing –  in focus.  Note the 
following sequence of comments (online usernames follow in italics): 
- Public unions and private unions are entirely different things.  Private unions 
negotiate with a private company; the rest of us are not involved.  If they 
succeed, the company and union prosper.  If not, they fail.  Public unions 
negotiate with the public in general.  Public employees being paid more mean 
private employees being paid less due to paying higher taxes.  (Sparhawk) 
 
- Public unions negotiate with the employer, just as private unions do.  Public 
employees being paid more can mean a wide variety of things.  In some cases, 
it means actually having better employees who do a better job with a stronger 
commitment to it.  Just because a union negotiates in support of public 
employees does not mean it operates against the public’s best interests.  (Julie 
Waters) 
 
- Thank you, Julie.  As usual, it’s always assumed public employees make a lot 
more than private employees.  It’s not always the case.  (daphnepf) 
 
- It’s not the case at all.  It depends on the job and the situation.  Some do quite 
well, but it’s easy to make things look worse than they are buy quoting top-
level salaries (Julie Waters) 
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- It’s frequently not the case as several studies have shown.  There are big 
differences depending on educational level.  Those with the least education 
tend to do somewhat better as public employees than as private employees.  
Those with more education tend to do worse.  (Meteor Blades) 
 
- I agree, public sector workers’ pay and benefits are based upon the averaging 
of wages earned in the private sector; public sector unions (police, firefighters, 
teachers, et al.) have become the new enemies in American politics.  It is 
strange to find individuals willing to blame Veterans Affairs nurses bringing 
in $36K/year that they need a pay cut because their meager take home pay is 
destroying the livelihood of all other Americans… (Epsilon) 
 
- The only time where it is the case is in areas where the local government is 
hiring the most skilled workers, as in rural areas.  Then, the most educated and 
skilled workers are doing government IT, teaching, policing, lawyering, etc.  
They may have a higher wage but it still is lower usually than they would 
make in a more urban area.  (elfling) 
 
- The problem is hiking taxes on poor/middle class to pay for service union 
wage hikes.  Why can’t the service unions collectively call on a wealth tax to 
fulfill obligations made to them?  The Dems are in trouble to the extent that 
they ask the private sector working and middle-class, which has seen stagnant 
wages for the last decade, to “suck it up” by shouldering a higher tax burden.  
And regrettably, some Dem governors are doing just that.  (PatriciaVa) 
 
- True and though not really the issue it’s an effective way to rile the middle 
class who is paying the lion’s share of the taxes.  The Democrats need to do 
two things – link tax hikes for the highest earners with collective bargaining 
agreements and be specific about expectations for labor, public and private.  
We need to define expectations for wages, unemployment, health care and 
pensions and strive for national standard.  Even if the super rich start to pay 
their fair share, what is it and what’s it for?  Getting these answers will diffuse 
the ageless issues used by the parties that impede getting closure.  (kck) 
	  
As civil and polite as it is cerebral and abstract, this thread (the longest and of highest 
aggregate quality in the whole of the study) rarely drifts beyond the boundaries of the 
logical form contained within the precipitating article.  Equally noteworthy, the self-
selected members of the community police themselves (for better or worse) and rarely 
allow for a wider field of perspectives.  When the divergence of viewpoints become too 
great, an offsetting, converging force will often try to intervene and reign in the 
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discussion back to a more reasonably norm for the community.  Consider the following 
exchange: 
- I look around my apartment and see a flat panel tv, glasses, chairs, a stereo, 
etc.  All of that stuff was created by the private sector.  The police just help 
make sure that stuff isn’t stolen or broken.  In exchange for that service, I give 
up a stereo I might have otherwise had.  The more expensive the police are, 
the less stuff I have for my own consumption.  Education is a little different 
because it is an investment (pay now, gain later).  But police and fire services 
are a total dead loss –  necessary, I agree, but they don’t make anything useful 
and draw off the stuff that is made (Sparhawk) 
 
- Production isn’t possible without public services.  Without public services, 
there will be no investment and no production.  Take a look around at the 
world at places where the government is unable to enforce property rights, 
where there are no universally enforced laws, where education and security 
are private goods to be paid for by those than can afford them.  They draw 
little investment, produce little, and everyone is worse off as a result.  
(WellstoneDem) 
 
- Both of you are making valid points.  The two real and complicated questions 
are:  1. When does the number of dollars paid to the public employee in total 
compensation exceed the value of the service provided?  At that point, if not 
before, one should certainly be in favor of reducing the compensation of the 
public employee.  2. Could one find an equally qualified individual for less 
money?  At that point, one can legitimately argue that the compensation 
should be reduced.  (Justanothernyer) 
 
Beyond those who help keep the core arguments of the discussion intact, other members  
of the online community take it upon themselves to expose others who do not fall within 
the narrow band of the prevailing political persuasion (in this case, liberal progressivism), 
either to ensure that near-outliers are widely known or to suggest to far-outliers that their 
views are not welcomed.  Examples include: 
- She’s a centrist.  Her signature is sort of a broad hint in this area.  And minus 
the apparent rationalizations, all centrism is about using the power of the 
government to facilitate upward transfer of wealth.  (alizard) 
 
- But outside Wall Street, the Richistani, and the political class they fund and 
the media they own, sightings of real centrists in the wild are rare.  For the 
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obvious reason, all that’s in it for the rest of us in centrism is lots and lots of 
trouble.  (sturunner) 
 
- Your anti-worker right wing bullshit gets old.  Well paid workers contribute 
more to the economy no matter the source of their income.  Libertarians are 
clueless, I swear.  The concepts of society and the common good completely 
escape you, don’t they?  (happy camper) 
 
- Shhhh… or this Ayn Rand reading guy who is calculating everyone’s net 
worth to society is going to suggest that our children go out and get jobs.  I 
can hear it already: Child Labor Laws – bah humbug.  (Puddytat) 
 
Los Angeles Times: Competing Attributions 
In stark contrast to blog-style articles originating from Daily Kos, stories posted 
on the website of The Los Angeles Times typically adhere to the same journalistic 
standards as political news that are physically printed in nearly any mainstream, 
American newspaper.   If any news analysis is performed, it is merely to aid the reader in 
connecting the often scattered dots of a more complex news reality and not to offer 
political judgment.  Nowhere in the selected precipitating news story from The Los 
Angeles Times is an opinion offered.  Instead, the article takes the form of a well ordered, 
just-the-facts recounting (in this particular case, of why a prominent State Department 
spokesperson abruptly resigned), complete with the requisite nut graph and string of 
attributed details.  Consider the first four paragraphs (style annotations appear in italics): 
(Nut Graph) The State Department’s top spokesperson resigned Sunday, three 
days after criticizing the Pentagon for its treatment of a soldier imprisoned on 
charges of leaking U.S. government documents posted on the WikiLeaks website.  
(Attributed Detail)  P.J. Crowley, the assistant secretary of State for public affairs, 
told a group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on Thrusdayt that the 
Pentagon’s treatment of Pfc. Bradley Manning was “ridiculous and 
counterproductive.”  His comments were made public by a blogger who attended 
the session.  (Attributed Detail) Manning was forced to sleep naked for several 
days under military rules intended to keep maximum-security prisoners who may 
be suicidal from injuring themselves.  Manning’s lawyers say he also has been 
made to stand at attention naked, and there was no justification for his treatment 
in custody.  (Attributed Detail) President Obama defended the Pentagon at a news 
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conference Friday, when ABC reporter Jake Tapper pressed him about Crowley’s 
comments.  Obama said he had been assured that Manning’s treatment was 
“appropriate and was meeting our standards.” (Richter, 2011) 
 
Though comments posted on the website of The Los Angeles Times are not nearly as 
voluminous as they are elsewhere, the leading thread reveals a deliberative style that is, 
once again, noticeably consistent and perhaps taking its queue from the form of the 
precipitating news story.  In this case, the whole of the deliberative exchange exudes an 
overarching sense of certainty based upon two very distinct kinds of attributions: 
righteousness, or the direct appeal to higher-level (if abstract) virtues of morality and 
humanity; or the seeming concreteness of lived experienced.  In the rather basic 
conservative-versus-liberal argument that ensues, one camp exclusively utilizes one 
beacon of certainty while the other is steadfast in tapping into the other.  Though the 
comments generally possess civility, politeness, and in several cases justification (thus 
yielding higher measures of deliberative quality), it is difficult to imagine that any 
common ground or co-created political meaning could emerge from the deliberations.  
Nowhere in the exchange is there even a whiff of doubt as to the certainty of each user’s 
respective argument, not unlike the style of the news story itself: 
- They made him stand at attention?  Poor dear.  My drill instructors at Parris 
Island would have been devastated for the unhappy little guy.  Manning is, or 
was supposed to be, a soldier.  We have an all-volunteer military.  Nobody 
asked him to enlist.  Soldiers occasionally stand at attention.  And as for 
requiring him to sleep without his footie jammies, well… He’s confined to a 
military brig, not at Club Fed.  Here’s a hint for Bradley: “Actions have 
consequences.”  (Kinnison) 
 
- Actions have consequences?  Here’s one… the belief that information on 
ongoing wars that cost human lives everyday needed to be freely available.  
Here is Mr. Crowley who lost a 3 decade long career for saying what he 
believed in the land of the free.  And both could have simply kept quiet.  If 
they were Wall Street CEOs throwing away money and lives, that would have 
been ok, if there were warmongering politicians sending young soldiers to 
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fake wars, that would have been ok.  Here a hint for Bradley and others – 
“Free thought has consequences.”  (neilm101)	  
	  
- From a retired member of the Armed Forces:  It may be the land of the free… 
but you give up certain rights when you join the military, the police, the 
intelligence services, or the Department of State.  This is the issue: You can’t 
simply go blabbing your mouth because you feel like it.  Manning or Crowley.  
(Salmon)	  
	  
- “I was just following orders” – soldier of the 3rd Reich (mr. gittes)	  
	  
- These comments show the mentality of the conservative mind.  Evil and 
perverse.  It’s part of their DNA.  (senior)	  
	  
Young Turks: Reverence for the Cult of Personality 
Unlike the other three sources of political news, the Young Turks YouTube is the 
only one with reporting emanating from a single individual – in this case, the channel’s 
creator and longtime host, Cenk Uygur.  As is the style of so many broadcasted talk show 
hosts, bloggers, and so-called political “commentators” (i.e. pundits), Uygur typically 
establishes a provocative but also strong and clear position early on in his segment 
(indeed, the leading thread is affiliated with a segment that indirectly identifies Uygur’s 
position in its very title – “Def. Secretary Gates: Crazy Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan”) and 
then incessantly reinforces his point with a rapid-fire succession of facts (volleyed in a 
staccato style), leading questions, unchallenged assumptions and quick conclusions. The 
style indicators (shown in italics) are clearly evident in the following section of his 
report: 
(Clear and Provocative Position) In terms of Afghanistan, we’re still there and 
not withdrawing.  (Leading Question) So, if our Defense Secretary thinks this is 
such a terrible idea, why do we continue to stay there?  (Clear and Provocative 
Position – Continued) It’s a very fair question.  (Fact #1)  And, by the way, the 
DNC just passed a resolution saying that Obama needs to do a speedy withdrawal 
from Afghanistan; so the Democrats agree.  (Fact #2)  And, oh by the way, ABC 
News did a poll two months ago saying 60% of Americans think it was the wrong 
idea to go into Afghanistan.  (Unchallenged Assumption)  My guess is that if you 
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did a poll – and I’ve seen others polls – that if you asked should we leave as soon 
as possible the percentage would be even higher and past 70%.  (Quick 
Conclusion)  So, if we all agree, let’s go… let’s get out of there. (Uygur, 2011a). 
 
Not surprisingly, the comment that then spawns the leading thread is also both 
provocative and clear in establishing its position: 
- Iraq sure, it was a big mistake… But don’t tell me for a second that we 
shouldn’t have gone into Afghanistan.  That’s bullshit.  We had to go over 
there and fuck those bitches up.  (MrHav1k) 
 
The comment immediately following the catalyzing post is, in turn, very much a leading 
question that triggers its own bombardment of facts:   
- All wars are bullshit.  Name one war that was done, solely chosen by the 
people, for the people.  Instead all ward are started by special interest groups.  
Normal people just want to have some land and house, a family, a little 
respect and getting old peacefully.  (georgemargaris) 
 
- What about World War 2?  (theRekcabofD) 
 
- Napoleonic Wars?  (sulmagnificent) 
 
- Ummm… the American Revolution?  (darkraider47) 
 
- Just for the sake of being a douche, I’m pretty sure the old Spartans eventually 
went to war because they all wanted to show everyone how awesome they 
were at killing.  (AsifIcarebear3) 
 
- World War I, many Americans at the time, wanted to remain isolated from the 
Great War in Europe.  (EvilFingers) 
 
- WW2.  If we hadn’t fought that this entire world would be controlled by a 
racist totalitarian state with only “Aryans” as the last ones living. 
 
- The Libyan revolt? (bersaba) 
 
- French revolution, American revolution, etc… the list just goes on and on.  
(redryan2000) 
 
- Defensive wars… can’t blame the US for WWII.  Can’t blame the French for 
WWI.  Wars of aggression, more accurately, are bullshit, which is why they 
are technically outlawed under international law. (Redfingers) 
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- Name one war?  Okay.  First one that comes to mind is the Yellow Turban 
Rebellion from 184-205 against Emperor Ling.  (falconfira) 
 
- Defeating Hitler was in the best interest of every human on the planet.  
(soundslave) 
	  
Though many contribute to this thread in a manner that suggests a relatively high level of 
deliberative quality (based upon the given methodology), there is very little being 
accomplished in the way of arriving at a more vibrant sense of understanding or co-
created meaning.  The thread barely takes the form of a discussion at all and is merely an 
accumulation of rather disjointed pseudo-facts; lost is any specific attention paid to 
debating the efficacy of recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As the amassing of 
unrelated facts continues to snowball, no members of the community step in to attempt to 
reign in the conversation and refocus it with a renewed sense of purpose, let alone 
endeavor to synthesize the discussion into any kind of cogent conclusion.  While they 
may behave with civility and politeness, employ justification, and express modest levels 
of complexity in their expression, members of the community very rarely attempt to 
moderate or conclude.  Given that Uygur’s popularity with his viewers arguably borders 
on that of a cult of personality (not unlike other single-voice purveyors of political news 
content), members of the community may not see it as their place to do so; those 
functions are reserved for the community’s leader (Uygur), who, noticeably, never 
directly engages with posters.   
Associated Press: Accidental Crusader 
 The final segment, drawn from the YouTube Channel of the Associated Press, not 
only covers a highly politically charged topic (abortion) but also does so without the 
presence of any journalist, commentator or moderator at all.  The three minutes of so-
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called raw video (the segment is entitled, “Raw Video: House Abortion Debate Gets 
Personal”) is of a single – if graphic – exchange between two members of Congress: one 
is male, likely pro-life, and identified as being a Republican from New Jersey; the other 
is a female, seemingly pro-choice, and introduced as a being a Democrat from California.  
The exchange, though brief, has nothing in the way of lead-up or post hoc assessment; it 
is merely the audiovisual record of one small block of a lengthier floor debate: 	  
(Male, Republican, New Jersey) I am talking about the scandal of these unborn 
children and calling it choice.  There is nothing, whatsoever, benign or caring or 
generous or just or compassionate or nurturing about abortion.  Earlier one of our 
colleagues called abortion “healthy” for the child.  Abortion dismembers children, 
piece to piece… in late-term abortions, the doctors goes in with a pair of forceps 
and literally hacks that baby to death… it is not healthy for children and it is not 
healthy for women either.  (Female, Democrat, California) I had planned to speak 
about something else but the gentleman from New Jersey has just put my stomach 
in knots.  I am one of those women he spoke about  just now.  I had a procedure at 
17 weeks pregnant with a child.  That procedure you just talked about was a 
procedure I endured.  I lost a baby, but for you to stand on this floor and to 
suggest as you have that somehow this is a procedure that is either welcomed or 
done cavalierly or done without any thought is preposterous.  To think that we are 
here tonight, debating this issue, when the American people are scratching their 
heads and wondering, what does this have to do with me getting a job?  
(Associated Press, 2011) 
 
If the leading thread extracted from the Young Turks discussion board lacked a definitive 
contributor who was attempting to coalesce or steer the conversation, it is safe to say that 
the same cannot be said for the Associated Press’ top thread.  As shown in the following 
exchange, and then repeated again and again throughout the thread (not shown), the user 
Viracocha711 takes it upon herself/himself to counter nearly every pro-life-leaning entry 
made on the board: 
- Abortion should be up to the carrying woman.  No one else.  (Gahagafaga) 
 
- Not at all you murdering son of a bitch.  (wefanworld) 
 
- Seriously, grow up! (Viracocha711) 
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- I just can’t come up with a good reason to allow anyone (even the mother) to 
kill a baby or fetus.  I don’t claim to be right.  I just can’t think of one good 
reason. (fermos11111) 
 
- Are you truly that ignorant?  What about a 13yr old girl who has been 
repeatedly raped by her stepfather?  Or a mother who will die if she continues 
on with a pregnancy?  Or a 30yr old woman was brutally raped.  YOUR 
COMMENT SICKENS ME! (Viracocha711) 
 
- She obviously had an abortion and is trying to make herself feel better by 
justifying killing babies… did I hit the nail on the head or what?  
(fermos11111) 
 
- Who had an abortion and is trying to make themselves feel better?  Abortion 
is a woman’s right!  It is her body!  END OF STORY.  If we force women to 
do things then that sets the stage to force anyone to do whatever the 
governments says when it comes to one’s body.  We are a SECULAR nation 
and everyone has the right to govern their own bodies.  Folks just need to 
mind their own business!  It’s that simple!  (Viracocha711) 
 
Though almost none of her/his adversaries offer counterstatements to the given retorts 
(even though the majority do continue to contribute in other threads affiliated with the 
same segment), Viracocha711 should not be considered a so-called “Internet troll,” the 
popular term given to a person who attempts to wreak havoc within online discussion 
boards by posting inflammatory and often topically unrelated messages so as to upset the 
ordinary flow of communication.  Instead, the user’s online persona is more depicted as 
that of an accidental crusader, a person who clearly operates with a heavy sense of 
righteousness and who somehow must fulfill the duty of speaking out but would 
otherwise like to see the very argument itself subside.  In this manner, and as illustrated 
on the final comment shown above, Viracocha711’s responses often blend a 
supercharged, emotional expression with a conclusion of utter simplicity – “… folks just 
need to mind their own business.”  In this way, his/her style is not unlike that of the 
Democratic House Member, who, after revealing something highly personal, reduces the 
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magnitude of the issue by saying, “To think that we are here tonight… when the 
American people… are wondering, what does this have to do with me getting a job?” 
 Interestingly, a brief (and admittedly non-scientific) scan of Viracocha711 
throughout cyberspace reveals an approach to commentary that is hardly accidental.  A 
Google search of this unusual term yields approximately 6,400 unique results, and it is 
relatively easy to determine that the user is actually an American male in his mid-40s 
who works as a computer engineer and lives in suburban Atlanta, Georgia.  Clearly 
spending copious amounts of time in dozens (if not hundreds) of online communities, 
Viracocha711’s modus operandi is to capitalize upon politically charged moments 
(always originating with the words or actions of a prominent political figure(s)) by 
employing them as an invitation to defend – or perhaps more accurately, to assert – his 
political views within a broader community.  Not surprisingly, there can be no swaying 
the opinions of such an unlikely crusader: a moment of (distant and detached) political 
controversy provides him the requisite agency to defend, just as his innate righteousness 
anchor his beliefs to a bedrock of certainty.  
	  
Conclusion and Summary of Findings 
In their most basic form, these findings support a simple but profound conclusion: 
there are powerful, overarching differences in the kinds of Internet-based conversations 
happening across all of the news platforms investigated.  Essential to a deeper 
understanding of the potential and threat they possess vis-à-vis democratic discourse – let 
alone the proliferation of reforms to strengthen what works well and mitigate against 
what does not – is the understanding that such spaces should not be considered 
myopically.  Even when taking care to recognize the heterogeneity of users, critics of 
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online discussions too often leap to blaming what they see as a singular platform of 
communication that precipitates a uniform result.  As but one recent (and, at the time, 
landmark) high-profile example, the editors of Popular Science in 2013 made the 
decision to eliminate online comments entirely claiming that “trolls and spambots” had 
diminished their ability to make good on the magazine’s “141-year commitment of 
fostering lively, intellectual debate and spreading the word of science far and wide” 
(LaBarre, 2013).  In an online explanation to readers, the site’s content director argued: 
Comments can be bad for science.  That's why… we're shutting them off… 
That is not to suggest that we are the only website in the world that attracts vexing 
commenters.  Far from it.  Nor is it to suggest that all, or even close to all, of our 
commenters are shrill, boorish specimens of the lower Internet phyla.  We have 
many delightful, thought-provoking commenters.  But even a fractious minority 
wields enough power to skew a reader's perception of a story, recent research 
suggests… If you carry out those results to their logical end – commenters shape 
public opinion; public opinion shapes public policy; public policy shapes how and 
whether and what research gets funded – you start to see why we feel compelled 
to hit the "off" switch (LaBarre, 2013). 
 
Indeed, commenters may very well shape public opinion in the manner described, but it 
must not be forgotten that while commenters, even if they are interfacing with one 
another using tools that did not exist a decade ago, are fundamentally the same human 
beings with the same tendencies.  In an essay featured in The New Yorker entitled “The 
Psychology of Online Comments,” Konnikova (2013) urges caution against Popular 
Science’s choice of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater, suggesting: 
Whether online, on the phone, by telegraph, or in person, we are governed by the 
same basic principles. The medium may change, but people do not.  The question 
instead is whether the outliers, the trolls and the flamers, will hold outsized 
influence—and the answer seems to be that, even protected by the shade of 
anonymity, a dog will often make himself known with a stray, accidental bark. 
Then, hopefully, he will be treated accordingly (Konnikova, 2013) 
 
  In advancing her point, Konnikova draws heavily upon the work of Yzer & Southwell 
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(2008) whose social and psychological research attempts to place this straw man fallacy 
in proper context: 
The recent emergence of new media, or better, new communication technologies, 
has afforded substantial commentary regarding societal effects, the latest chapter 
in a decades-old trend that rises and falls with each new communication 
technology. [We] do not deny that the current generation of communication 
technologies differs from predecessors… [we] argue against the need for 
wholesale changes in theory to understand the effects of these technologies.  New 
communication technologies do not fundamentally alter the theoretical bounds of 
human interaction; such interaction continues to be governed by basic human 
tendencies.  What is perhaps most interesting about these new technologies is 
their ability to provide new or previously rare contexts for information expression 
and engagement (Yzer and Southwell, 2008, p.8). 
 
 It is against the backdrop of these emerging possibilities for different forms of 
interaction and exchange that the findings of this chapter are summarized and also 
depicted in the form of a single table included as Appendix H: 
• In total: The sample of threads deemed to be robust generated a vastly higher 
level of deliberative quality than the sample of non-robust threads.  When 
postings catalyze more lengthy conversations, these conversations are 
approximately six times more likely to be of high deliberative quality than those 
that do not generate lengthy conversations.  To put it another way, the quantity of 
comments in a thread appears to be positively correlated with its discursive 
quality.  Though they can be anything from racist to vulgar, negative comments 
do not appear to hold the same ability as positive ones to sustain a conversation.  
Intrinsically, this may be avery positive sign for the underlying health of public 
discourse. 
• In response to RQ1: There are large and statistically significant differences in 
overall measures of discursive quality across the four platforms, thus lending 
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further credence to the need of considering their idiosyncrasies.  Interestingly, and 
as shown in Figure 3, all four platforms had a nearly identical share of comments 
demonstrating a middle level of quality.  This consistent band, accounted for, in 
each, about one-third of the total with a range of just five basis points (35 to 40).  
In contrast, low-quality comments had a range of 24 (9 to 34 basis points) and 
high quality comments had a range of 26 (28 to 52).  With respect to individual 
measures, civility was dependably high across all four platforms; politeness 
varied considerably; justification was reasonably consistent across the four and 
clustered around 50%; and complexity was uniformly low across the four. 
 
Figure 3: Measures of Discursive Quality Across Four Platforms (% of Total) 
 
• In response to RQ2: Print-based news generated higher quality comments than 
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audiovisual news; the same was true for the four individual indicators of quality. 
• In response to RQ3: News coming from Internet-native sources generated higher 
quality comments than news from traditional sources; the same held true for the 
component indicators.  
• In response to RQ4: News covering international issues was no different than 
news covering domestic issues vis-à-vis the quality of comments; this was also 
the case for each of the individual indicators.  The Mantel-Haenszel analysis 
(controlling for news source) revealed two intriguing outliers: the Young Turks 
generated comments that were significantly more justified for international-
focused segments; the AP generated comments that were significantly more 
justified for domestic-focused segments. 
• In response to RQ5: News stories focused on a mode of governing were very 
slightly – though statistically significant – different than news stories covering 
issues of campaigning.  Those stories focused on governing generated higher 
quality comments; the same was true for each of the four component measures. 
The Mantel-Haenszel analysis (again, controlling for news source) revealed that, 
for the AP and The Los Angeles Times, civility was noticeably higher for 
campaign-focused stories than governing-focused stories.  For Daily Kos, 
politeness was noticeably higher for articles covering governing than those 
examining campaign-related issues. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
	  
Preface 
One does not have to have the vision and perspective of Buckminster Fuller, 
Gordon Moore or Ray Kurzweil to appreciate the extent to which new technologies – and 
new attitudes surrounding those technologies – have accelerated the rate of change 
throughout modern society.  To put it more simply: Things move pretty fast in the Digital 
Age.  Thus, before commencing a discussion of the implications of the findings contained 
within this study, it is first necessary to review some of the key shifts – some of them 
rather extraordinary – in both the prevailing wisdom and the quality of tools available to 
catalyze (or in some cases, squelch) the power and prevalence of online comments.     
When this investigation first began several years ago, there were already telltale 
signs that the pressures faced by news organizations to adequately monitor and moderate 
these relatively open discursive spaces were mounting.  For some, their concerns centered 
around a bevy of new ethical and legal dimensions – questions of corporate liability, 
concerns for slander or libel, etc. – arising from the blurred line of responsibility existing 
at the intersection of professionally-edited, journalist-produced news content and the so-
called "Wild West" of comment boards (see, for example, Rosen, 2011).  Others were 
concerned about the potential tarnishing of their own reputations resulting from their 
willingness to host a platform containing sentiments that were toxic, racist, xenophobic or 
homophobic (see, for example, Sloane, 2013).  As one example, The Attleboro Sun 
Chronicle, a modest daily newspaper based in Southeastern Massachusetts, garnered 
national and international attention (see, for example, Kirchner, 2010) when it made the 
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landmark decision to begin charging users 99 cents for a dedicated login before they 
could post comments. The newspaper's editor, Mike Kirby, shared the following in an 
interview with the author: 
The decision was taken out of basic need.  We're a small paper that wants to be 
engaged with the community and our readers, but our news staff was simply not 
big enough to keep up with the volume of comments that needed to be monitored.  
On top of that, there was a situation in which a string of comments defaming the 
character of a local city official put us in a real bind.  We didn't author what was 
written but the words were sitting on our server and readily viewable from our 
webpage.  Commenters don't have the burden of proof upon them that journalists 
do.  The 99-cent fee was actually the brainchild of our [information technology] 
guy.  He thought that if we required people to charge a tiny fee – 99 cents – to 
their credit card, we would have a clear record of who they were.  This was first 
and foremost about protecting the integrity of the paper.  It really didn't matter to 
us if people remained anonymous within the user community and pseudonyms 
were still allowed.  But if something got really sticky we had a way to more 
clearly show what was our content and what wasn't.  And, if it gave people a little 
more skin in the game and made them think a bit more before they posted, that 
was certainly okay, too (M. Kirby, personal communication, February 5, 2012).  
 
Since data for this investigation were first collected, major news-providing 
organizations everywhere have wrestled mightily with these overarching questions and 
many have used anonymity controls as a primary level.  In one recent tally, of the largest 
137 newspapers in the United States – those with daily circulations in excess of 50,000 – 
49% have banned anonymous commenting while an addition 9% never allowed 
commenting (of any form) in the first place (Santana, 2014).  Some, such as The Chicago 
Sun-Times, heralded the spirit of the forums but felt compelled to hit the pause button in 
in April 2014 until such time as either technology or attitudes (or both) could mature: 
The world of Internet commenting offers a marvelous opportunity for discussion 
and the exchange of ideas.  But as anyone who has ever ventured into a comment 
thread can attest, these forums too often turn into a morass of negativity, racism, 
hate speech and general trollish behaviors that detract from the content. In fact, 
the general tone and demeanor is one of the chief criticisms we hear in regard to 
the usability and quality of our websites and articles.  Not only have we heard 
your criticisms, but we often find ourselves as frustrated as our readers are with 
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the tone and quality of comments on our pages... Again, we are not doing away 
with comments.  But we do want to take some time and work on the qualitative 
aspect of how they are handled and how we can foster a productive session rather 
than an embarrassing mismatch of fringe ranting and ill-informed, shrill bomb-
throwing (Newman, 2014). 
 
Others news outlets, such as the periodical National Journal, have made the reluctant 
choice but expressed no intention of ever going back: 
We believe that public service is a noble calling; that ideas matter; and that 
trustworthy information about politics and policy will lead to wiser decisions in 
the national interest.  Those principles are reflected in everything we do – from 
the stories we write, to the events we produce, to the research and insights we 
offer our members.  But there's one place where those principles don't seem to 
hold: in the comments that appear at the end of our Web stories.  For every 
argument, there's a round of ad hominem attacks – not just fierce partisan feuding, 
but the worst kind of abusive, racist, and sexist name-calling imaginable.  The 
debate isn't joined.  It's cheapened, it's debased... and research suggests that the 
experience leaves readers feeling more polarized and less willing to listen to 
opposing viewpoints (Grieve, 2014). 
 
As an alternative to eliminating anonymity altogether, and sensitive to its potentially 
beneficial disinhibiting effects, other news providers have ramped up their monitoring 
and moderating functions considerably.  The Huffington Post, for example, made the 
decision to employ a large team of specialists trained to ensure that comments met a 
certain standard of civility and soon thereafter required user identities to be validated 
through Facebook (Toth, 2014). This latest decision upset many longtime commenters 
who benefited from the platform's (once) leading-edge system of progressive credibility 
badges and other online tools used to differentiate users based upon the overall quality of 
their comments over a period of time. One prolific commenter signed off rather 
poignantly: 
4 Plus years... 7900 fans... 2600 friends... 63000 comments... after a Networker 
Badge, a Superuser Badge, a Moderator Badge, a Third World America Badge, a 
Predictor Badge, a Beta Tester Badge AND most significantly, a Political Pundit 
Badge. Each represents something very real to me: commitment, connection, 
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trust, concern, foresight, judgment and wisdom recognized by HP. I THOUGHT 
THAT HP WAS GOING TO HAVE A LONG TERM PLACE IN MY LIFE... 
Day in and day out, it was HP that was my intellectual oasis, my debate club. It 
was a point of connection with folks who really wanted to consider complex 
issues and speak in nuances tones. I took part in some really wonderful 
conversations. One of them involved 23 interchanges with a nurse who altered my 
understanding of the nature of the choices that women make in matters of 
reproductive health. In others I fought long and hard with those representing the 
other side of the political and social spectrum and, in the end, agreed that we 
could disagree without being disagreeable. I have been moved by many similar 
testimonials here in the last several days. HP has been a friend, a companion to 
many of us. I understand that HP has changed. Arianna Huffington envisioned a 
place where a virtual community of serious conversationalists could gather but 
that vision has given way to one of service as a global platform for the 
dissemination of information. The move to all Facebook comments is part of that 
(Nieman Journalism Lab, 2014).  
 
As another example, National Public Radio utilized an off-site, contracted service to 
perform essentially the same type of initial monitoring function and then announced it 
was taking an additional step: 
[The service] has improved the situation significantly, but it hasn't yet gotten the 
community to that goal of the civil discussion that you value.  Balancing the 
desire to encourage free and open discussion and the need to prevent spam and 
harmful comments, we believe we've come up with a compromise that will be 
satisfactory to most of our members. Starting today, all new users to the site will 
go through a period in which all of their comments are reviewed by a community 
manager prior to the comments appearing on the site. We expect this review to 
take fewer than 15 minutes for each comment. Once a user has established a 
reputation for following the commenting guidelines all of his comments will 
appear immediately after posting. Community managers will only review 
comments in response to a specific report from other community members 
(Myers, Stencel, & Carvin, 2011). 
 
Closer to the center of the current investigation, though all four of the news outlets 
included in this study had anonymous commenting interfaces in place at the time of data 
collection in 2011, all required third-party credentialed user accounts (i.e. connected to a 
credit card, social media site, or some other identity verifier) by the close of 2013.  It is 
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important to review the evolution of the three platforms (both the Associated Press and 
Young Turks operate on YouTube) in some detail. 
YouTube: Better Tools But Commerce Trumps Discourse 
YouTube (and its parent company Google) had long been regarded by many as 
the proverbial "cesspool" of Internet discussion platforms (see, for example, Tate, 2014). 
As one popular blogger noted, "YouTube is a comment disaster on an unprecedented 
scale. All of the worst things that could be said have been said here: YouTube IS the 
room with the million monkeys and the million typewriters, but they haven’t even gotten 
half-way though Hamlet yet because they’re too busy pitching feces at one another" 
(Hermann, 2012). In an attempt to improve its reputation, YouTube in late 2013 took the 
controversial step of requiring all would-be commenters to have a validated Google+ 
account before they could post. The move was met with fierce criticism from a variety of 
different audiences and was interpreted by some, including one of YouTube's original co-
founders, to be a thinly-veiled ploy to boost market share for its struggling social media 
platform (Johnson, 2012). An international petition (currently in possession of more than 
269,000 signatures) logged on change.org argued, "Google is forcing us to make google+ 
accounts and invading our social life to comment on a youtube video and trying to take 
away our anonymous profile. They are also trying to censor us unless we share the same 
worldview as they do" (Change.org, 2014). Even writers for The New York Times (long 
an organization with strict commenting policies and safeguards) questioned the 
announcement in noting: 
These steps should encourage more civilized discourse. But I’ll miss the old 
regime. As news sites and e-commerce sites moved to tidy up their comments 
sections... there was (some modicum of) value in YouTube remaining a portal to 
chaos. The comments, for now, are human, even if all too human. They 
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counterbalance the shiny, happy videos of screaming goats and laughing babies. 
Sure, they’ll make your stomach turn, but isn’t it beneficial to feel that way from 
time to time? There’s something useful in reminding oneself that under the 
cleanest streets of the fanciest neighborhoods, there’s a sewer. Soon YouTube 
comments will be less obscene, more decorous and quite possibly more 
substantive. They’ll also be less revealing (Lapidos, 2013). 
 
Less than one month following the decision, commenting traffic on YouTube plummeted 
by an estimated 40% (Sloane, 2013) and business analysts were quick to point out that 
the company’s overall sanitation strategy had worked: 
[The response to the YouTube decision] confirms that people are much less 
courageous about making racist, sexist, homophobic, and altogether vile 
comments in public when there's a chance those comments could get linked back 
to their offline person.  It also makes YouTube more attractive to major brands 
who might want to advertise on the site, an initiative the company has taken quite 
seriously lately in light of recent deals with big-time media buyers and its hiring 
of an executive from consumer goods giant Procter & Gamble.  In the past, brands 
have had to worry about having their content placed beside hateful anonymous 
comments, as happened when Cheerios posted a ground-breaking ad earlier this 
year featuring a mixed-race family.  The new comment policy gives them greater 
confidence that investing in YouTube ads and sponsored content will not get 
wasted amidst a sea of ignorance, making them that much more likely to give 
YouTube more of their money (Taube, 2013). 
 
Perhaps somewhat lost in the debate surrounding YouTube's decision to disallow 
anonymity (and, by extension, to mandate linkage with its in-hose social media platform) 
was the company's release of a much more robust set of commenting and reviewing tools 
intended to transform the way commenters engage in a community setting and catalyze 
comments into conversations. Key changes included: comments from the video creator 
being ranked very highly and surfacing more regularly in the comment stream; elevating 
comments from popular personalities on YouTube and users in one's Google+ network 
higher up the comment chain; and greater standing given to more highly engaged 
commenters who have historically received positive (i.e. "thumbs up") feedback from 
their previous posts. At the same time, video owners were given new abilities to calibrate 
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their preferences between automatic posting of submitted comments and manual 
approval; and to create a blacklist with words that automatically push comments into the 
review queue or block users (Lardinois, 2013).  
Important to note, neither the Associated Press nor the Young Turks, whose 
audiovisual segments and affiliated comment streams are hosted on YouTube, offer any 
additional guidance or rules above and beyond what is required by YouTube. 
Los Angeles Times: A Well-Lawyered Corporate Response 
In contrast to YouTube, The Los Angeles Times appears to have embraced a 
decidedly legalistic response in response to the challenge of allowing its online 
commenting platform to evolve given the torrent of negativity surrounding the poor 
quality of postings.  Owned by the multinational media giant Tribune, The Los Angeles 
Times requires each of its (now) registered users to certify that they understand its terms 
of service, memorialized in a dense, 12-page document.  No attempt is made to inspire 
the spirit of healthy discourse or engender democratic debate; instead, the rules merely 
address the boundaries of possible entries.  Users are warned not to engage in 
communication that, among a wider array of possible qualities: 
… contains vulgar, profane, abusive, racist or hateful language or expressions, 
epithets or slurs, text, photographs or illustrations in poor taste, inflammatory 
attacks of a personal, racial or religious nature... is defamatory, threatening, 
disparaging, grossly inflammatory, false, misleading, fraudulent, inaccurate, 
unfair, contains gross exaggeration or unsubstantiated claims, violates the privacy 
rights of any third party, is unreasonably harmful or offensive to any individual or 
community... or discriminates on the grounds of race, religion, national origin, 
gender, age, marital status, sexual orientation or disability, or refers to such 
matters in any manner prohibited by law (Los Angeles Times, 2013). 
 
Such a policy clearly exists to protect the corporation (as opposed to any members of the 
discursive community) and its overarching utility is derived more from its very existence 
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(and users' recorded compliance with it) than any of the actual content it contains.  
Moreover, the legal nature of the document reflects both binary thinking and a detached 
orientation that is reactive only when necessary.  Nowhere, for example, are any 
exemplars offered to illustrate proper and improper online behavior.  Language and word 
choice are considered to be either compliant or non-compliant; any consideration or 
judgment of nuance is weighed down by repeated pronouncements of rights reserved by 
the corporation.  Even in the briefer and more colloquial user FAQ (frequently asked 
questions), the same arm's-length-style guidance endures: 
Readers are reminded to post comments that are germane to the article and write 
in a common language that steers clear of personal attacks and/or vulgarities. We 
reserve the right to remove any user or user's comments that are identified as 
inappropriate. Examples of these types of infractions are comments that include: 
abusive, off-topic or foul language... racist, sexist, homophobic or other offensive 
terminology... attacks that celebrate the death, injury or illness of any person, 
public figure or otherwise... Comments are filtered for language (Los Angeles 
Times, 2014). 
 
Though members of the online community are given the ability to report abuse (i.e. lack 
of compliance with the terms of use) on a particular comment, flagged comments remain 
posted until such time that they can be investigated by a Los Angeles Times staffer.  No 
mention is made of who these staffers are, what a reasonable response time is for their 
adjudication, or how a decision to filter a comment may be appealed.  The entire process 
is nameless and mechanistic; it occurs absent any engagement either between 
commenters or between commenters and the moderators.  
One small improvement to the platform (though still occurring at the requisite 
arm's length) is the denotation of certain comments as so-called "Editor's Picks." An 
increasingly common designation granted by large, American newspaper sites (and 
originating with The New York Times), an Editor's Pick at The Los Angeles Times is a 
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comment "than an editor has identified as insightful and thought-provoking that help[s] 
further the dialogue" (Los Angeles Times, 2014).  While such an engagement is arguably 
beneficial to the democratic health of the discursive community, it falls short in several 
critical ways: the name of the editor (a typical large newspaper has many) is never 
revealed; his/her thinking behind choosing a given article for the denotation is never 
explained; and nowhere is the broader "dialogue" given proper context. 
Daily Kos: Straight Talk and Empowering Users to Be Activists  
 In stark contrast to The Los Angeles Times, Daily Kos not only utilizes straight – 
and at times, borderline crude – talk to convey its discussion standards but also to clearly 
give the benefit of the doubt to commentators when it comes to interpretations of their 
postings.  With respect to the former, founder Markos Moulitsas (a.k.a. “Kos”) could not 
be more unabashed in his articulation of the community’s norms: “The core of the Daily 
Kos behavior guide is simple: don't be a dick. While we go into some depth below about 
sanctionable behavior, it's not an all-encompassing list. There are always types of 
behavior that while not listed below, rise to the level of "dickishness", and as such are 
actionable” (Moulitsas, 2013). 
 From a technical perspective, the managers of Daily Kos (the blog operates as a 
limited liability corporation (LLC) under the name Kos Media with Moulitsas having 
controlling interest) have placed the responsibility to monitor and police discussions 
directly into the hands of the community.  Users have two powerful tools at their disposal 
– the ability to “uprate” (or publicly support) a given comment thus giving it greater 
emphasis in the discussion; and the capacity to immediately “hide” entries they deem to 
have risen to the aforementioned level of “dickishness” (along with more carefully 
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identified types of behavior).  Culturally, however, and unlike other commenting 
platforms, there are significant consequences for employing either in haste; users must do 
so very judiciously and with great care:  
Our new reporting tools make it easier to track hidden comments and who [hid] 
them.  If we determine that a comment should not have been hidden, those [who 
did so] will lose their ratings ability for a period of time, progressively longer for 
each infraction until that ability is removed forever.  Uprating personal insults is 
as bad if not worse than making the insult itself because this rewards the insulters 
and encourages them to continue the same behavior.  Doing so will likewise cost 
users their ratings privileges for a period, with long penalties for repeat infractions 
(Moulitsas, 2013). 
 
At the same time, users are clearly reminded of the fact that “In baseball, a tie goes to the 
runner. At Daily Kos, any gray area will be decided in favor of the commenter. So if 
you're not sure that something should be [hidden], then don't [hide it]. Because if the 
situation is that iffy, chances are that it'll be you who gets burned.  [The ability to hide 
comments] is for clear and obvious violations (Moulitsas, 2013). 
 Though it uses very different terms than the variables named in this study, Daily 
Kos essentially tackles the current study’s fundamental distinction between civility and 
politeness head-on and prescribes different norms.  Threats of violence, bigotry and 
personal insults (all of which are germane to the variable of civility) are dealt with 
specifically, as is the broader topic of language usage.  Moulitsas, whose spent some of 
the 1980s living in his mother’s native country of (then) war-torn El Salvador insists: 
I grew up in a country where people were killed for their political beliefs. It's not 
fun.  Violence has no place in our political discourse.  It's not kosher to wish 
violence against each other, and it's not cool to wish it against our enemies.  This 
does not mean that all forms of cartoon violence, literary references, metaphors 
and the like are barred.  It does mean that threatening to beat up or kill someone, 
or suggesting that people should kill themselves, or saying that poison should be 
put in somebody's crème brûlée, or making similar remarks, even as a joke, is 
prohibited and can lead to banning” (Moulitsas, 2013). 
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With respect to bigotry, Moulitsas set the following guidelines concluding with a nod 
towards the community’s activist style: “Any language designed to denigrate someone on 
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality, physical appearance, etc. is 
prohibited. Leave that shit to the Republicans” (Moulitsas, 2013).  And on the subject of 
personal insults he further maintains: 
It is impossible to have a real debate when you call the other party, say, "batshit 
insane."  At that point, you're not engaging in debate, you're just engaging in a 
pissing match.  And while that may be fun for you, it isn't fun for anyone else.  So 
maintain a sense of decorum.  There are plenty of people on the site who avoid 
[having their comments hidden] despite engaging in the most contentious topics. 
It can be done.  Just be courteous and stick to the facts (Moulitsas, 2013). 
 
When it comes to the choice of foul or vulgar language, however, Daily Kos is 
very clear in not only distinguishing it from other kinds of controversial behaviors but 
also maintaining its presence goes part and parcel with spirited exchange.  Moulitas was 
unapologetic in writing, “I don't care about language. We're adults. If potty words make 
your ears bleed, I recommend Disney.com.  Of course, there's a difference between 
"that's fucking awesome!" or "that's fucked up!" and "fuck you" or "you're a fucking 
asshole." If you know the difference, you're an adult” (Moulitsas, 2013). 
Though Daily Kos clearly appeals to a liberal/progressive audience, its organizers 
contend that all political arguments need to be pulled apart and that dissent is the 
lifeblood of healthy discussion.  Unlike other commenting sites, Daily Kos has a clear 
policy against the declaration of so-called “debate free zones,” spaces where a user posts 
his/her contribution and then ostensibly asks for it to simply be memorialized.  The 
board’s standards on the matter are made blatantly clear, connected to the community’s 
core identity, and reflect the broader commitment of preparing users for more activist 
forms of politics: 
	  	  
	  
114 
Some users have asked about the ability to declare their diary off-limits to their 
detractors, so that they can discuss a topic without having opponents intrude. This 
would apply to internally contentious issues like Israel-Palestine, Snowden-NSA, 
and guns.  Or primaries where the community is divided among the contenders. 
While I find some validity in the request, and considered it deeply, fact is it 
conflicts with the debate-centric focus of the site.  We're not an echo chamber, nor 
do I want it to become one.  So if you want to be spared dissent, Daily Kos just 
won't be the place for you.  If you can't handle dissent, then maybe political 
activism is not the thing for you (Moulitsas, 2013). 
	  
	  
Implications 
Sorting Through the Noise: Recognizing the Multiplicity of Online Publics 
The fact that news platforms everywhere – and certainly including those 
scrutinized by this study – have responded so very differently to the emerging questions 
of anonymous commenting should serve as yet another powerful reminder that there is no 
singular conceptualization, consistent useful definition, nor matrix of commonly agreed 
upon norms that present a unified understanding of what constitutes an online public – be 
it from the perspective of news providers, audiences or both.  The desire to seek one is 
not only a sure path to disappointment but also serves to reinforce unhealthy stereotypes; 
such stereotypes may ultimately cloud the more progressive realization that there is 
significant potential for a great multiplicity of publics (each with different norms and 
expectations) to emerge and operate in ways that fundamentally support an underlying 
sense of civic responsibility, catalyze the shaping of public opinion and formation of 
political meaning, and are generally understood to be advancing democratic virtues.  
As one recent (and, admittedly, downright hilarious) example of this stereotyping, 
comedian John Oliver of HBO's Last Week Tonight made a direct appeal to Internet 
commenters on the subject of so-called "net neutrality."  Oliver enlisted their help in 
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registering negative feedback on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
website during its period of open comment: 
Good evening, monsters. This may be the moment you've spent your whole lives 
training for... For once in your life, we need you to channel that anger, that badly 
spelled bile that you normally reserve for unforgivable attacks on actresses you 
seem to think have put on weight or politicians you disagree with or photos of the 
ex-girlfriend getting on with her life or non-white actors being cast as fictional 
characters... We need you to get out there and for once in your lives focus your 
indiscriminate rage in a useful direction. Seize your moment, my lovely trolls, 
turn on caps lock and fly, my pretties! Fly! Fly! Fly!  (Oliver, 2014). 
 
Though the strategy proved highly effective for purposes of fanning the flames of dissent 
(the FCC website actually crashed the very next day from the influx of traffic), the 
combination of its nearsightedness and satirical forcefulness crowded out the possibility 
of Oliver catalyzing a more thought-provoking response from the considerable majority 
of commenters who, based at least upon the findings of this study, could have registered 
their opposition with comments of higher deliberative quality.  In choosing to activate the 
stereotypical Internet trolls, and speaking to them as if they were one in the same with the 
whole of the online public (however defined), the plan mobilized a disruptive force as 
opposed to one that could be more expansive, serious and contributory.  
To be clear, no one understanding of online public could or should be privileged 
over another.  What matters most for purposes of the implications of this study is the 
crying need to consider cyber-communities, spaces, platforms and fora not as a unitary 
construct but as multiplicity of ideas and dynamics.  Even the underlying methodology 
employed in this study (using an a priori coding scheme to analyze the content of 
individual comments based upon four reasonable measures), though relatively easy to 
demonstrate the high level of face validity the scheme enjoys, is deliberately grounded in 
but one particular understanding of how deliberative quality operating within an online 
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public may be assessed. Be that as it may, it is the utilization of a common set of 
measures – applied scientifically and effective in neutralizing any normative judgments 
or personal biases along the path of exploration – that allows one to understand these 
conversations at a deeper level.  To build upon a metaphor used in Chapter 1, while the 
"loudest drunk in the bar" may be extraordinarily distracting, the ability to block him or 
her out presents the opportunity of examining the pluses and minuses of the whole 
"tavern" far more effectively and holistically. 
As was revealed throughout the findings of this study, statistically significant 
differences in overall levels of deliberative quality were detected across the four 
platforms.  It was further discovered that Internet-native and print-based news platforms 
were home to comments of a higher quality than, respectively, traditional and 
multimedia-based news sites.  The overarching content of the precipitating story or 
segment, irrespective of the platform upon which it was hosted, was either not a 
statistically significant factor (as in the case of the international-domestic dichotomy) or a 
minuscule one (as in the case of the governing-campaigning dichotomy).  These findings 
give rise to the need to further investigate what differences are present between similar 
kinds of platforms; the results of subsequent analyses are documented below. 
	  
Table 38: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative 
Quality) – Internet-Native Sources Only 
	  
Source Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Daily Kos  178 (9%) 751 (39%) 1,000 (52%) 
Young Turks 545 (20%) 1,097 (40%) 1,081 (40%) 
χ2 (2, N = 4,652) = 122.269, p < 0.001 
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Table 39: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) – 
Internet-Native Sources Only 
	  
Source Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Daily Kos 122 (6%) 1,807 (97%) 
Young Turks 253 (9%) 2,470 (91%) 
χ2 (1, N = 4,652) = 13.409, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 40: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) – 
Internet-Native Sources Only 
	  
Source Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Daily Kos 492 (26%) 1,437 (74%) 
Young Turks 1,008 (37%) 1,715 (63%) 
χ2 (1, N = 4,652) = 68.499, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 41: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) – 
Internet-Native Sources Only 
	  
Source Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Daily Kos 882 (46%) 1,047 (54%) 
Young Turks 1,437 (53%) 1,286 (47%) 
χ2 (1, N = 4,652) = 22.445, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 42: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) – 
Internet-Native Sources Only 
	  
Source Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Daily Kos 1,163 (60%) 766 (40%) 
Young Turks 1,893 (70%) 830 (30%) 
χ2 (1, N = 4,652) = 42.668, p < 0.001 
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Table 43: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative 
Quality) – Traditional Sources Only 
	  
Source Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Associated Press  234 (33%) 275 (39%) 202 (28%) 
Los Angeles Times 116 (31%) 131 (35%) 132 (34%) 
χ2 (2, N = 1,090) = 4.855, p = 0.088 
	  
	  
Table 44: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) – 
Traditional Sources Only 
	  
Source Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Associated Press  128 (18%) 583 (82%) 
Los Angeles Times 75 (20%) 304 (80%) 
χ2 (1, N = 1,090) = 0.471, p = 0.471 
	  
	  
Table 45: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) – 
Traditional Sources Only 
	  
Source Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Associated Press  382 (54%) 329 (46%) 
Los Angeles Times 208 (55%) 171 (45%) 
χ2 (1, N = 1,090) = 0.133, p = 0.716 
	  
	  
Table 46: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) – 
Traditional Sources Only 
	  
Source Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Associated Press  390 (55%) 321 (45%) 
Los Angeles Times 195 (52%) 184 (48%) 
χ2 (1, N = 1,090) = 22.445, p < 0.001 
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Table 47: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) – 
Traditional Sources Only 
	  
Source Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Associated Press  1,163 (60%) 766 (40%) 
Los Angeles Times 1,893 (70%) 830 (30%) 
χ2 (1, N = 1,090) = 1.150, p = 0.284 
	  
	  
Table 48: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative 
Quality) – Print Sources Only 
	  
Source Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Daily Kos  178 (9%) 751 (39%) 1,000 (52%) 
Los Angeles Times 116 (31%) 131 (35%) 132 (34%) 
χ2 (2, N = 2,308) = 133.933, p <0.001 
	  
	  
Table 49: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) – 
Print Sources Only 
	  
Source Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Daily Kos  122 (6%) 1,807 (94%) 
Los Angeles Times 75 (20%) 304 (80%) 
χ2 (1, N = 2,308) = 73.557, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 50: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) – 
Print Sources Only 
	  
Source Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Daily Kos  492 (26%) 1,437 (74%) 
Los Angeles Times 208 (55%) 171 (45%) 
χ2 (1, N = 2,308) = 129.361, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  
	  
120 
Table 51: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) – 
Print Sources Only 
	  
Source Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Daily Kos  882 (46%) 1,047 (54%) 
Los Angeles Times 195 (52%) 184 (48%) 
χ2 (1, N = 2,308) = 4.176, p < 0.05 
	  
	  
Table 52: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) – 
Print Sources Only 
	  
Source Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Daily Kos  1,163 (60%) 766 (40%) 
Los Angeles Times 1,893 (70%) 830 (30%) 
χ2 (1, N = 2,308) = 5.582, p < 0.05 
	  
	  
Table 53: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Deliberative 
Quality) – Audiovisual Sources Only 
	  
Source Low (Quality = 1) 
Medium 
(Quality=2) 
High 
(Quality=3) 
Associated Press  234 (33%) 275 (39%) 202 (28%) 
Young Turks 545 (20%) 1,097 (40%) 1,081 (40%) 
χ2 (2, N = 3,434) = 60.930, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 54: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Civility) – 
Audiovisual Sources Only 
	  
Source Uncivil (Civility = 0) 
Civil 
(Civility = 1) 
Associated Press  128 (18%) 583 (82%) 
Young Turks 253 (9%) 2,470 (91%) 
χ2 (1, N = 3,434) = 73.557, p < 0.001 
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Table 55: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Politeness) – 
Audiovisual Sources Only 
	  
Source Impolite (Politeness = 0) 
Polite 
(Politeness = 1) 
Associated Press  382 (54%) 329 (46%) 
Young Turks 1,008 (37%) 1,715 (63%) 
χ2 (1, N = 3,434) = 65.33, p < 0.001 
	  
	  
Table 56: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Justification) – 
Audiovisual Sources Only 
	  
Source Unjustified (Justification = 0) 
Justified 
(Justification = 1) 
Associated Press  390 (55%) 321 (45%) 
Young Turks 1,437 (53%) 1,286 (47%) 
χ2 (1, N = 3,434) = 0.979, p = 0.322 
	  
	  
Table 57: Results of Chi-Square Analysis (Political News Source and Complexity) – 
Audiovisual Sources Only 
	  
Source Non-Complex (Complexity = 0) 
Complex 
(Complexity = 1) 
Associated Press  546 (77%) 165 (23%) 
Young Turks 1,893 (70%) 830 (30%) 
χ2 (1, N = 3,434) = 14.497, p < 0.001 
 
As shown in Table 38, there were statistically significant differences in the level 
of deliberative quality of online comments attached to the two Internet-native news 
sources (Daily Kos and Young Turks).  Tables 48 and 53 reveal the same can be said for, 
respectively, comments affiliated print-based news sources (Daily Kos and The Los 
Angeles Times) and audiovisual news sources (Associated Press and Young Turks).  This 
second case is particularly notable in that it reveals a statistically significant difference in 
the quality of comments operating within a single platform (YouTube).  Similar analyses 
of these three pairings were conducted for each of the component measures of quality; the 
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results are shown in Tables 49-52 and 54-57.  With the exception of a single comparison 
– the justification variance within the audiovisual news sources (Table 56) – statistically 
significant differences were detected across the board. 
In contrast, and as shown in Table 43, there were no statistically significant 
differences between the quality of comments generated within the Associated Press and 
The Los Angeles Times (i.e. the two traditional news sources).  Moreover, none of the 
component measures registered any statistically significant differences (see Tables 44-47) 
for this pairing. 
Taken as a whole, these findings begin to paint the broad brush strokes of a 
conceptual picture in which not only is one platform very different than another, but also 
one in which a more intrinsic hierarchy of platforms might be present.  The innovation of 
the Internet (even with all of its warts, garbage and noise) may be at least partly 
responsible for creating the technological, cultural and behavioral superstructure that 
allows a multiplicity of publics – and, perhaps even more important, types of publics – to 
emerge.  To better understand the potential implications for this suggestion, however, it is 
first necessary to return to a more fundamental discussion of the meaning of public, and 
to consider how this overarching sense of multiplicity may allow one to think with 
greater specificity and granularity about the opportunities, needs and challenges of online 
communities as they attempt to better embrace the democratic. 
A Multiplicity of Online Publics: Differentiating Community Needs for 
Information Engagement/Processing and Discursive Norms 
	  
As summarized in Chapter 2, an extensive and growing body of scholarship has 
attempted to articulate a wide array of cogent definitions – and, by extension, conditions 
and expectations – for what is meant by "public" (a term that has a tendency to be used 
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rather colloquially).  While this study remains deliberately neutral and makes no 
consideration of which definition may be superior – be it more plausible and practical; 
possessing greater efficacy in catalyzing democratic spirit; or more open and accessible 
to a diversity of viewpoints – it does seek to explore some of the profound ways in which 
they are different.  While no subset could conceivably be wholly representative of the 
gamut of meanings, four were chosen and dissected in an attempt to illustrate some of the 
contours of the broader range and to further reinforce the need to consider a multiplicity 
of constructs.  Three of these have been described previously: the rational-critical "public 
sphere" relying upon the utilization of the idea speech type (Habermas, 1989); "agonistic 
confrontations," which privilege adversarial conditions in debate over the need for 
compromise and consensus (Mouffe, 2000); and "rhetorical democracies" assigning high 
intrinsic value to rhetorical contributions that contribute to a broader public activity and 
promote civic dialogue (Hauser & Grim, 2004).  The fourth involves Schudson's (2011) 
concept of a so-called "monitorial citizen."   
Perhaps highly relevant within the contemporary period of 24-hour news cycles, 
instantaneous information and a plethora of vehicles and channels, a monitorial citizen is 
oriented with a "defensive rather than proactive" (Schudson, 2011, p. 311) posture.  
Though not detached from political activity, monitorial citizens are highly politically 
cognitive and readily scan their respective information environments – or, as Schudson 
puts, continuously "keep an eye on the scene" (p. 311) – for news germane to their needs 
and interests.  They can become highly politically active when needed but otherwise 
choose to stay out of the conventional political fray.  Schudson's research, too, clearly has 
at least some lineage in the political psychology literature (see, for example, Popkin, 
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1994; Graber, 2001) as monitorial citizens must recognize particular schema in switching 
back and forth between modes of inaction and action, all while exhibiting a default mode 
of low-information rationality (Popkin, 2004).   
To systematically disentangle some of the overlapping features of these different 
definitions of public, they are assessed against a troika of possible community needs.  It 
is important to note that those selected were hardly intended to be exhaustive.  Rather, 
they are intended to be both commonsensical and reflect the range of existing 
considerations and dynamics covered in the Chapter 2.   
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Figure 4: A Multiplicity of Online Publics and Needs 
 
 
As depicted in Figure 4, these three clusters – representing the community needs 
of information engagement, information processing and discursive norms – constitute the 
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horizontal axis within an array depicting a hierarchy of definitions of public.  The four 
given typologies of public (i.e. public spheres, agonistic confrontations, rhetorical 
democracies and monitorial citizenship) constitute the vertical axis.  Within each 
corresponding cell, a relative assessment of importance is proffered in an attempt to 
suggest which needs are most vital to which typology; needs are expressed as having 
above average, average, or below average importance to a given typology.  Ultimately, 
these typologies are ordered on the chart in descending order from highest levels of 
aggregate need (public spheres) to lowest levels of aggregate need (monitorial 
citizenship).   
The first cluster, the need of information engagement, contains three subheadings: 
political literacy, political cognition and collective action.  While all of these terms have 
been defined previously, it is important to note that they have been arranged along the 
axis in the form of a continuum between engagement in the form of thinking and 
engagement in the form of acting.  When examined in this way, clearer differences 
between the typologies begin to emerge.  Public spheres, for example, require a high 
degree of political literacy but very little in the way of collective action.  For agonistic 
confrontations, the inherent adversarial conditions demand that participants be very quick 
to think on their respective feet as the debate evolves, thus demanding a higher than 
average level of political cognition.  Within rhetorical democracies, collective action 
gives the typology its very form in that they need to be eventful so that individual 
rhetorical contributions, however inchoate, can congeal into a broader collective 
expression.  Lastly, monitorial citizens need not possess much in the way of political 
literacy but the sense of both knowing when to act (through the cues of political 
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cognition) and then having the will to act (by embracing collective actions) are of 
paramount importance. 
The second cluster places the community's need for information processing at its 
conceptual center and builds upon the seminal debate of the 1920s between Walter 
Lippman and John Dewey describing the role and power of journalism in industrial 
society. Here, too, the subheadings are arranged on a continuum – this time operating 
between top-down and bottom-up information processing – and appear in three forms: 
Lippman's (1922) intelligence bureaus (most top-down); Dewey's (1927) citizen 
journalists (most bottom-up); and Sunstein's (2001) general interest intermediaries. 
In Public Opinion, Lippman (1922) noted that citizens were increasingly 
incapable of knowing the world directly and could arrive at political judgments based 
upun the "pictures in our heads" (p. 4), or   
the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. To that 
pseudo-environment his behaviour is a response. But because it is behaviour, the 
consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where the 
behaviour is stimulated, but in the real environment where action operates." (p. 
10). 
 
To mitigate against possible perceptual distortions to said pictures (arising from 
dynamics as disparate as government censorship to groundbreaking innovations in 
information transmission), Lippman advocated for the creation of elite-driven intelligence 
bureaus that would be the guardians of knowledge and the stewards of reason.  Such 
elites would be tenured in their positions for life and be disconnected from actual 
decision-making; Lippman argued that "the only institutional safeguard is to separate as 
absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which 
investigates" (Lippman, 1922, p. 201). The steadfast commitment of such bureaus to 
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privilege fact rather than propagating and promulgating symbols would serve, Lippman 
believed, as a powerful remedy to the emerging ills of modern society: 
I argue that representative government, either in what is ordinarily called politics, 
or industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the basis of election, 
unless there is an independent, expert, organization for making the unseen facts 
intelligible to those who have to make the decisions. I attempt, therefore, to argue 
that the serious acceptance of the principle that personal representation must be 
supplemented by representation of the unseen facts would alone permit a 
satisfactory decentralization and allow us to escape from the intolerable and 
unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all 
public affairs… This organization I conceive to be in the first instance, the task of 
a political science that has won its proper place as formulator, in advance of real 
decision, instead of apologist, critic, or reporter after the decision has been made 
(Lippmann, 1922, p. 31-32). 
 
Dewey's (1927) response, as memorialized in The Public and Its Problems, echoed 
Lippman's diagnosis of the public's poor health but offered a fundamentally different 
remedy.  Rather than look beyond the masses and elevate the role of elites, Dewey 
aspired to align the creation and dissemination of knowledge more with the realm of lived 
experience.  Doing so would require a radical shift in the prevailing expectation of each 
person's civic – or in Dewey's parlance, community – responsibilities:  
The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of methods and conditions 
of debate, discussion and persuasion.  That is the problem of the public.  We have 
asserted that this improvement depends essentially upon freeing and perfecting 
the processes of inquiry and of dissemination of their conclusions.  Inquiry, 
indeed, is a work which devolves upon experts.  But their expertness is not shown 
in framing and executing policies, but in discovering and making known the facts 
upon which the former depend.  They are technical experts in the sense that 
scientific investigators and artists manifest expertise.  It is not necessary that the 
many should have the knowledge and skill to carry on the needed investigations; 
what is required is that they have the ability to judge of the bearing of the 
knowledge supplied by others upon common concerns (p. 209). 
 
Though Dewey's seminal political text is notoriously light on hard details, his concluding 
thoughts give rise to the citizen journalist (though he does not here use the actual term) 
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and his/her invaluable role in formulating, disseminating and digesting a community's 
intelligence: 
Vision is a spectator; hearing is a participator.  Publication is partial and the 
public which results is partially informed and formed until the meanings it 
purveys pass from mouth to mouth.  There is no limit to the liberal expansion and 
confirmation of limited personal intellectual endowment which may proceed from 
the flow of social intelligence when that circulates by word of mouth from one to 
another in the communications of the local community.  That and that only gives 
reality to public opinion.  We lie, as Emerson said, in the lap of immense 
intelligence.  But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken, 
inarticulate and faint until it possesses the local community as its medium (p. 
219). 
 
Much later, and in what could be seen as something of a conceptual fulcrum 
between the two sides of the Dewey-Lippman debate, Sunstein (2001) highlights the 
importance of general interest intermediaries (such as daily newspapers, news 
periodicals, and nightly news broadcasts) that provide elements of a shared cultural 
narrative and a common frame of reference.  The number and reach of such 
intermediaries, he contends are very much on the decline as a result of both a rising 
consumerist orientation by the general public and the introduction of new technological 
tools to filter content.  The erosion of the intermediary function retards the exposure of 
people to opinions, ideas and perspectives that they may not otherwise seek out on their 
own.  Sunstein sees this development as antithetical to a well-functioning system of free 
expression: 
First, people should be exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in 
advance.  Unplanned, unanticipated encounters are central to democracy itself.  
Such encounters often involve topics and points of view that people have not 
sought out and perhaps find quite irritating.  They are important partly to ensure 
against fragmentation and extremism, which are predictable outcomes of any 
situation in which likeminded people speak only with themselves.  I do not 
suggest that government should force people to see things that they wish to avoid. 
But I do contend that in a democracy deserving the name, people often come 
across views and topics that they have not specifically selected.  Second, many or 
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most citizens should have a range of common experiences. Without shared 
experiences, a heterogeneous society will have a much more difficult time in 
addressing social problems. People may even find it hard to understand one 
another. Common experiences, emphatically including the common experiences 
made possible by the media, provide a form of social glue. A system of 
communications that radically diminishes the number of such experiences will 
create a number of problems, not least because of the increase in social 
fragmentation (Sunstein, 2001, p. 9-10). 
 
Taken together, these three subheadings – citizen journalist, general interest 
intermediaries and intelligence bureaus – present a range of options to aid in the 
description of how different types of publics respond to the need of information 
processing in very different ways.  Public spheres, for example, are places of timely, 
highly-rationale news digestion and discussion.  Such discussants rely heavily upon 
objective sources for analysis of complex issues (the output of intelligence bureaus), 
embrace the ordering and prioritization of those issues (the work of general interest 
intermediaries), and then actively contribute to robust discussions in which such inputs 
are rationally equated to the perspective of lived experience (the duty of a citizen 
journalist).  In stark contrast, a well-functioning public consisting of monitorial 
citizenship discounts the need for either citizen journalism or intelligence bureaus.  
Participants, who are perpetually scanning the landscape of information for topics 
impacting their unique affairs, instead rely heavily upon general interest intermediaries to 
help them monitor the news stream most efficiently.  Rhetorical democracies similarly 
rely upon such intermediaries to engender, and then sustain, the critical mass of the 
rhetorical event, while agonistic confrontations are typified by debating gladiators 
wielding their respective contributions to citizen journalism as primary weapons. 
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Lastly, the third cluster considers a range of possible (though certainly not 
exhaustive) discursive norms that overlap with the measures of deliberative quality 
employed by this study.  Not surprisingly, public spheres, in employing an ideal speech 
type, place above average importance on meeting all four of the discursive norms.  For 
very different reasons, three of the four norms are also highly important for the success of 
agonistic confrontations.  Requiring the presence of an adversary, for example, is a 
profound expression of civility (at least as it is defined in this study), just as a deliberate 
preference for adversarial conditions undoubtedly conveys an appreciation for the 
complexity associated with any argumentative position.  Rhetorical democracies, as 
Hauser (1999) and others have shown, are often too quickly dismissed by casual 
observers as being too raucous (i.e. very impolite), even though they may very well 
constitute vibrant publics.  Finally, monitorial citizens, with their keen ability to scan the 
landscape and heavy utilization of general interest intermediaries to help them find 
relevancy, are far less susceptible to be distracted or intrigued by any particular 
discursive patterns. 
Exemplars of Vibrant Online Publics: Best Practices and New Tools 
	  
Now that some of the key features of different typologies have been disentangled 
using a common rubric of community needs, it becomes possible to search for different 
(existing) exemplars of each and to further investigate some of the more novel 
approaches and tools such spaces utilize to catalyze democratic exchange.  The previous 
section detailed a conceptual framework within which such a multiplicity of public 
spaces could both theoretically exist and – if closely aligned with a given set of 
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community needs – thrive.  It follows, then, that the current section will describe actual 
flourishing domains that ably demonstrate the presence of this multiplicity.   
Of all the news platforms examined by this study, Daily Kos clearly distinguished 
itself as hosting comments that were of a very high level of deliberative quality.  As 
shown in Table 4, 91% of all comments examined were of middle or high levels of 
quality.  Daily Kos was also the only news outlet in which a majority of the comments 
examined (51%) were deemed to be of high quality.  In addition, the channel accounted 
for comments containing the highest measures of civility, politeness, justification and 
complexity – in some cases by a very wide margin – thus affording it some of the critical 
qualities defining a public sphere.   
With respect to its community's needs for creating, managing and digesting 
information, it similarly places great importance on providing for both bottom-up and 
top-down forms of engagement, as well as for types that are somewhere in between.  
Among the sites investigated by this study, Daily Kos was home to far-and-away the 
most prolific commenters and, based upon even a cursory reading of its comments, it is 
plain to see that even some of its most infrequent and casual participants make substantial 
contributions.  Citizen journalism is alive and well on the site and, on fairly regular 
occasion, particularly provocative, illuminating or poignant comments rise to the level of 
receiving treatment within the hypertextual frame that is akin to a bona fide article 
written by a member of the staff.  Many of these same commenters, too, appear on the 
site's real-time leaderboard of authors which is readily searchable based on several 
rankings derived from overall community response (e.g. most recommended, most 
prolific, most followed, highest mojo (a compound measure computing overall impact)).  
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The broader technical design of the site, which affords users an opportunity to focus in on 
popular content, and provides managers with the opportunity to showcase a range of 
stimulating discussions, functions as an able general interest intermediary.  Though 
content is voluminous, participants and organizers alike have considerable tools at their 
disposal to sort through information and find what is most relevant.  Lastly, Daily Kos 
maintains something of its own intelligence bureau in the form of dKosopedia.com, an 
in-house attempt to actively build and strengthen a political encyclopedia.  Currently 
consisting of over 14,000 topical entries (ranging from subjects as varied as "Hurricane 
Katrina" to the "Evolution of the Credit Default Swap"), the encyclopedia is frequently 
cited as a source of evidence by commenters on the site.  During its launch, Moulitsas 
(2004) likened  dKosopedia to a virtual, open-source, community-driven think tank.  
Equating even further with the given typology of a public sphere, Daily Kos and 
its participants rely upon a steady resuscitation of political facts to build their arguments 
and engage in debate.  The best arguments are generally not those made by commenters 
demonstrating the highest levels of political cognition (though such skills are not 
unimportant) but by those who have the best researched and cited claims.  Interestingly, 
the site's tagline – "News. Community. Action." – likely overstates the willingness of 
participants to truly engage in collective action.  Daily Kos, not unlike other public 
spheres, is a highly discursive space where conversation and rational thinking have 
preference over bona fide deeds.   
None of the other news platforms considered by this study (Los Angeles Times, 
Young Turks, Associated Press) come anywhere close – at least in their current forms – 
to meeting the community needs of any of the given typologies.  Much can be learned, 
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however, from looking beyond this simple set and identifying other spaces in which these 
typologies are clearly thriving.  The Room for Debate webpage of The New York Times, 
for example, bears a great resemblance to the given typological definition of an agonistic 
confrontation.  Similarly, Ta-Nehisi Coates' blog – a component of The Atlantic 
magazine – is a rich and powerful example of a living and evolving rhetorical democracy 
(or perhaps, more granularly, an ongoing series of rhetorical democracies).  Lastly, the 
Collaborative Discovery Engine (also known as "Opinion Space"), an innovation of the 
College of Engineering and School of Information at the University of California at 
Berkeley, when applied to such public affairs projects as the State of California Report 
Card, demonstrate how a monitorial citizenry can be highly active and viable.  Each of 
these three are assessed in brief. 
Though it understandably emanates from one of the largest, most influential and 
best-resourced mainstream newspapers in the world, The New York Times' Room for 
Debate platform may very well constitute the most progressive and ambitious attempt to 
modernize the role of traditional media while not supplanting its historic core.  Here, 
elites (i.e. New York Times reporters and editors) still generate and disseminate news 
content in much the same way that they have for more than 160 years.  What comes next, 
however, is another matter entirely.  In a very clear and deliberate way, Room for Debate 
creates the conditions for an agonistic confrontation, and even the title of the forum itself 
suggests consensus should not be an overarching goal.  To begin a dialogue, Times 
editors author a very brief synopsis of a given issue, embed one or more links from recent 
articles that appeared in the paper, and then ask several guiding questions to aid in 
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framing the debate.  In one recent example, involving the water crisis in the western 
United States, the introduction read as follows: 
With water increasingly scarce in the drought-ravaged American West, many 
states could face drastic rationing without rain.  Even with more sustainable 
practices, the future of water in the West is not secure.  Population growth, 
conflicting demands for resources, and the unpredictable nature of a changing 
climate will all exacerbate the crisis of an already parched landscape.  What are 
the best ways to share the water? And how can we ensure it lasts for the 
foreseeable future?  (New York Times, 2014, June 9, emphasis added to indicated 
embedded hyperlinks). 
 
A handful of debaters representing at least two (but often more) sides to a given issue are 
then invited by the Times to contribute an essay of not more than 500 words to energize 
discussion and seed what will then be a more expansive discussion among members of 
the online community.  In the given example, six debaters, emerging as credible citizen 
journalists, included: a professor from the University of Arizona whose research 
investigates the economics of the water supply; a senior fellow at the Public Policy 
Institute of California who advocates for a water rights exchange; a renowned dietician 
from the Netherlands claiming that American diets and consumption habits are 
responsible for water shortages; the director of a non-profit recycled water research 
foundation; an urban water policy expert; and the general manager of a regional water 
authority.  Each of their contributed essays states a clear claim that is then supported by 
considerable evidence in the form of facts, specialized research findings, or short 
descriptions of relevant lived experiences.  The broader community then engages in a 
lengthy debate that is both civil and representative of the broader complexity of the issue.  
No attempt is ever made, however, to arrive at a single answer to the questions that have 
been asked; instead, members of the online community engage as adversaries (with 
varying degrees of politeness), staking their claims and justifying their positions.  In this 
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rather intensive back and forth, contributions ranked as readers’ favorites (the platform 
offers such a tool) are typically those that either best connect some of the issue's 
conceptual dots or reveal a provocative, alternative dimension.  To put it more simply, 
political cognition is an invaluable asset to the community.  
A second storied news outlet, The Atlantic, is home to another flourishing 
exemplar of one of the four typologies defined previously. Ta-Nehisi Coates, a senior 
editor and popular blogger for the periodical, is actively creating, supporting and 
catalyzing an impressive series of rhetorical democracies (without naming them as such) 
surrounding some of the most profound political issues of the day.  To better understand 
his approach, the researcher examined his broader involvement with the online 
community following the publishing of one of his most prominent recent features – the 
May 21, 2014, cover story arguing for reparations for African-Americans.  
It is important to note that Coates has an established reputation within the online 
arena for doing something that is, on the one hand, rather easy to describe, but, on the 
other, tremendously time consuming.  In an interview with NPR On the Media’s Bob 
Garfield, Coates described both sides of the coin: 
I always tell people it's like a dinner party, and I try to host it that way. I try to 
keep the conversation interesting, in terms of what is the bane of all comments 
sections, and that is, you know, rude commentary, people going over the line, 
trolling, that sort of thing.  I generally follow the same rules, so I always tell 
people, if you were in my house and you insulted one of my guests, I would ask 
you to leave.  I don't understand why it would be any different in a comments 
section... [the time I have to invest in keeping the conversation civil and directed] 
is way, way too much, and more than I ever expected.  I invest at least as much 
time in curating and in hosting as I do in actual writing.  It can get really, really 
hectic.  Blogging will burn you out, period.  I think blogging plus having to curate 
definitely is a load.  And I’m of the mind that it's not something that somebody 
should do for the rest of their life (Garfield, 2013). 
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For as long as he chooses to sustain the juggling act, then, Coates will continue to be the 
exceedingly rare combination of mainstream journalist, abounding blogger, and perhaps 
most important of all, extraordinarily committed moderator.  While Coates carries with 
him the credibility of an elite journalist, his blog is clearly one in which is the sole 
master, and his rules, though hardly onerous (he expresses them quite casually and even 
comically) reveal that he is the lone enforcer, judge and jury of what is appropriate and 
what is not: 
We've been through this before, but it's a good time to go through it again. Here 
are the basics of commenting here.  One thing worth adding is that I need people 
to understand that this is a moderated space.  I know that most blogs do a 
minimum of moderation. But there's quite a bit here.  It's all after the fact and 
transparent, but this is supposed to be a dinner party.  It's not a food fight.  Here 
are some road rules:  1.) Try to assume the good will, and honest motives, of your 
fellow commenters. Half of the unnecessary beef I see up here comes from basic 
misunderstandings.  I'm not saying that there aren't really differences.  There most 
certainly are.  But the point is to spend our time on those, as opposed to what we 
"think" someone was trying to imply.  2.) Try not to be unnecessarily 
antagonistic.  This rarely happens here, but I generally find that an extra heap of 
sarcasm ("Heh. Yeah, that's real intelligent.') or the occasional tweaking ("I'll be 
commenting on you momma tonight!") or even the threat for bodily harm 
("What's that about Michelle Obama? I'LL CUT U!!!") tends to serve as 
distractions.  I mean, it's fun, but probably not good for the neighborhood.  3.) If 
your comment is "held for moderation," it rarely means that you've said 
something objectionable.  More likely you've managed to trip the spam filter. 
Send me an e-mail.  I'l fish it out as soon as possible.  4.) It's worth remembering 
that this is a liberal blog, written by a guy whose politics are unfailingly liberal. 
So if you see me defend Huck or Palin, it's probably not because I'm "going soft" 
on them, being "too polite," or "a sleeper agent for birthers the nation over."  It's 
most likely just on that one issue.  5.) There are no set of rules for why someone 
might be deleted or banned. The only big one holds that if you came here, through 
google's news portal, to tell us why Sarah Palin is our country's foremost 
intellectual, you will be banned.  Beyond that, don't be an ass, and we'll be fine.  
6.) White people.  Never, ever comment on one of my barbershop threads.  We 
tried this once.  Someone ended telling me to go to Hair Cuttery.  In Obama's 
America, I thought you guys might be ready.  You're not and hence banished to 
the bleachers.  Just kidding.  Sorta.  I mean damn, Hair Cuttery??  7.) Claiming 
that conversate isn't a word, is a bannable offense.  Ditto for "irregardless."  And 
"overstand."  All words are words.  That is all (Coates, 2010). 
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Though he may be unapologetic for his chosen level of monitoring and moderating, he 
readily recognizes that subjects as controversial as reparations demand that discussants 
have sufficient space and freedom to engage in this shared exploration of a very sensitive 
topic.  In this way, such a discussion becomes the very kind of public event Hauser 
(1999) suggested in his discussion of rhetorical democracies, in which individual 
contributions made by members of what would otherwise be considered to be an inchoate 
group create a coalescing force that can result in collective action.  As opposed to 
searching for the destination of some elusive truth reached through rational-critical means 
(as in public spheres) or the sustainment of adversarial conditions required to fend off the 
onset of hegemony (as in agonistic confrontations), rhetorical democracies derive energy 
from their evolutionary nature.  Coates, an African-American whose own thinking 
changed radically on the subject of reparations over a three-year span, is creating the 
conditions by which others can share in the ongoing journey (though he obviously 
remains at the helm).  In the initial moment of discussion, Coates offers not only a very 
lengthy, multi-part essay on the topic to prime the conversation but also a relatively open 
space within which discussants can express more raw opinions and perspectives.  He 
opens the forum by suggesting: 
Here is your uncurated space to talk about reparations.  Later we will have a 
curated space according to the usual rules on my blog.  Even though this is 
uncurated – it is still moderated.  In other words, you still have to obey basic 
Atlantic rules of commenting.   No one will try to steer the conversation, but 
namecalling and blatant trolling will still bring the pain of banhmmer.  Think of 
this as Hamsterdam.  But what happens in Hamsterdam, must stay in Hamsterdam 
(Coates, 2014). 
 
This three-step process – priming the conversation, allowing for an open period of period, 
and then curating a discussion – is highly effective in not only activating and propelling 
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the rhetorical democracy but also in readying discussants to be actively engaged in 
contributing to a shared and dynamic search for a deeper understanding. 
If Ta-Nehisi Coates' blog is demonstrative of the potential that newer 
technologies, when administered appropriately, hold in empowering rhetorical 
democracies, it is safe to say that the groundbreaking work of the CITRIS Data and 
Democracy Initiative at the University of California at Berkeley may possess equivalent 
capacity to enliven monitorial citizenries.  Noting that the most common interface for 
Internet comments is a list, sorted either chronologically or by binary ratings, researchers 
endeavored to build an interface that was both more readily scannable and did not have a 
tendency to lead to cyberpolarization and the the reinforcement of extreme opinions.  
Employing a combination of discursive and engineering tools (deliberative polling, 
dimensionality reduction and collective filtering), the team introduced a so-called 
"collaborative discovery engine" named Opinion Space (Faridani, Bitton Royokai, & 
Goldber, 2010): 
Opinion Space solicits opinions to a set of controversial statements as scalar 
values on a continuous scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) and 
applies dimensionality reduction to project the data onto a two-dimensional plane 
for visualization and navigation, effectively placing all participants onto one level 
playing field.  Points far apart correspond to participants with very different 
opinions, and participants with similar opinions are proximal.  One of our goals is 
to move beyond one-dimensional characterizations of opinion: the arrangement of 
points is statistically optimized to convey the underlying distribution of opinions 
and does not correspond to conventional left/liberal and right/conservative 
polarities.  Participants are also asked to contribute a textual comment in response 
to a discussion topic; each comment is associated with the position of the 
contributing user in the visualization space.  We designed Opinion Space to be a 
self-organizing system that rewards participants who consider the opinions of 
those with whom they might normally disagree (p. 1175-1176). 
 
In a controlled experiment, when Opinion Space was compared with a traditional 
(i.e. chronological) list interface, participants read a similar diversity of comments but 
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were significantly more engaged with the system and had noticeably higher agreement 
with and respect for the comments they read (Faridani, Bitton Royokai, & Goldberg, 
2010).  Beyond being a potentially invaluable improvement for how monitorial citizens 
can more efficiently navigate online discussion spaces, Opinion Space has been utilized 
to engender such a public's participation on a much grander scale.  The California Report 
Card, for example, a joint project between CITRIS and California's Lieutenant Governor, 
was designed to rethink the ways in which citizens and government officials interact.  An 
op-ed penned by the lead collaborators suggested that the state's collective intelligence 
could be amplified through a better utilization of technology, noting: 
The methods used to find out what citizens think and believe are limited to 
elections, opinion polls, surveys and focus groups.  These methods may produce 
valuable information, but they are costly, infrequent and often conducted at the 
convenience of government or special interests.  We believe that new technology 
has the potential to increase public engagement by tapping the collective 
intelligence of Californians every day, not just on election day.  While most 
politicians already use e-mail and social media, these channels are easily 
dominated by extreme views and tend to regurgitate material from mass media 
outlets.  We’re exploring an alternative (Newsom & Goldberg, 2014). 
 
The alternative they describe is a mobile-friendly extension of the Opinion Space 
platform designed to streamline and organize public input for the benefit of policymakers 
and elected officials.  Participants are initially asked to assign letter grades relative to the 
State of California's performance on six timely issues: implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act; quality of K-12 public education; affordability of state colleges and 
universities; access to state services for undocumented immigrants; laws and regulations 
regarding recreational marijuana; and marriage rights for same-sex partners (California 
Report Card, 2014).  Once completed, participants are invited to virtually join other 
Californians in a virtual coffee house, in which six mugs are situated around a table.  
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Each mug corresponds to a unique suggestion made by another participant as to which 
public policy issues should be considered for inclusion in the next version of the Report 
Card.  Mugs that are further away from the front of the table (the frame uses a first-
person perspective) are suggestions likely to be less agreeable to the current user, just as 
mugs closer to the front are likely to be more agreeable.  The user is then asked to rate the 
relative importance of the proposed issue for the next report card and also to assign a 
letter grade for the state's current level of effectiveness with respect to that issue.  Just 
before submitting the completed report card, the user is asked to contribute his/her own 
submission of an important issue. 
In this process, an extraordinary amount of useful data is being collected to 
inform civic leaders as to public opinion.  Not only do elected and appointed officials 
gain an overarching sense of their ability to make progress on matters of public import, 
but they also gain a sense of which matters are of greatest concern.  Interestingly, while 
the system allows for a large amount of information to be conveyed and shared, it is 
hardly a discursive space.  Short of writing a one sentence suggestion at the end of the 
engagement, participants do little more than interacting with on-screen sliding scales.  
And yet the power of the tool – to convey citizen perspectives, to avoid special interest 
barriers or filters, and to take individualized communicative action that is then 
synthesized into both aggregate and granular political pulses – cannot be denied, nor can 
its initial popularity (statistics posted on the site show that more than 30,000 citizens 
throughout all of California's 58 counties have participated).  Researchers have no 
immediate plans to incorporate any kind of traditional discussion forum into the platform 
and, nor would it appear is there any pressing need to do so. 
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Unleashing the Democratic: Guiding Questions For Tailored Reforms 
	  
By now it should be abundantly clear that there is no such thing as a singular 
definition of what constitutes an online community, let alone how it should behave, what 
it needs to thrive, who it needs to encompass, or why it exists in the first place.  As such, 
trying to articulate even a modicum of guiding principles to best energize the public or 
more optimally inspire them towards a mode of democratic participation would be 
foolhardy.  As this study has shown through the administration of an objective content 
analysis employing several measures of reasonable face validity, there are vast 
differences operating within different kinds of discussion boards; even within a singular 
platform, when controlling for disparate kinds of precipitating thematic content, such 
differences are highly significant.  At a more conceptual level, this analysis gives rise to 
the idea of a multiplicity of publics, different typologies that each require fundamentally 
different starting materials and must satisfy various combinations of inherent community 
needs if it is to thrive.  Embracing the notion of a multiplicity further suggests that there 
is no one way to exercise the democratic within online space, nor is there a 
corresponding, unitary mechanism for measuring the efficacy of such spaces.  
And yet, it is equally clear that any number of digital forums have begun to figure 
out, at minimum, how they can get better.  Colorful metaphors conjuring images of the 
loudest drunk at the bar, cesspools of hate-soaked racism, or monkeys writing 
Shakespeare while flinging feces begin to reek of complacency and the desire for a quick 
escape.  In contrast, true pioneers – from the organizers of the Daily Kos to Ta-Nehisi 
Coates to information theorists at UC Berkeley to an inventive editorial page team at the 
"gray lady" – have refused to surrender their underlying belief that new technologies, if 
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utilized carefully, can help to unlock more of the potential arising from democratic 
exchange.  In profoundly different ways, each demonstrates time and time again that the 
conveners of an online community – whether directly involved or detached, whether 
operating by a doctrine of rules or tapping into their own intuitions, whether seeking 
consensus or demanding adversarial conditions, whether creating the conditions for 
deliberation or the harvesting of pubic opinion – are perhaps the most prominent 
determinant of its likelihood of success.  Though it can often be a fantastically 
exhausting, muddy and even thankless task, the more time and thought a convener gives 
to the overarching "why" and "how" of an online community the better off that 
community generally is.  
One highly relevant finding of this investigation (RQ3) revealed significant 
evidence that news sources native to the Internet generated comments of much higher 
deliberative quality than those attached to news sites predating it.  One possible 
explanation may be found in the fact that the Internet, as a superstructure, is radically 
different than the communication technologies proceeding it.  Instead of being just a 
more flexible and robust channel for the transmission of information, the Internet created 
the conditions for truly multi-directional transmission and reception. In setting up 
platforms born in cyberspace, conveners were obliged to think more holistically about 
these new dynamics and consider the array of new opportunities and challenges 
associated with them.  In contrast, the organizers of traditional news sites, at least 
initially, largely just bolted commenting interfaces (of disparate flexibly and possessing a 
wide variance of user tools) and continued to operate as they always had.  This is not to 
say traditional news outlets cannot catch up to their Internet-native counterparts (e.g. both 
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The Atlantic and The New York Times have clearly made great strides), but it does mean 
that it requires a completely different approach – and much more expansive thinking – 
surrounding the role of journalists, the consideration of audiences, and the very purpose 
of political news in the first place.  
What follows then, is not so much a how-to guide as it is a preliminary framework 
of critical guiding questions.  Organizers need to understand and as clearly as possible 
articulate their respective motivations for offering online comment opportunities in the 
first place.  Concurrently, members of the online community should have reasonably 
clarity regarding not only the participative expectations placed upon them but also a fair 
sense of how their needs as a coalescing public (corresponding to a variety of different 
typologies) will be met.  In effect, active and deliberate consideration of these many 
questions functions as something of a calibration within a given public space.  This effort, 
as illustrated in Figure 5, accounts for the interplay that has typically operated between 
the worlds of deliberation and news while also recognizing (given the introduction of 
new technologies) newer opportunities to modulate discursive norms and content 
attributes.  Within the conceptual space of this historic back-and-forth, participants and 
journalists alike may possess greater opportunity to define the relative importance they 
place on the shared community needs of information engagement and processing.  The 
calibrating choices they make should ideally correspond to the type of public they wish to 
be.  While this study examined the broad contours of four such typologies (public sphere, 
agonistic confrontation, rhetorical democracy, monitorial citizenship), it is important to 
remember that a large but indefinable number – a multiplicity – theoretically exist. 
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Figure 5: Calibration of Public Spaces 
 
While there are, indeed, multiple ways to excite and enliven the democratic within 
such spaces, they will almost certainly fail if these calibrating decisions are not 
considered, even if only modestly.  An emerging truism of online spaces vis-à-vis their 
democratic potential may very well be that choosing NOT to offer the opportunity for 
participation at all may be preferable than doing so either cavalierly or carelessly.  
Democracy is no easy proposition, and while a few key experimental advancements can 
generate great reason for optimism, a handful of failures certainly can erode confidence 
quickly.     
As online platforms come into existence or as they seek to evolve, conveners 
(and, if possible, audiences alike) should begin by posing to themselves a basic but all-
important question:  Can we identify and clearly articulate the overarching mission, 
objective(s) and basic motivation(s) that allowed the idea of this discursive space to arise 
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in the first place?  Grappling with this question is an extraordinarily important precursor 
to either launching a platform or making improvements.  The answer can take on any 
number of forms and examples include (based upon this exploratory study) but are not 
limited to: to generate rationale discourse and strive for a consensus of understanding; to 
ensure that as many viewpoints as possible are given the opportunity to weigh in, all the 
while ensuring that no one perspective colonizes another; to allow for an ongoing, shared 
discovery of issues that are continuously evolving in their own right; to engender 
widespread participation and encourage people to take action beyond the discursive 
space; to allow members of a given audience to readily communicate their perspectives 
and opinions to elites (e.g. journalists, elected officials, etc.); to offer constructive 
critique of a given news article based upon a wealth of different vantage points and 
perspectives; to serve as a populist counterweight to elite-created news content; to engage 
in direct or indirect communication with the author or creator of content in an attempt to 
optimize the relevancy of current editorial trajectories; and to exploit a broader 
community’s collective intelligence while synthesizing individual contributions into a 
salient sense of collective public opinion.  An answer to this fundamental question helps 
both to gauge the level of a convener’s inherent readiness to seed and then manage an 
online community while also revealing some of the basic contours of what typology of 
public may be most optimal given the particular circumstances. 
Beyond the question of a site's raison d'être, additional initial reflection is needed 
to help establish and introduce a broader understanding of what participation both entails 
and even means.  Rather than relying upon a single holistic question, this exploration 
involves a handful of important asks: are participants encouraged to cite externally 
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verifiable facts when making postings; are statements drawing upon participants' political 
cognition (including those arguments that begin with "I think") appreciated or generally 
frowned upon?; do participants have to clearly identify themselves and validate their 
authenticity?; is anonymity acceptable or not?; should participants asking questions of or 
debating with one another be encouraged?; should participants asking questions of or 
critiquing the author be acceptable?; what is the approximate range of viewpoints a 
community would hope to have, and should participants take responsibility for ensuring 
this range?; how often is one expected to participate in the community?; is a participant 
expected to respond to challenges made to his/her posting?; are participants expected to 
help other participants possessing vastly different viewpoints find common ground?; are 
participants invited to or given incentives to submit their own content that may be 
presented for more pronounced  distribution?  
The third set of questions address both the expectations for human monitoring and 
moderating as well as the deployment of various technological tools to either aid in that 
process of serve as a surrogate. As has been shown, the more high-functioning platforms 
have a very clear answer to the question: who (or what) is monitoring the site and what is 
their (or its) expectation for when a responding action may be necessary?  Beyond this 
fundamental question, however, a number of other guiding choices come into focus: do 
participants have the power to identify postings that have either high or low value given 
the community's mission and standards?; do participants have a mechanism for reporting 
what comments may constitute a threat to the community, and if so, is the sequestration 
of comments automatic or subject to review?; who is the final arbiter of this decision and 
is there a reasonable appeal process?; what are the consequences of engaging in activities 
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that undermine the mission of the site?; how are these consequences enforced and by 
whom?; if an automatic system of filtering or moderating exists, what does the 
underlying logic look like?; how is content (both precipitating news content and 
subsequent comments) optimally organized given a community's needs?; are participants 
empowered with the abilities to either block or showcase other participants?; does the 
community have access to a repository of facts, vital information or examples that model 
appropriate participation? 
Finally, conveners and participants alike must consider carefully the set of 
discursive norms that define the community.  As has been shown, seemingly similar 
kinds of online spaces can have vastly different rules governing the appropriate use of 
language, and technical aids to filter out bad language (as they are unable to infer 
meaning) are often woefully inadequate.  Generally, communities need to decide if they 
are highly prescriptive in what is acceptable and what is not (often requiring the clear 
statement of a corpus of words and terms that are off limits) or, as in Coates' blog or the 
Daily Kos, provide an equally clear, broader expression of where participants can and 
cannot go with respect to their underlying intentions.  Though this study examined in 
depth four discursive norms – civility, politeness, justification and complexity – they 
were never intended to be exhaustive.  While each deserves careful attention as to its 
relative importance, there are numerous other considerations that could be addressed to 
better establish expectations: are participants expected to use proper English when 
posting or are shortcuts and slang readily embraced by the community?; is there a 
standard range for the length of a contribution?; are alternative, less literal contributions 
to the discussion acceptable (i.e. video clips, sounds recordings, artistic expressions, 
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etc.)?; should there be a moratorium on the utilization of logical fallacies (i.e. red 
herrings, straw men, etc.); how does the community feel about more excitable forms of 
speech, such as the choice to use all capital letters, an overabundance of exclamation 
points or particular clauses that speak to anger or passion? 
Not surprisingly, all of these questions as well as their overarching categorization 
began with an appreciation for the kind of multiplicity outlined throughout this chapter 
and summarized in Figure 4.  For the scholar, the challenge remains to continue to better 
understand what is potentially an ever-expanding and ever-evolving constellation of 
definitions and possibilities for democratic engagement within this multiplicity.  For the 
practitioner (conveners and participants alike), the pressing need is to establish what a 
community hopes to be (and, just as important, what it hopes not to be), to allow form to 
follow intended function, to be both deliberate and open-minded in encouraging its 
evolution, and to remain circumspect when presented with silver bullets or game-
changing innovations.  Technology may foster new possibilities to awaken the 
democratic; just as easily, it has the potential of lulling participants into thinking it has 
somehow become an easy proposition.  No matter the era or the tools at one's disposal, 
Churchill's comments continue to ring true: "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or 
all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except 
all those other forms that have been tried from time to time" (Churchill, 1974).  
Limitations of the Study 
	  
Even as this study arguably sheds new light on many of the profound differences 
that exist within online communities, and though it addresses some of the pathways to 
better unleash the latent democratic potential of a multiplicity of online publics, it is 
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essential to document its underlying limitations.  While a handful of the investigation's 
weaknesses arose from resource and time constraints, more often than not its 
shortcomings were the result of an inherent tension: while the overarching research 
trajectory intended to operate at the frontier of existing research and scholarship on the 
bricolage of subject matter, the landscape of online platforms – along with the tools 
associated with them, prevailing thinking surrounding them, and the response of news 
organizations towards them – continued to evolve at an accelerating rate.  Thus, some of 
the critical decisions made with respect to the overarching research design may, at times, 
appear to a reviewer to be too arbitrary or narrow-minded.  If there is an air of artificiality 
about the study, it is the result of having to be decisive in choosing to peel back the first 
several layers of the proverbial onion, all the while knowing there are both many layers to 
the onion and, possibly, many other vegetables to consider.  What follows, then, is a 
summary of the investigation's 10 most significant weaknesses. 
First and foremost, it is important to note the data set analyzed could be regarded 
as at least somewhat dated.  Three years of age would not typically be considered old by 
content analysis standards, but the rapid pace of digital evolution makes what happens in 
online spaces to be something of an outlier in this regard. Case in point, all four of the 
news sources considered by this study (along with countless others) saw significant 
changes to their approaches to managing online comments between the time data were 
first collected and when they were analyzed.  It is known that, at least in the case of 
YouTube, some of these changes had a profound impact on the overall number of 
comments posted.  At the same time, the introduction of new tools – such as those 
allowing users to hide, filter or prioritize the comments they see – arrived on the scene 
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after data had been collected but before findings could be assessed.  For example, the 
chronological ordering of comments (the only choice when data were harvested) is now 
just one of several sequencing options available to users (and hardly the most popular one 
at that).  Quite literally, the whole interface through which users engage with an online 
community has shifted significantly during the period of study.  As a result, the 
generalizability of the findings into current and future periods becomes somewhat 
problematic. 
Equally a concern for the overall strength of the study's generalizability was the 
decision to scrutinize comments coming from just four news sources; as shown in Figure 
1, each of these four organizations represented a respective quadrant in the 2x2 array 
between channel modality and channel constitution.  While care was taken to choose the 
occupants of these quadrants with respect to overall popularity and (at least then) concern 
for relative consistency in the commenting interfaces across the four, it is too much of a 
conceptual leap to suggest that any one platform could ably or wholly represent one of 
these groups.  Not only did the study's findings clearly demonstrate that significant 
differences in deliberative quality existed across the discussion boards of the four news 
sites, the significance of those differences was also readily apparent in forums that shared 
the same commenting platform (i.e. Young Turks and Associated Press, both of which 
operate on the YouTube platform).  Moreover, while the original grouping technique (as 
shown in Figure 1) proved invaluable in systematizing the preliminary exploration of the 
discursive landscape, what emerged from the analysis is the need to think of a different 
organizing construct altogether, and one more in line with what is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Added to this important question of representativeness is the potential for inherent 
biases to be present based upon ideological predispositions within the different online 
communities.  Again, while the choices of news sources were made judiciously to best 
meet the data needs corresponding to the study's primary research questions, a troubling 
consideration is that the broader left-right spectrum (at least from an American 
perspective) is not well represented.  Daily Kos and Young Turks, for example, are 
unabashedly leftist-progressive in advancing their activist agenda.  In addition, The Los 
Angeles Times is widely regarded as having a left-of-center editorial slant.  Though it has 
its critics on both the right and the left, the Associated Press operates as an apolitical, not-
for-profit corporation feeding print articles and audiovisual content to member news 
organizations around the world.  The absence of a right-leaning news organization from 
the mix weakens the overall generalizability of the findings.  For example, while the 
findings did show that commenters communicated differently (at least in terms of the 
four measures of deliberative quality) across these four left-leaning and centrist 
discussion boards, it is entirely possible that this finding would not hold true if right-
learning news platforms were examined.  A fuller investigation would have adopted a 
more holistic consideration of the ideological spectrum. 
This concern raises another issue: outside of the brief inspection in the 
supplementary analysis, no attempt is made to think more granularly as to who are the 
actual commenters making discursive contributions.  As individual comments constitute 
the unit of analysis for this study, a more thorough understanding of actual participants 
would certainly have been helpful (and likely further illuminating).  And while the 
methodology was deliberate in harvesting data from anonymous users, there could have 
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been a greater accountability of, at minimum, the uniqueness of users.  As it is currently 
constructed, and as it was used to differentiate between robust threads and non-robust 
threads, the research design is incapable of distinguishing between, for example, a 
lengthy back-and-forth between two users and a sustained conversation among a larger 
group of participants.  The total number of unique users within a given conversation is 
simply not a consideration.  While anonymous platforms make it relatively easy to invent 
and utilize new pseudonyms (all of which is non-verifiable by the researcher), it is fairly 
easy to tell, at least when one is reading a chain of comments, when a given chain is a 
dialogue between a few and when it is among many.  As the content analysis scrutinized 
individual postings, however, and not chains, individual pseudonyms attached to each of 
the nearly 17,000 comments registered would have been required to first be collected and 
then used to differentiate (using a more sophisticated procedure) between robust and non-
robust discussions. 
Beyond the data set and questions of broader sampling is the need to reconsider 
the measures of deliberative quality.  As a strictly exploratory study, the current 
investigation can make do with binary attributes to the variables of civility, politeness, 
justification and complexity.  To go any further, however, more complex measures will 
be required.  As of now, the research design cannot gauge the difference between a 
comment that contains a single instance of vulgarity and one taking the form of a 
profanity-laced tirade.  It can merely distinguish between "polite" and "impolite."  With 
no gradations, there is no possibility of using the methodology to conclude, for example, 
that one comment is "less polite" or "significantly less polite" than another. Equally 
important, the broader measurement of overall quality (as the simple sum of the four 
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component measures) can take on only one of only five values.  Though it would require 
considerably more work (plus time and resources), introducing greater precision into each 
of the measurements would not only reveal much more in the way of depth but also make 
the methodology more portable for future investigations. 
Given what has been articulated as the emerging need to consider a multiplicity of 
online publics, it is reasonable to assume that the given calculation of deliberative quality 
is heavily skewed towards certain typologies of publics and away from others.  As 
discussed previously and illustrated in Figure 4, the four components of deliberative 
quality utilized in this study are important norms within the construct of public spheres; 
they are less important for agonistic confrontations and rhetorical democracies, and they 
have little value for monitorial citizenship.  Adding their measures together makes a fair 
degree of sense for public spheres and their prescribed mode of employing so-called 
"ideal speech types."  Here, this compound measure of deliberative quality makes 
intuitive sense and would likely be highly correlated with overall levels of efficacy and 
vibrancy within such a space.  Against the backdrop of other typologies, however, this 
definition begins to lose meaning. 
Finally, there is an enduring concern as to the decision to separate (irrespective of 
the given methodology) robust from non-robust threads.  While doing so revealed higher 
levels of deliberative quality at work in robust threads (and, correspondingly, much lower 
levels within non-robust threads), there is indeed something inherently artificial about the 
choice to distinguish between types of chains (or to even think in terms of chains) in the 
first place.  Before the advent of user-friendly management and sorting tools, participants 
simply viewed a chronological list (with responses to a given post indented accordingly).  
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It is simply not known, nor does this study truly take into account, the extent to which 
users are able (or even seek) to wander through the bevy of comments and navigate their 
way down particular threads.  No less important, the metaphor of the "loudest drunk at 
the bar" is an important one.  Given the study's design, the researcher is able to easily 
filter out the "drunk's" effect; participants, who actually exist in the space, have no such 
capabilities (or certainly did not at the time when data were collected).    
In choosing to focus on robust threads, too, this research clearly sets its sights on 
delving into the differences between the segments of online discussion boards that are 
already working, on average, rather well.  Doing so is somewhat counterintuitive and, as 
has been shown, the widespread negative criticism hoisted upon such forums is largely 
born out of of their darker elements (and thus, more prevalent in non-robust threads).  In 
the hopes of ultimately proposing a slate of tailored reforms intended to better unleash the 
democratic potential of such spaces, the researcher was deliberate in attempting to better 
understand what was inherently healthy and then trying to find ways of further improving 
that health.  An alternative approach could have been to scrutinize what was most 
destructive and then prescribe ways to mitigate against – or better still, neutralize – those 
factors. 
Opportunities for Additional Research 
	  
Most immediately, and as implied by the preface to Chapter 5, it would be highly 
worthwhile to repeat the study, using much the same methodology, and examine what 
impact (if any) the elimination of pseudonyms and anonymity from the four platforms 
investigated have had on the underlying findings.  Anonymity has both psychological and 
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sociological pluses and minuses associated with it, and gauging the net effect may shed 
new light on where in the multiplicity it could be of benefit.  	  
The study would, unquestionably, benefit from both a significant expansion of its 
time horizon and the utilization of a more extensive array of news sources.  Given that so 
many news sites have already tinkered – or in some cases, overhauled – their 
commenting platforms, the possibility naturally arises for a series of pre- and post-change 
content analyses to be conducted and then compared.  The Digital Age is creating tools at 
an astonishing pace; the need to maximize the speed of roll-out and implementation, 
however, more often than not far outweighs the necessity of gauging their effectiveness.  
Such investigations could perform an invaluable public service and engender an 
appreciation for better assessing what already exists. 
Perhaps the most ambitious new direction for this research would be to blend the 
methodologies of content analysis and active experimentation.  Conceivable if not easily, 
different online communities could be created with each modeled upon a particular 
typology of public.  Different stimuli could then be applied – be it the introduction of 
different community expectations, the tweaking of rules, changes to the digital 
infrastructure, a modulation in the overarching approach to moderation, etc. – and the 
various impacts measured.  What the current study has shown is that there is a need to 
consider an array of differently constituted online publics.  What it cannot yet show is the 
extent to which the various components (needs, norms, etc.) of these publics may possess 
different power in activating the democratic.  The ability to consider the possibilities at 
hand with greater sophistication, all the while recognizing that there is no optimal 
engineering, would be an invaluable step forward. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SAMPLE OF POLITCAL NEWS ARTICLES/SEGMENTS PRECIPITATING 
USER COMMENTS 
 
Date Source Title # Comments 
2/1/11 Young Turks U.S. oil drilling in response to Egypt protests? 353 
2/1/11 AP Obama: Egypt’s transition must begin now 43 
2/1/11 Daily Kos GOP redistricting efforts languishing 35 
2/2/11 Young Turks Barbara Bush pro-gay ad 464 
2/2/11 AP Gibbs: Obama condemns violence, calls for change 66 
2/2/11 Daily Kos H.R. 3 hides even bigger dangers than redefinition of rape 48 
2/3/11 Young Turks Record profits during recession? 157 
2/3/11 AP Bernanke: Economy better; budget unsustainable 33 
2/3/11 Daily Kos GOP unveils pro-greenhouse gas legislation; White House vows veto 83 
2/3/11 LA Times House Republicans propose $74 billion in budget cuts 20 
2/4/11 Young Turks GOP budget lie exposed 105 
2/4/11 AP Unemployment falls to 9.0%, only 36K new jobs 59 
2/4/11 Daily Kos Census shows a dramatic browning of America 130 
2/4/11 LA Times Obama urges Egypt to go into transition process ‘right now’ 9 
2/5/11 Young Turks Mark Foley loves young Republicans 150 
2/5/11 AP US backs Egypt reform moves, seeks support 35 
2/5/11 Daily Kos The folly of raising the Social Security retirement age 88 
2/5/11 LA Times 
Egypt’s talks with opposition are 
‘extraordinary,’ a possible turning point, 
John Kerry says 
8 
2/6/11 Young Turks Senator’s blatant lie about big coal 106 
2/6/11 AP Elaborate ceremony for Reagan centennial 21 
2/6/11 Daily Kos The final verdict on the Bush Doctrine 105 
2/6/11 LA Times Conservative Democrats switch to GOP across the deep south 34 
2/7/11 Young Turks Rand Paul – Cut foreign aid (Is he right?) 525 
2/7/11 AP Obama: White House, CEOs must work together 72 
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2/7/11 Daily Kos Blue Dogs feeling ignored by Pelosi 89 
2/7/11 LA Times Obama a business booster in Chamber of Commerce speech 59 
2/8/11 Young Turks Tea Party R’s kill Patriot Act? 62 
2/8/11 AP Biden touts high-speed rail investment in Philly 62 
2/8/11 Daily Kos Health insurers continue to drop children’s coverage 94 
2/8/11 LA Times Most Americans say Obama is handling Egypt about right, Pew poll says 3 
2/9/11 Young Turks Tea Party rep. wrong about stimulus bill 60 
2/9/11 AP Napolitano: Threat may be highest since 9/11 98 
2/9/11 Daily Kos White House to propose cutting energy assistance for poor 260 
2/9/11 LA Times House Republicans’ spending cuts fall short of goal 31 
2/10/11 Young Turks Sarah Palin vs Rick Santorum – CPAC strike back on Fox News 140 
2/10/11 AP Top intel officials: Terror remains top US threat 18 
2/10/11 Daily Kos ME-Sen: Snow removal: Tea Party Express targets Olympia Snowe 96 
2/10/11 LA Times CPAC: Donald Trump says he’s considering a 2012 presidential run 60 
2/11/11 Young Turks How being gay kills – GOP Representative 222 
2/11/11 AP Govt. to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 12 
2/11/11 Daily Kos WSJ: White House will leave Social Security out of budget 56 
2/11/11 LA Times CPAC: Mitt Romney says Obama is ‘weak president’ 112 
2/12/11 AP Paul wins Conservatives’ straw poll 83 
2/12/11 Daily Kos Obama gives preview of budget: Freezes and investments 158 
2/12/11 LA Times Ron Paul of Texas wins CPAC presidential straw poll 28 
2/13/11 Young Turks Fox News Egypt panel rips democracy 88 
2/13/11 AP Obama takes scalpel to budget, avoiding pain 106 
2/13/11 Daily Kos So-called “Right to Work” and the assault on the middle class 215 
2/13/11 LA Times John Boehner: ‘Not my job’ to convince skeptics on Obama birth, religion 110 
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2/14/11 Young Turks President Obama’s budget proposal – analysis 85 
2/14/11 AP Clinton: GOP 2011 budget devastating for security 65 
2/14/11 Daily Kos Ezra Klein: The White House is calling for Social Security Talks 107 
2/14/11 LA Times Obama begins rollout of budget certain to spark strong debate 83 
2/15/11 Young Turks GOP in favor of loose nukes? 189 
2/15/11 AP GOP: No presidential leadership on budget 27 
2/15/11 Daily Kos 
Poll: Overwhelming support for immigration 
reform with border security, path to 
citizenship 
59 
2/15/11 LA Times Senate passes extension of Patriot Act provisions 14 
2/16/11 Young Turks Boehner OK w/ Americans losing jobs 131 
2/16/11 AP New Obama spokesperson steps into spotlight 43 
2/16/11 Daily Kos Can Republicans avoid a federal shutdown without ditching their tea partiers? 91 
2/16/11 LA Times CBS News poll: Most Americans don’t want to strip healthcare law of its funding 8 
2/17/11 Young Turks Obama sides with Tea Party?! 250 
2/17/11 AP Bernanke: Fed moving ahead on financial revamp 16 
2/17/11 Daily Kos Boehner threatens shutdown over spending bill 205 
2/17/11 LA Times Sarah Palin making rounds among socially conservative groups 36 
2/18/11 Young Turks Investigations on WMD lies that led to Iraq war 202 
2/18/11 AP Raw video: House abortion debate gets personal 150 
2/18/11 Daily Kos Pelosi blasts GOP’s ‘so be it’ attitude towards government shutdown 41 
2/19/11 AP House passes sweeping cuts to domestic programs 200 
2/19/11 Daily Kos CPAC, bowing to Santorum’s conservative stool, bans groups that support gay equality 50 
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2/20/11 Daily Kos 
Senate panel to cut Social Security and 
Medicare is based on imaginary theory of 
legislation 
70 
2/20/11 LA Times After House passage of GOP budget cuts, lawmakers head home to hear from voters 26 
2/21/11 Daily Kos Deficit commission members forget they didn’t make recommendations 52 
2/21/11 LA Times Gallup: Solidly Democratic states are down by half 4 
2/22/11 Young Turks Mike Huckabee a dangerous candidate for president? 137 
2/22/11 AP Oil prices surge as Libya protests mount 21 
2/22/11 Daily Kos State of the Nation Poll: More Dem voters say we’re on ‘wrong track’ 46 
2/22/11 LA Times Harry Reid offers plan to avert government shutdown 20 
2/23/11 Young Turks O’Reilly – Obama won’t defend liberals 164 
2/23/11 AP Obama dispatches Clinton for talks on Libya 113 
2/23/11 Daily Kos House GOP scrambles to avoid blame for government shutdown 37 
2/23/11 LA Times Gay marriage: questions and answers about the Obama administration’s decision 25 
2/24/11 Young Turks Crusades OK to radical Republican Santorum 170 
2/24/11 AP Mideast unrest translates to higher fares 3 
2/24/11 Daily Kos Freshman GOPer wants funding restored for program he cut 54 
2/24/11 LA Times Mitt Romney, Tim Pawlenty show support for Wisconsin governor 14 
2/25/11 Young Turks President Obama vs himself on unions 287 
2/25/11 AP White House: U.S. to impose sanctions on Libya 37 
2/25/11 Daily Kos House Committee takes aim at housing rescue programs 20 
2/25/11 LA Times State’s racial past could hurt a presidential run by Haley Barbour 15 
2/26/11 Young Turks Cenk proud of Wisconsin protesters 203 
2/26/11 AP Anti-American protest in Pakistan 52 
2/26/11 Daily Kos Simon Johnson: U.S. isn’t in fiscal crisis, but we’re on our way 34 
2/26/11 LA Times ‘Tea Party’ activists rally at national policy conference 43 
2/27/11 Young Turks Universities vs poor students 216 
2/27/11 AP Obama welcomes governors to White House 42 
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2/27/11 Daily Kos Treasury’s housing finance plan misses the mark 91 
2/27/11 LA Times Boehner signals reluctance about shutdown 5 
2/28/11 Young Turks Corporate tax cuts screwing states 315 
2/28/11 AP Obama offers alternative health care option 89 
2/28/11 Daily Kos Sarah Palin’s popularity drops with Republicans.  Again. 66 
2/28/11 LA Times GOP governors to launch ads backing Wisconsin Gov. Walker 8 
3/1/11 Young Turks Def. Secretary Gates: Crazy wars in Iraq, Afghanistan 234 
3/1/11 AP Mortgages to cost more without Fannie, Freddie 13 
3/1/11 Daily Kos House GOP votes unanimously to protect big oil subsidies 59 
3/1/11 LA Times House vote first step in averting government shutdown 12 
3/2/11 Young Turks ‘Federal government dumbass program’ – Senator Hatch gives absurd speech 59 
3/2/11 AP Supreme Court hears argument over post-9/11 arrest 18 
3/2/11 Daily Kos 
NBC/WSJ: People overwhelmingly side with 
the unions; say leave Medicare, Social 
Security alone 
82 
3/2/11 LA Times With stopgap funding bill passed, budget sparring resumes 2 
3/3/11 Young Turks Fox won’t suspend Huckabee, Palin – ‘fair and balanced’ ploy 196 
3/3/11 AP Obama tells Libya’s Gadhafi to go 65 
3/3/11 Daily Kos The public: Yes to union givebacks, no to the end of collective bargaining 97 
3/3/11 LA Times New Gingrich a step closer to Presidential bid 16 
3/4/11 AP Unemployment dips to 8.9 pct., 192K jobs added 38 
3/4/11 Daily Kos Republicans issue a new round of government shutdown threats 45 
3/4/11 LA Times GOP tries to sell idea that less spending means more jobs 90 
3/5/11 Young Turks GOP deficit plan would cost jobs – report  72 
3/5/11 AP Michael Moore rallies Wis. pro-union protesters 49 
3/5/11 Daily Kos GOP Senators try to block stricter rules for for-profit colleges 62 
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3/6/11 Young Turks Coburn against Hingrich for President in 2012 60 
3/6/11 Daily Kos Open thread for night owls: Get ready for the ‘womancession’ 66 
3/7/11 Young Turks GOP college voter suppression & Michele Bachmann’s IQ 334 
3/7/11 AP Report: Military leadership needs more diversity 66 
3/7/11 Daily Kos The latest GOP attack on health reform: middle class tax hikes 51 
3/7/11 LA Times GOP Presidential content begins to warm up 32 
3/8/11 AP Debate over Congress hrg. On Islamic radicalism 45 
3/8/11 Daily Kos GOP Senators push for more drilling as they cuts in renewables research 53 
3/8/11 LA Times Likely GOP presidential candidates praise GOD, criticize Obama in Iowa 9 
3/9/11 Young Turks Report: Banks horrible for investors 159 
3/9/11 AP Imams denounce House Muslic hearings 54 
3/9/11 Daily Kos Cantor: Democrats wrong to oppose Social Security, Medicate benefit cuts 105 
3/9/11 LA Times Leaders of Obama debt commission go rogue 33 
3/10/11 Young Turks Down goes Senator Ensign 131 
3/10/11 AP King: Muslim radicalization must be probed 74 
3/10/11 Daily Kos Pelosi: Bachmann’s affordable care act charges ‘imaginry’ 376 
3/10/11 LA Times House Republicans vow to uphold the Defense of Marriage Act 51 
3/11/11 LA Times After Japan quake, Obama holds firm on oil reserves and drilling 20 
3/12/11 Young Turks Why Republicans cut education 500 
3/12/11 AP Wis. Gov. says support will grow for new law 139 
3/12/11 Daily Kos Palin, Huckabee send aides to RNC meeting on 2012 campaign 73 
3/12/11 LA Times State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley resigns 30 
3/13/11 Young Turks Why are gas prices going up? – Obama vs GOP 193 
3/13/11 AP Hawaiians offer hope and help for Japan 32 
3/13/11 Daily Kos Assault on student voting: Just the latest GOP overreach 78 
3/13/11 LA Times Haley Barbour bashes Obama on economic and energy policies 8 
3/14/11 Young Turks Republican defends big oil subsidies 168 
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3/14/11 AP Obama ‘heartbroken’ over Japan devastation 86 
3/14/11 Daily Kos House Republicans come out swinging on job creation 63 
3/15/11 AP Energy chief: US will learn from Japan disaster 38 
3/15/11 Daily Kos The latest GOP non-jobs agenda: Repealing Wall Street refor 72 
3/16/11 Young Turks Crazy gun law – Caught on tape at open mic 162 
3/16/11 AP Japan nuclear crisis rattles financial markets 32 
3/16/11 Daily Kos Pelosi: We’ll help Boehner pass funding bill – if he’ll compromise 51 
3/17/11 Young Turks New tax rates for the rich possible 377 
3/17/11 AP Obama Trip Aims to Reinforce Latin American Ties 22 
3/17/11 Daily Kos House progressives reflect on being in the minority 24 
3/17/11 LA Times Democrats move to repeal Defense of Marriage Act 5 
3/18/11 Young Turks 1/4 America kids in poverty & record profits, bonuses 47 
3/18/11 AP Obama: Coalition prepared to act in Libya 62 
3/18/11 Daily Kos Former Attorney General Mukasey lobbies for U.S. Chamber to gut foreign bribery law 45 
3/18/11 LA Times Sarah Palin traveling to India and Israel 26 
3/19/11 Daily Kos The continuing death of the FEC 53 
3/20/11 AP Raw video: Obama plays soccer 63 
3/20/11 Daily Kos Sarah Palin’s 2008 campaign game-changer: Sarah Palin 118 
3/20/11 LA Times Obama juggles Libya war, Brazil trade 9 
3/21/11 Young Turks John McCain – Obama waited too long on Libya 419 
3/21/11 AP Obama lauds Chile’s transition to democracy 15 
3/21/11 Daily Kos 
What do all Scandinavians, Belgians and 
Dutch have than 52 million Americans 
don’t?  Health care 
106 
3/21/11 LA Times Tim Pawlenty files paperwork for Presidential bid 11 
3/22/11 Young Turks Called out – 2012 GOP Presidential hopefuls 240 
3/22/11 AP U.S. loses jet on 4th day of Libya operation 41 
3/22/11 Daily Kos Geithner poised to blow big loophole in Wall Street reform 121 
3/23/11 Young Turks Republican BS on Obama’s handling of Libya 308 
3/23/11 AP GOP Presidential hopefuls off to slow start 17 
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3/23/11 Daily Kos Donald Rumsfeld offers Obama advice on Libya 75 
3/23/11 LA Times Healthcare law’s condition is anything but stable on its anniversary 11 
3/24/11 Young Turks Disastrously wrong predictions from Republicans on health care reform 249 
3/24/11 AP Census: One in six Americans are Hispanic 138 
3/24/11 Daily Kos Newtered: Mass scrubbing of Newt Gingrich’s Twitter archive 64 
3/24/11 LA Times White House plans private briefing on Libya for Congress next week 3 
3/25/11 Young Turks Barbour for amnesty for illegal immigrants? 159 
3/25/11 AP Economy stronger, but oil prices a concern 30 
3/25/11 Daily Kos Cantor denies making progress to avoid government shutdown 32 
3/25/11 LA Times No big stars in a nebulous field of Republican hopefuls visiting Iowa 5 
3/26/11 Young Turks 1 in 4 Americans have criminal record 48 
3/26/11 AP GOP address: Critical of health care overhaul 55 
3/26/11 Daily Kos Fed: Household wealth plummets 23% in two years 169 
3/26/11 LA Times House Republicans prefer bite-sized bills 7 
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APPENDIX B 
 
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: LATIMES.COM 
Date # Comments 
# Non-
Threads 
# 
Catalysts 
# 
Responses 
Mean 
Length 
# Threads 
Examined 
% 
Threads 
2/3/11 20 14 3 3 1.00 0 30.0% 
2/4/11 9 9 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
2/5/11 8 6 1 1 1.00 0 25.0% 
2/6/11 34 19 6 9 1.50 3 44.1% 
2/7/11 59 18 13 28 2.15 6 52.5% 
2/8/11 3 1 1 1 1.00 0 66.7% 
2/9/11 31 15 6 10 1.70 3 52.6% 
2/10/11 60 22 11 27 2.45 3 63.3% 
2/11/11 112 27 26 59 2.26 10 75.9% 
2/12/11 28 13 6 9 1.50 1 53.6% 
2/13/11 110 15 25 70 2.80 14 86.3% 
2/14/11 83 22 20 41 2.05 4 73.5% 
2/15/11 14 3 4 7 1.75 2 78.6% 
2/16/11 8 2 3 3 1.00 0 75.0% 
2/17/11 36 18 6 12 2.00 2 50.0% 
2/20/11 26 9 6 11 1.83 3 65.4% 
2/21/11 4 4 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
2/22/11 20 10 4 6 1.50 1 50.0% 
2/23/11 25 8 5 12 2.40 2 68.0% 
2/24/11 14 6 3 5 1.67 1 57.1% 
2/25/11 15 10 2 3 1.50 1 33.3% 
2/26/11 43 18 9 16 1.78 4 58.1% 
2/27/11 5 2 1 2 2.00 0 60.0% 
2/28/11 8 2 2 4 2.00 1 75.0% 
3/1/11 12 6 2 4 2.00 0 50.0% 
3/2/11 2 2 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
3/3/11 16 11 2 3 1.50 1 31.3% 
3/4/11 90 33 17 40 2.35 6 63.3% 
3/7/11 32 9 10 13 1.30 1 71.9% 
3/8/11 9 6 1 2 1.00 0 33.3% 
3/9/11 33 7 7 19 2.71 3 78.8% 
3/10/11 51 19 12 20 1.67 5 62.7% 
3/11/11 20 10 3 7 2.33 1 50.0% 
3/14/11 30 10 6 14 2.33 2 66.7% 
3/15/11 8 3 2 3 1.50 1 62.5% 
3/17/11 5 1 2 2 1.00 0 80.0% 
3/18/11 26 7 7 12 1.71 3 73.1% 
3/20/11 9 5 2 2 1.00 0 44.4% 
3/21/11 11 9 1 1 1.00 0 18.2% 
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3/23/11 11 5 2 4 2.00 1 54.6% 
3/24/11 3 3 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
3/25/11 5 5 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
3/26/11 7 7 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
TOTAL 1,155 424 239 485 2.03 85 62.7% 
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APPENDIX C 
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: AP YOUTUBE CHANNEL 
Date # Comments 
# Non-
Threads 
# 
Catalysts 
# 
Responses 
Mean 
Length 
# Threads 
Examined 
% 
Threads 
2/1/11 43 24 9 10 1.10 1 44.2% 
2/2/11 66 39 7 20 2.86 2 40.9% 
2/3/11 33 29 2 2 1.00 0 12.1% 
2/4/11 59 17 9 33 3.67 2 71.2% 
2/6/11 35 27 3 5 1.67 2 22.9% 
2/7/11 21 10 3 8 2.67 1 52.4% 
2/8/11 73 26 15 32 2.13 4 64.4% 
2/9/11 62 32 11 19 1.73 4 48.4% 
2/10/11 98 73 12 14 1.17 1 26.5% 
2/11/11 18 18 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
2/12/11 12 9 2 1 1.00 0 25.0% 
2/13/11 83 38 10 35 3.50 3 54.2% 
2/14/11 106 54 11 41 3.72 4 49.1% 
2/15/11 65 24 13 28 2.15 3 63.1% 
2/16/11 27 19 2 6 3.00 1 29.6% 
2/17/11 43 25 5 14 2.80 1 44.2% 
2/18/11 16 14 1 1 1.00 0 12.5% 
2/19/11 150 30 16 104 6.50 4 80.0% 
2/20/11 200 88 25 87 3.48 6 56.0% 
2/2311 21 18 1 2 2.00 0 14.3% 
2/24/11 113 49 16 38 2.38 5 47.8% 
2/25/11 3 3 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
2/26/11 37 31 3 3 1.00 0 16.2% 
2/27/11 52 23 9 20 2.22 2 55.8% 
2/28/11 42 26 6 10 1.67 4 38.1% 
3/1/11 89 45 12 32 2.67 4 49.4% 
3/2/11 13 13 0 0 N/A 0 0.0% 
3/3/11 18 13 2 3 1.50 1 27.8% 
3/4/11 65 36 7 21 3.00 2 43.1% 
3/5/11 38 21 5 12 2.40 2 44.7% 
3/6/11 49 22 5 22 4.40 1 55.1% 
3/8/11 66 36 9 21 2.33 1 45.5% 
3/9/11 45 26 5 14 2.80 1 42.2% 
3/10/11 54 16 6 32 5.33 2 70.4% 
3/11/11 74 26 14 34 2.43 3 64.9% 
3/13/11 139 67 19 53 2.79 8 51.8% 
3/14/11 25 6 4 15 3.75 2 76.0% 
3/15/11 86 37 18 31 1.72 8 57.0% 
3/16/11 38 22 3 13 4.33 2 42.1% 
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3/17/11 32 17 3 12 4.00 1 46.9% 
3/18/11 22 15 3 4 1.33 1 31.8% 
3/19/11 57 33 5 19 3.80 1 42.1% 
3/20/11 59 37 5 17 3.40 2 37.3% 
3/21/11 93 40 8 5 5.63 3 14.0% 
3/22/11 15 9 2 4 2.00 1 40.0% 
3/23/11 30 19 5 6 1.20 1 36.7% 
3/24/11 17 5 5 7 1.40 2 70.6% 
3/25/11 138 52 24 62 2.58 7 62.3% 
3/26/11 30 25 2 3 1.50 1 16.7% 
3/27/11 55 30 9 16 1.78 4 45.5% 
TOTAL 2,825 1,414 371 991 2.45 111 48.2% 
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APPENDIX D 
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: DAILYKOS.COM 
Date # Comments 
# Non-
Threads 
# 
Catalysts 
# 
Responses 
Mean 
Length 
# Threads 
Examined 
% 
Threads 
2/1/11 35 5 8 22 2.75 2 85.7% 
2/2/11 48 10 10 28 2.80 4 79.2% 
2/3/11 83 18 15 50 3.33 5 78.3% 
2/4/11 115 26 23 66 2.87 6 77.4% 
2/5/11 84 10 16 58 3.63 5 88.1% 
2/6/11 105 22 16 67 4.19 4 79.0% 
2/7/11 77 27 14 36 2.57 5 64.9% 
2/8/11 94 17 15 62 4.13 4 81.9% 
2/9/11 254 16 26 212 8.15 4 93.7% 
2/10/11 85 24 10 61 6.10 3 83.5% 
2/12/11 140 15 21 104 4.95 9 89.3% 
2/13/11 215 17 20 178 8.90 3 92.1% 
2/14/11 107 16 18 73 4.06 4 85.0% 
2/15/11 59 9 8 42 5.25 4 84.7% 
2/16/11 79 14 12 53 4.42 6 82.3% 
2/17/11 181 35 30 116 3.87 8 80.7% 
2/18/11 41 10 10 21 2.10 2 75.6% 
2/20/11 58 13 9 31 3.44 3 69.0% 
2/21/11 49 10 9 30 3.33 3 79.6% 
2/22/11 46 10 11 25 2.27 4 78.3% 
2/23/11 37 19 8 10 1.25 2 48.6% 
2/24/11 54 26 9 19 2.11 2 51.9% 
2/25/11 20 7 5 8 1.60 2 65.0% 
2/26/11 34 8 5 21 4.20 3 76.5% 
2/27/11 85 9 17 59 3.47 5 89.4% 
2/28/11 66 12 16 38 2.37 4 81.8% 
3/1/11 59 18 8 33 4.12 3 69.5% 
3/2/11 82 14 15 53 3.53 7 82.9% 
3/3/11 97 9 14 74 5.29 2 90.7% 
3/4/11 45 17 8 20 2.50 2 62.2% 
3/5/11 60 18 7 35 5.00 2 70.0% 
3/6/11 64 16 10 38 3.80 4 75.0% 
3/7/11 51 14 8 29 3.62 3 72.5% 
3/8/11 51 21 12 18 1.50 6 58.8% 
3/9/11 74 16 14 44 3.14 3 78.4% 
3/10/11 36 12 8 16 2.00 3 66.7% 
3/12/11 73 8 13 52 4.00 3 89.0% 
3/13/11 77 23 15 29 1.93 5 57.1% 
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3/14/11 62 28 14 21 1.42 3 56.5% 
3/15/11 69 14 11 44 4.00 3 79.7% 
3/16/11 51 17 7 27 3.86 2 66.7% 
3/17/11 23 12 5 6 1.20 1 47.8% 
3/18/11 45 15 3 27 9.00 1 66.7% 
3/19/11 52 10 9 33 3.67 3 80.8% 
3/20/11 107 24 18 65 3.61 6 77.6% 
3/21/11 104 8 15 81 5.40 3 92.3% 
3/22/11 116 15 18 83 4.61 6 87.1% 
3/23/11 74 26 14 34 2.43 5 64.9% 
3/24/11 64 12 14 38 2.71 6 81.3% 
3/25/11 32 17 6 9 1.50 3 46.9% 
3/26/11 163 21 19 123 6.47 5 87.1% 
TOTAL 3,982 810 646 2,522 3.90 196 79.6% 
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APPENDIX E 
DISCUSSION BREAKDOWN: YOUNG TURKS YOUTUBE CHANNEL 
Date # Comments 
# Non-
Threads 
# 
Catalysts 
# 
Responses 
Mean 
Length 
# Threads 
Examined 
% 
Threads 
2/1/11 353 102 34 217 6.40 10 71.1% 
2/2/11 464 262 50 152 3.04 10 43.5% 
2/3/11 157 62 21 69 3.28 7 57.3% 
2/4/11 105 36 16 53 3.31 4 65.7% 
2/5/11 150 85 17 48 2.82 6 43.3% 
2/6/11 106 30 14 62 4.43 3 71.7% 
2/7/11 525 268 40 217 5.43 7 49.0% 
2/9/11 62 47 6 9 1.50 2 24.2% 
2/10/11 60 42 4 14 3.50 1 30.0% 
2/11/11 140 86 39 15 2.60 7 38.6% 
2/12/11 223 123 32 78 2.44 9 49.3% 
2/14/11 88 44 9 35 3.89 4 50.0% 
2/15/11 85 32 13 40 3.08 3 62.4% 
2/16/11 189 70 29 90 3.10 9 63.0% 
2/17/11 131 67 16 38 2.38 6 41.2% 
2/18/11 250 90 38 122 3.21 17 64.0% 
2/19/11 202 137 20 45 2.25 4 32.2% 
2/23/11 137 57 21 59 2.81 10 58.4% 
2/24/11 164 68 25 74 2.96 8 60.4% 
2/25/11 170 83 19 68 3.58 5 51.2% 
2/26/11 287 101 39 147 3.78 8 64.8% 
2/27/11 203 66 31 106 3.42 7 67.5% 
2/28/11 216 112 28 76 2.71 8 48.1% 
3/1/11 315 83 43 189 4.40 5 73.7% 
3/2/11 234 89 29 116 4.00 4 62.0% 
3/3/11 59 29 9 21 2.33 3 50.8% 
3/4/11 196 98 20 79 3.90 6 50.5% 
3/6/11 72 32 7 33 4.71 2 55.6% 
3/7/11 60 34 7 19 2.71 3 43.3% 
3/8/11 334 192 52 90 1.73 19 42.5% 
3/9/11 131 60 14 57 4.07 5 54.2% 
3/10/11 159 74 17 68 4.00 5 53.5% 
3/13/11 500 188 58 254 4.38 13 62.4% 
3/14/11 193 76 27 90 3.33 6 60.6% 
3/15/11 168 113 17 41 2.41 3 34.5% 
3/17/11 162 68 27 27 2.48 10 33.3% 
3/18/11 377 163 47 167 3.55 14 56.8% 
3/19/11 47 20 11 16 1.45 5 57.4% 
3/22/11 419 198 54 167 3.09 14 52.7% 
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3/23/11 240 107 38 95 2.50 8 55.4% 
3/24/11 308 140 47 121 2.57 18 54.5% 
3/25/11 249 120 33 96 2.91 10 51.8% 
3/26/11 159 58 18 83 4.61 5 63.5% 
3/27/11 48 18 9 21 2.33 3 62.5% 
TOTAL 8,897 4,030 1,145 3,684 3.22 316 54.3% 
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APPENDIX F 
CODING INSTRUCTIONS AND SCHEME 
 
Overview & General Instructions 
 
This study is investigating the quality of online user comments posted to online 
discussion forums hosted by one of four political news channels: The Los Angeles Times 
website, the Daily Kos website, The Young Turks YouTube Channel, and the Associated 
Press YouTube Channel.  Data were collected over a two-month period beginning 
February 1, 2011 and concluding on March 31, 2011.  A gross total of 16,859 comments 
were archived over the study period and, based upon a partitioning methodology 
designed by the researcher, a subset of 5,881 comments require encoding.   
 
As a member of the two-person coding team, you will be responsible for encoding 
approximately one-half of this subset.  The researcher is supplying you with printed 
copies of all comments you have been assigned to code.  You are also being given full 
access to the digital archive of news content affiliated with these discussions as your 
assistance is needed in categorizing the collection of articles and segments. 
 
You will receive compensation from the researcher according to the employment contract 
provided to you.  In fulfillment of that agreement, you are required to: 
 
• Utilize the provided coding scheme to the best of your ability and with as 
uniform a level of focus as possible.  Though the data set is large, you are being 
provided with ample time to complete the coding assignment.  As such, be sure 
to code only when you are well rested and can give the requisite attention to the 
project. 
 
• Enter all coding data directly into the online GoogleDrive spreadsheet assigned to 
you.  News source and date information have been preloaded into the spreadsheet 
and correspond to identifying information appearing on the printed sheets.  You 
may open and use the online spreadsheet whenever you wish and as many times 
as you wish.  Contact the researcher if you have any questions about the online 
spreadsheet or if you encounter any problems accessing it. 
 
• Refrain from communicating with the other member of the coding team in any 
way until such time as the researcher has received all coding data.  Should you 
have any questions about the coding scheme or any particular data elements, 
please contact the researcher exclusively. 
 
• Complete all coding by September 1, 2012.  Please contact the researcher 
immediately if, for any reason, you anticipate you will not be able to complete 
the assignment by this deadline. 
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Coding Scheme: Measures of the Quality of Deliberation 
 
Each comment is considered discreet and must be coded separately as its own row within 
the online spreadsheet.  Columns correspond to four measures of deliberative quality 
(civility, politeness, complexity and responsiveness) and are described in detail below. 
 
Civility Measure 
 
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions? 
 
a) The discussant verbalizes a generalized or specific threat to democracy, 
democratic institutions or democratic values.  Democracy is considered to be an 
amalgamation of the broader concepts of liberty, equality, and the rule of law. 
 
Example Yes: “The U.S. Supreme Court should be disbanded and replaced by a 
committee of the NRA.” 
 
Example Yes: “Freedom of speech should be eradicated.” 
 
Example No: “When 2012 rolls around, we need to elect a new president.”  
 
 Example No: “I cannot believe in this day and age, with so many people below  
the poverty line, you can still vote Republican.” 
 
 
b) The discussant verbalizes a threat to individual rights and freedoms.  These 
threats may take the form of statements intending or promising to do physical, 
psychological or emotional harm with the goal of retarding the utilization of such 
rights and freedoms.  Moreover, these threats may be directed specifically at 
another discussant or more generally at a citizen or group of citizens. 
 
Example Yes: “If you’re not gainfully employed, you should have no right to  
vote.” 
 
  Example Yes: “I’m going to rip [username’s] tongue out so he can’t yap any  
more!” 
 
Example No: “Pro-gay advocates need to take to the streets in protest of the 
Defense of Marriage Act.” 
 
Example No: “If you don’t like it, get off our duff and do something about it!” 
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c) The discussant employs one or more antagonistic stereotypes – that is, the 
discussant distinguishes, labels and makes a judgment about a group of 
individuals – that are intended to antagonize, discredit or harm.  These 
antagonistic stereotypes may be directed specifically at another discussant or 
more generally at a citizen or group of citizens. 
 
Example Yes: “Cutting the capital gains tax just means more fancy sports cars 
and private jets for the uber-rich.” 
 
Example Yes: “… [username] is a typical soccer mom who is convinced her kids 
are little angels that do nothing wrong.” 
 
Example No: “Senior citizens are worried about the future of Social Security – 
and they should be!” 
 
Example No: “He’s no different than many new immigrants who will work long 
hours for little pay and then send most of their money back to their 
home country.” 
 
 
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Civility = 0. 
 
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Civility = 1. 
 
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it 
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell, Civility = 99. 
 
 
Politeness Measure 
 
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions? 
 
a) The discussant engages in name-calling that is clearly intend to offend.  These 
name-callings may be directed specifically at another discussant or more 
generally at a citizen or group of citizens. 
 
Example Yes: “Senator King is an obnoxious prick.” 
 
Example Yes: “[Username] is a total fraud and shouldn’t even be allowed  
to post on this discussion board.” 
 
Example No: “Politicians generally do a lousy job in terms of truly 
understanding the needs of their constituents.” 
 
Example No: “[Username] is totally wrong in her analysis.  She’s looking at the 
wrong kinds of data.” 
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b) The discussant engages ad hominem attacks – that is, the discussant attacks 
another’s characteristics or authority without addressing the substance of the 
argument.  These attacks may be directed specifically at another discussant or 
more generally at a citizen or group of citizens. 
 
Example Yes: “I don’t expect you to understand.  After all, you’re poor.” 
 
Example Yes: “[Username] has no business lecturing us about tax policy.” 
 
Example No: “President Bush lied to us.  He said in the campaign he wouldn’t 
raise taxes… and then he did.” 
 
Example No: “I can understand why the rich don’t want a national health care 
program.  It will likely lead to higher taxes and nearly all of them 
have private insurance already.” 
 
 
c) The discussant uses vulgar language appearing in the dictionary at 
www.noswearing.com.   These words may be expressed explicitly or clearly 
implied in the use of abbreviations, grawlixes or other obvious symbols. 
 
Example Yes: “How the f**k are we supposed to do that?” 
 
Example Yes: “Holy @#$%&!  You can’t be serious!” 
 
Example No:  “Our taxes are going up again?!  Jesus H. Christ!” 
 
Example No: “The House of Representatives makes we want to barf.” 
 
 
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Politeness = 0. 
 
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Politeness = 1. 
 
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it 
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell,  
Politeness = 99. 
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Justification Measure 
 
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions? 
 
a) The discussant justifies an argument or perspective by providing supporting 
evidence in the form of cited facts, embedded documents, web links, 
quoted/paraphrased comments from experts, etc. 
 
Example Yes: “Senator Johnson took in $190K of PAC money according 
  to the Center for Government Reporting.”    
 
Example Yes: “How can [username] say that?  Doesn’t he remember what 
  he posted two days ago?: www.youtube.com/acqwr122” 
 
Example No:  “Everyone knows that Republicans favor small government.”  
 
Example No: “President Obama has a war chest of $59 million already!” 
 
 
b) The discussant justifies an argument by providing supporting evidence in the 
form of a description of personal experience or a first-hand account 
 
Example Yes: “When I got laid off from my job my unemployment benefits 
  were only $600 per month.  How can I survive on that?”   
 
Example No: “The average person receiving unemployment benefits gets about 
$600 per month.  That’s not very much at all.” 
 
 
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Justification = 0. 
 
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Justification = 1. 
 
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it 
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell,  
Justification = 99. 
 
 
Complexity Measure 
 
Can you answer yes to one or more of the following questions? 
 
a) The discussant incorporates opposing viewpoints into a given post (irrespective 
of whether he/she agrees with those viewpoints) 
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Example Yes: “Who can tell who’s right?  Conservative say Obamacare will 
bankrupt the country.  Liberals say health care is a right we owe 
our citizens.” 
 
Example No: “I agree with liberals in saying that access to affordable health 
care is a right just the same as free speech or worship.” 
 
 
b) The discussant expresses a viewpoint in more than one way 
 
Example Yes:  “The build-up of the military gets a bad rap.  Not only does it 
  stimulate large sectors of the economy but it also leads to the   
  development of new technologies that improve every-day  
  quality of life.” 
 
Example No: “The build-up of the military gets a bad rap.  It stimulates large 
sectors of the economy.” 
 
 
c) The discussant verbalizes his/her lack of certainty 
 
Example Yes:  “I’ve wrestled for years with the abortion question and I still   
  can’t decide if I’m pro-choice or pro-life.  My values as a  
  citizen are at odds with my values as a Catholic.” 
 
Example No:  “The pro-choice position is the only position that’s consistent  
  with the Bill of Rights.” 
 
 
d) The discussant clearly asks an honest question (and not a rhetorical one) in an 
attempt to better understand an issue 
 
Example Yes:  “How many young people voted in the last election?” 
 
Example No:  “Vote Democrat and expect lower taxes?  How dumb do you  
 think I am? 
 
 
If you can answer yes to any of the above questions, Complexity = 0. 
 
If you cannot answer yes to any of the above questions, Complexity = 1. 
 
If the comment has been removed, flagged as spam, is indecipherable (including if it 
appears in a language other than English), or you simply cannot tell,  
Complexity = 99. 
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Coding Scheme: Categorization of Corresponding Article/Segment 
 
Each comment corresponds to an original printed article or broadcasted audiovisual 
segment.  Two additional columns are included on the online spreadsheet and coders are 
asked to make appropriate categorizations of each corresponding article/segment. 
 
Geographic Focus 
 
Does the segment or article focus the majority of its attention on (1) political issues, 
discussions or considerations within the United States; or (2) political issues, discussions 
or considerations outside of the United States?  
 
If (1), Geographic Focus = Domestic. 
 
If (2), Geographic Focus = International. 
 
If you cannot tell, Geographic Focus = Cannot Tell. 
  
Example Domestic: An article describing the Democratic Party’s 
opposition to the Defense of Marriage Act.  
 
Example International:   A segment describing widespread protests of the 
    G7 summit in Paris.  
 
Topical Focus 
 
Does the segment or article focus the majority of its attention on (1) lawmaking, 
policymaking or public policy; or (2) on elections, balance of power discussions or 
political strategy? 
 
If (1), Topical Focus = Governing. 
 
If (2), Topical Focus = Campaigning. 
 
If you cannot tell, Topical Focus = Cannot Tell. 
  
Example Governing: A segment describing a United Nations debate to 
 dispatch humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees. 
 
Example Campaigning:   A article detailing the current field of Republican  
Presidential candidates and their odds of winning 
the Iowa caucuses.  
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APPENDIX G 
CODING QUICK SHEET 
 
 
Pre-populated by Researcher: 
 
Date of Article:  ___ / ___ / 2011 
 
Source:   ☐ Associated Press YouTube Channel   
    ☐ Young Turks YouTube Channel   
    ☐ Los Angeles Times Website 
    ☐ Daily Kos Website 
 
Channel Constitution:  ☐ Internet-Native 
    ☐ Traditional 
 
Channel Medium:  ☐ Print 
    ☐ Multimedia 
 
Discussion Thread ID: Thread #: ___ Sequence #: ___ 
 
 
To Be Populated by Coding Team Members: 
 
Measures of the Quality of Deliberation 
 
Civility:   ☐ 0  YES (a) threats to democracy; (b) threats to individual  
    ☐ 1 NO rights and freedoms; (c) antagonistic stereotypes 
    ☐ 99 N/A 
 
Politeness:   ☐ 0  YES (a) name-calling; (b) ad hominem attacks;  
    ☐ 1 NO (c) vulgarity 
    ☐ 99 N/A 
  
Justification:   ☐ 0  NO (a) cited facts; (b) cited personal experience 
    ☐ 1 YES  
    ☐ 99 N/A 
 
Complexity:   ☐ 0  NO (a) opposing viewpoints; (b) multiple viewpoints;  
    ☐ 1 YES (c) lack of certainty; (d) honest question 
    ☐ 99 N/A 
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Categorization of Corresponding Article/Segment 
 
Geographic Focus  ☐ Domestic 
   ☐ International 
    ☐ Unable to Determine 
 
Topical Focus   ☐ Governing/Policymaking 
   ☐ Campaigning/Strategizing 
    ☐ Unable to Determine 
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APPENDIX H 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
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